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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction of this Court is conferred by UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2-2(3)0). 
ISSUES FOR REVIEW 
Did the trial court err in granting summary judgment in favor of Admiral 
Insurance Company ("Admiral"), and against Basic Research, LLC, Dynakor Pharmacal, 
LLC, The Carter-Reed Company, LLC, Zoller Laboratories, LLC, Dennis Gay, Daniel B. 
Mowrey and Mitchell K. Friedlander (collectively, "Basic Research") on the following 
grounds: 
1. Did the district court err by ignoring the broad rules of construction for 
insurance policies and, instead, interpreting the covered offense of "use of another's 
advertising idea" narrowly to encompass only claims involving misappropriation or the 
wrongful taking of another's advertising idea? 
2. Did the district court err when it concluded that the conduct of which the 
plaintiffs in the underlying consumer lawsuits complain(ed) with respect to Basic 
Research did not implicate a misappropriation or wrongful taking so that: (a) those 
plaintiffs' claims do not potentially fall within one of the predicate offenses enumerated 
in the Admiral policies, triggering Admiral's duty to defend Basic Research? 
3. Did the district court err when it concluded there must be a causal 
connection between the underlying consumer plaintiffs' injuries and Basic Research's 
advertising activities when the definition of "advertising injury" only requires "injury 
arising out of.. . use of another's advertising idea in your 'advertisement,'" so that 
misuse of another's advertising idea, as alleged here, potentially falls within the policy's 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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coverage? 
4. Did the district court err when it concluded that the policy term "of 
another" could not be implicated where the conceded "advertising ideas" - "eat all you 
want and still lose weight" - was on the FTC's "Red Flag" list and was trademarked by 
other entities before Basic Research "used" this advertising idea? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. NATURE OF THE CASE AND COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This is a coverage dispute about an Admiral policy provision insuring against 
third-party claims for "personal and advertising injury." In 2007-2009, consumers sued 
Basic Research in three separate class action lawsuits in Utah and California, alleging 
that Basic Research had falsely advertised and otherwise violated various consumer fraud 
statutes with respect to a diet product, Akavar 20/50." Basic Research tendered the 
claims to Admiral, seeking coverage under the "personal and advertising injury" 
provisions of two commercial general liability policies issued by Admiral to Basic 
Research for the relevant time period. Admiral initially agreed to defend Basic Research 
in one of those actions, but not in the other two. But Admiral ultimately failed to defend 
Basic Research in all three of them, leaving Basic Research to pay more than $4 million 
dollars in reasonable and necessary defense fees and expenses. 
Basic Research initially sued Admiral for declaratory relief in the United States 
District Court, District of Utah. After filing summary judgment cross-motions, by 
agreement of the parties Basic Research dismissed the federal action and on January 14, 
2011 re-filed it in the Utah District Court, Third Judicial District for Salt Lake County. 
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The parties them re-filed their summary judgment cross-motions with the state district 
court. 
Basic Research contended there was a potential for coverage because the 
underlying Akavar lawsuits' consumer claimants alleged facts implicating Admiral's 
"personal and advertising injury" policy offense of "injury arising out of. . . use of 
another's advertising idea in [Basic Research's] advertisement" that had damaged the 
claimants. Thus, Admiral owed a duty of defense. Admiral contended that the underlying 
claims did not trigger a defense and that, even if it did, certain policy exclusions relieved 
Admiral of the defense duty. 
Oral argument was held on March 24, 2011 before the Honorable L.A. Devers. 
On May 24, 2011, the district court denied Basic Research's motion for summary 
judgment and granted Admiral's motion. The court narrowly interpreted the policy 
offense — "use of another's advertising idea in your advertisement" - as if it were 
limited to the meaning of an earlier "misappropriation of advertising ideas" policy 
offense. Opinion, p. 14. Based on that understanding the district court held that the 
underlying plaintiffs had not alleged a "misappropriation" claim, so that Admiral had no 
duty to defend Basic Research. Opinion, pp. 14-15. Basic Research timely appealed the 
district court's ruling by filing a notice of appeal on June 21, 2011. 
II. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A. Admiral's Insurance Policies 
1. Two Consecutive Policy Periods Are Implicated 
Admiral issued to Basic Research, LLC, as named insured, identical Commercial 
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General Liability insurance policies with successive terms from August 20, 2007 through 
August 20, 2008, then August 20, 2008 through August 20, 2009. [3rd District Court 
Record ("R") 29-30, 88-89] They provided continuous coverage with "general aggregate" 
and "personal and advertising injury" limits of $5,000,000 each. Id. 
2. Appellants Are All Insureds 
The policies provide coverage for Basic Research. [R 29, 88] A named insured 
endorsement to each policy includes Covarix, LLC and its subsidiaries as named insureds 
under the policies. [R 29-30, 54, 88-89, 124] Dynakor, Carter-Reed and Zoller Labs are 
all subsidiaries of Covarix, LLC. [R 670] Covarix, LLC does business as Basic 
Research, LLC. [R 29, 88] The policies also cover "any other person or organization 
qualifying as a Named Insured under this policy." [R 33, 92] Such insured "persons or 
organizations" include: (1) "members" of limited liability companies like Basic Research, 
but only with respect to the conduct of your business;" (2) "managers" of any "insured 
"with respect to their duties as managers;" and (3) "employees" of "insureds for "acts 
within the scope of their employment by you or while performing duties related to the 
conduct of your business." [R 40-41, 100-101] "Employee" is policy-defined to include 
"leased worker" (defined in turn as a "person leased to [an insured] by a labor leasing 
firm . . . to perform duties related to the conduct of your business." [R 45, 46, 105, 106] 
Under Admiral's policies, each Appellant is an "insured:" Gay as a Basic 
Research "manager," Mowrey and Friedlander as "leased workers" from non-party 
Bydex Management, LLC to Basic Research; and Dynakor, Carter-Reed and Zoller as 
Covarix, LLC subsidiaries. [R 669-670] The underlying lawsuits alleged that their 
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alleged conduct occurred within the individuals' managerial duties and employment and, 
as to all of them, within the scope of business. [R 630-31] Admiral has never disputed 
these appellants' status as insureds. 
3. Policies' Relevant Coverage 
The policies' "Insuring Agreement" requires Admiral to: "pay those sums that the 
insured becomes legally obligated to pay as "damages because of 'personal and 
advertising injury'" to which this insurance applies," and provides that Admiral has the 
"right and duty to defend the insured against any 'suit' seeking those damages." [R 37, 
97] "Personal and advertising injury" is defined to include: "injury . . . arising out of one 
or more of the following offenses:... f. The use of another's advertising idea in your 
'advertisement.'" "Advertisement" is defined: 
1. "Advertisement" means a notice that is broadcast or 
published to the general public or specific market 
segments about your goods, products or services for 
the purpose of attracting customers or supporters. For 
the purposes of this definition: 
a. Notices that are published include material 
placed on the Internet or on similar electronic 
means of communications;. . . [R45, 105] 
4. Policies' Relevant Exclusions 
Admiral's policies exclude coverage for: 
a. Knowing Violation of Rights of Another 
"Personal and advertising injury" caused by or 
at the direction of the insured with the 
knowledge that the act would violate the rights 
of another and would inflict "personal and 
advertising injury". 
b. Material Published With Knowledge of Falsity 
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"Personal and advertising injury" arising out of 
oral or written publication of material, if done 
by or at the direction of the insured with 
knowledge of its falsity. 
g. Quality Or Performance of Goods — Failure to 
Conform to Statements 
"Personal and advertising injury" arising out of 
the failure of goods, products or services to 
conform with any statement of quality or 
performance made in your "advertisement". [R 
37-38, 97-98] 
B. The Underlying Lawsuits 
1. The Miller Suit 
On November 9, 2007, Pamela Miller, Randy Howard and Donna Patterson filed a 
putative class action complaint against Basic Research, Dynakor, Gay, Mowrey and 
Friedlander, among others, in a lawsuit styled as Pamela Miller, et al v. Basic Research, 
LLC et al, United States District Court, District of Utah, Central Division, Case No. 
2:07-CV-00871 ("the Miller suit"). On May 23, 2008, the Miller suit plaintiffs filed a 
First Amended Complaint, alleging that the insureds ("Basic Research") violated Utah 
state law by making misleading claims in its advertisements of Akavar 20/50, a diet 
supplement ("Akavar") "through the U.S. mail, published in national magazines, posted 
on the Internet, displayed in retail stores across the county ("point-of-purchase"), and 
broadcast on television...." [R 822] 
i 
The Miller suit alleged that Basic Research made these claims to promote Akavar 
as a product that enabled weight loss without diet or exercise, and that others (noted by 
the FTC) have made similar claims for other allegedly "prototypical fraudulent weight-
loss produces]." [R 815] The Akavar advertisements were repeatedly alleged to include: 
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"Eat All You Want And Still Lose Weight" and "And We Couldn't Say It in Print If It 
Wasn't True." [R 804, 808, 826] 
The Miller plaintiffs also alleged they purchased Akavar "based on this 
advertising" and "these representations." 
Based upon this advertising disseminated by Defendants, Ms. 
Miller purchased a supply of Akavar through Defendants' 
Internet website, www.AMvar.net. [R 803-804] 
Based upon these representations made as part of Defendants' 
in-store advertising materials, Plaintiff Howard purchased 
two bottles of Akavar at the Wal-Mart store ... [R 804] 
Based upon this advertising by Defendants, Ms. Patterson 
purchased a supply of Akavar from a General Nutrition 
Center store located in Arlington, Virginia ... [R 805] 
The Miller plaintiffs also alleged they "purchased Akavar and have suffered injury 
as a result." [R 828] They did not allege that they "suffered injury" because the product 
did not work as advertised. 
2. The Tompkins Suit 
On December 6, 2007, Mary Tompkins filed a putative class action complaint 
against Basic Research, Dynakor, Gay, Mowrey and Friedlander and among others styled 
as Mary Tompkins et al v. Basic Research, LLC et aL, Superior Court of California for 
the County of Sacramento, Case No. 34-2007-00882581 ("the Tompkins suit"), later 
removed to the United States District Court, Eastern District of California and then 
transferred to the United States District Court, District of Utah, Central Division, where it 
was consolidated with the Miller suit. [R 670] The Miller and Tompkins suits are being 
litigated under the Miller suit case name and number ("Miller/Tompkins suits"). [R 670] 
The Tompkins suit alleges that Basic Research made misleading weight loss 
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claims in its advertisements as alleged in the Miller suit to promote sales of Akavar, 
including the use of the slogans "Eat All You Want And Still Lose Weight" and "And 
We Couldn't Say It in Print If It Wasn't True," that these misleading claims were made 
to promote Akavar as a product that enables one to lose weight without diet or exercise, 
and that such claims are a widespread problem as others have made similar claims to 
advertise weight loss products. [R 909-10, 911, 914-16, 924-25] 
The Tompkins plaintiffs alleged they purchased Akavar based on the misleading 
claims made by Basic Research: 
Based on Defendants' advertising, Ms. Tompkins purchased a 
supply of Akavar through a California retailer. [R 911] 
The Tompkins plaintiffs further allege that they "purchased Akavar and ha[ve] 
suffered injury as a result," [R 919], and that they "suffered, and will continue to suffer, 
harm and damages as a result of defendants1 unlawful and wrongful conduct." [R 921] 
They did not allege that they "suffered injury" because the product did not work as 
advertised. 
The Miller and Tompkins cases were subsequently consolidated in the federal 
District of Utah. [R 670] By order entered March 2, 2011,1 the Miller/Tompkins district 
court certified the following nationwide class: "Persons who purchased Akavar after 
seeing or hearing the marketing slogan "Eat all you want and still lose weight" during the 
relevant damages period." The class is not restricted to persons who contended they lost 
money because Akavar did not work as advertised. Only purchase of the product after 
i 
1
 Miller v. Basic Research LLC, No. 2:07-CV-871 TS, 2011 WL 818150, at *2 (D. 
Utah March 2, 2011). 
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exposure to the advertising is required. 
3. The Forlenza Suit 
On May 26, 2009, Nicole Forlenza and Shaiden Monroe filed a putative class 
action complaint against Basic Research, Dynakor, Carter-Reed, Gay, Mowrey and 
Friedlander, among others, in a lawsuit styled: Nicole Forlenza and Shaiden Monroe et 
al v. Dynakor Pharmacol, LLC et al.9 United States District Court, Central District of 
California, Case No. 2:09-CV-03730 ("the Forlenza suit"). [R 671] On June 11, 
2009, the Forlenza suit plaintiffs filed a First Amended Complaint, adding Zoller 
Laboratories, LLC as a defendant. [R671] Subsequent second, third and fourth 
amended complaints were filed. [R 671] The suit was eventually dismissed without a 
settlement. [R671] 
The Forlenza suit alleged Basic Research used the same advertising tagline — 
"Eat all you want and still lose weight. We couldn't say it in print if it wasn't true" - and 
that Akavar enables one to lose weight without diet or exercise. [R 932, 1010-1013] The 
Forlenza suit also alleged that others have made similar claims to advertise weight loss 
products or "miracle pills," as the FDA confirmed, and that "Akavar is just one of those 
'miracle pills' . . . . Defendants attempt to sell Akavar by convincing consumers that they 
can avoid the only proven and safe weight-loss method recognized by the FDA." [R 936] 
The Forlenza claimants further allege that they purchased Akavar because they 
By Request for Judicial Notice, Basic Research called this Order to the district 
court's attention five days after oral argument on March 28, 2011. [R 1466-77] The 
district court neither ruled on the Request nor referred to the Miller/Tompkins class 
certification order in its Opinion. 
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believed and relied on the representations: 
Plaintiffs.. .purchased Akavar products for their own personal 
use. In so doing, Plaintiffs...believed and relied specifically 
on the representations contained in the marketing materials 
for the products, which they had viewed on television, on the 
Internet, and in the premises of the Retailer Defendants where 
they purchased the product... [R 1026-27, 1032-33, 1035-36] 
The Forlenza claimants further allege that they sustained injury because they 
purchased the product in reliance on the representations, and that they sustained injury for 
reasons that included the advertisements' untruth: 
Plaintiff Forlenza has thus suffered injury and damage 
because she purchased a product based on false advertising 
and because the product has not worked as advertised. [R 
1014-15]... 
C. Additional Facts about Advertising Ideas in Akavar Advertisements 
Before the suits, the slogans "Eat All You Want And Still Lose Weight" and "And 
We Couldn't Say It in Print If It Wasn't True" were registered trademarks of Western 
Holdings, LLC, a separate and distinct corporate entity from Basic Research which is not 
a party to this coverage suit. [R 1207-12] 
Persons and entities other than Basic Research used an almost identical slogan to 
advertise weight loss products long before the facts pled in the Miller, Tompkins and 
Forlenza suits are alleged to have commenced. For example, in 2004, the Federal Trade 
Commission filed an action against Natural Products, LLC, All Natural 4 U, LLC, and 
Ana M. Solkamans for using the slogan "Eat All You Want and Still Lose Weight (Pill 
Does All the Work)" to advertise Bio Trim™, a weight loss product. FTC v. Natural 
Products, LLC et al (CD. Cal. Case No. SACV 04-1279), Complaint for Permanent 
i 
Injunction and Other Equitable Relief (filed 11/3/2004), p. 5,112(d). [R 1208, 1222] 
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The FTC also referred to this slogan in a press release on the above lawsuit. See FTC 
Stops Bogus Ads for "Bio Trim" and Other Weight-Loss Products (FTC Press Release 
November 7, 2005), [^2. [R 1208, 1235-36] The FTC further identified this slogan as a 
"Red Flag Claim" on its Red Flag | Bogus Weight Loss Claims Internet microsite. [R 
1208, 1238] Extrinsic evidence of these facts was before the district court below. [R 
1207-1212] 
D. Admiral's Acceptance, then Dishonor of its Defense Duties 
1. Miller/Tompkins suit defense duties denied 
Basic Research gave written notice of the Miller/Tompkins suit to Admiral as early 
as January 31, 2008. [R 671, 1094] Admiral denied a defense for the Miller/Tompkins 
suit on June 6, 2008. [R 671, 1098] 
2. Forlenza suit defense duties accepted, then dishonored 
Basic Research gave written notice of the Forlenza suit to Admiral on or about 
June 4, 2009 and, on or about July 15, 2009, supplemental written notice of the Forlenza 
suit to Admiral including a copy of its First Amended Complaint. [R 671, 672, 1144] By 
letters dated June 25, 2009 and July 6, 2009, Admiral acknowledged receipt and agreed 
to defend Basic Research in the Forlenza suit subject to a reservation of rights under the 
second Admiral policy. [R 671-72, 1127, 1135] 
On November 19, 2009, Basic Research e-mailed Admiral to express concern over 
Admiral's ongoing failure to actually defend it or to communicate with Basic Research. 
[R 1191, 1195] Admiral apologized, stating invoices for the incurred defense costs were 
being reviewed by counsel. [R 1191, 1196] On December 8, 2009, Basic Research again 
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e-mailed Admiral to request that it pay defense expenses. [R 1191, 1199] Admiral 
confirmed that it had accepted the defense under a reservation of rights and was still 
having the invoices reviewed by counsel. [R 1191, 1200] 
By letter dated January 11, 2010, Admiral suddenly advised Basic Research that it 
had appointed "an associated counsel" for Basic Research who would also serve as 
"panel counsel" for Admiral. [R 1191, 1203] However, the appointed counsel never 
participated in the Forlenza suit defense. [R 1192] 
On April 7, 2010, Admiral filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings in the 
coverage action, arguing for the first time that it had no duty to defend the Forlenza suit. 
[R 640] Admiral never previously asserted that the Forlenza suit allegations do not 
establish a potential for coverage under the second Admiral policy. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Admiral owes a duty to defend Basic Research in the underlying consumer 
lawsuits. Admiral's policies provide coverage for "personal and advertising injury" 
implicated by claims for "damages because of ['injury arising out o f ] . . . use of another's 
advertising idea in [Basic Research] 'advertisement.'" An "advertisement" includes 
"notice published . . . to specific market segments about your goods, products or services 
for the purpose of attracting customers or supporters." 
Contrary to the district court conclusion in its May 24, 2011 Ruling, while "use" 
may include "misappropriation" or "wrongful taking" it is not limited to those 
definitions. Utah courts have deemed "use" to have a much broader meaning. As rules 
of insurance policy construction in coverage disputes require courts to construe policy 
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terms liberally and in favor of the insured, it was error for the district court to adopt a 
narrow interpretation of the term "use" that includes only "misappropriation/wrongful 
taking." No policy exclusion relieves Admiral from its duty to defend Basic Research. 
Basic Research respectfully requests this Court to reverse the district court's 
decision that Admiral has no duty to defend Basic Research in the Miller, Tompkins and 
Forlenza lawsuits, and to hold that Admiral must reimburse Basic Research for its 
defense fees and expenses to date with prejudgment interest thereon from the date of each 
invoice, and must pay the defense fees and costs going forward until each of those 
underlying consumer lawsuits has been fully and finally resolved. 
ARGUMENT 
I. APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARDS 
Basic Research moved for summary judgment declaring that Admiral, under the 
terms of the insurance policies it issued to Basic Research, owes a duty to defend Basic 
Research in the underlying consumer lawsuits. Without regard or deference to the district 
court's prior ruling, this Court reviews Basic Research's and Admiral's cross-motions de 
novo. Peterson v. The Sunrider Corp., 2002 UT 43, f^ 13, 48 P.3d 918; see also Swan 
Creek Vill Homeowners Ass 'n v. Warm, 2006 UT 22, f 16, 134 P.3d 1122. Utah law 
applies.3 
Summary judgment is appropriate when no genuine issues of material fact exist, 
and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. {Peterson, Swan 
The district court so concluded on the ground that pursuant to the forum selection 
clause contained within the Admiral policies, Admiral agreed to the jurisdiction of Utah 
courts and to the application of Utah law. Opinion, pp. 2-3. 
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Creek). As an insurer's duty to defend is a question of law, summary judgment is the 
proper means by which to resolve this issue. Ohio Cas. Inc. Co. v. Cloud Nine, LLC, 464 
F. Supp. 2d 1161,1165 (D. Utah 2006) (citing Utah law). 
A duty to defend exists when facts give rise to a potential of liability under the 
insurance policy. DeseretFed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 714 P.2d 
1143, 1146 (Utah 1986).4 If the facts render coverage uncertain, the insurer has a duty to 
defend until those uncertainties have been clarified to reveal conclusively that there is no 
coverage. Benjamin v. Arnica Mut. Ins. Co., 2006 UT 37, f 22, 140 P.3d 1210 (Utah 
2007) (so noting); Equine Assisted Growth and Learning Ass 'n (UEAGALA ") v. Carolina 
Cas. Ins. Co., 2011 UT 49, f 8, P.3d , 2011 WL 3652331, at *2 (Aug. 19, 2011) 
(same, citing Benjamin). Where there is any doubt, the default conclusion is that the 
insurer must defend. Id. ("When in doubt, defend.") (quoting Appleman on Insurance 
Law and Practice § 136.2[C] (2d ed. 2006)); see also Cloud Nine, 464 F. Supp. 2d at 
1166 (same). 
"An insurer denying a duty to defend must establish that the claims fall outside the 
coverage of the policy or the claims are exempted from coverage." Simmons v. Farmers 
Ins. Group, 877 P.2d 1255, 1258, n.3 (Utah App. 1994). Policy provisions purporting to 
limit or exclude coverage are "strictly construed" against the insurer. U.S. Fid. & Guar. 
4See also, Harris v. Zurich-Holding Co. of Am., No. 2:05-CV-482 TC, 2006 WL 
120258, at *2 (D. Utah Jan. 17, 2006) (unpublished), citing and quoting Montrose Chem. 
Corp. v. Superior Court, 6 Cal. 4th 287, 861 P.2d 1153, 1161 (Cal. 1992) ("[I]t is the 
insurer's burden to establish that the suits filed against [the insured] fall outside of the 
policy's coverage . . . . '[T]he insured need only show that the underlying claim may 
fall within policy coverage; the insurer must prove it cannot' " (emphasis added)). 
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Co. v. Sandt, 854 P.2d 519, 523 (Utah 1993). 
To determine Admiral's defense duty the Court begins "by comparing the 
language of the insurance policy with the allegations in the complaint." Fire Ins. Exch. v. 
Estate ofTherkelsen, 2001 UT 48, f 21, 27 P.3d 555. But the coverage analysis does not 
end there. As held in EAGALA, supra, 2011 UT 49, [^18 (following Therkelsen, supra) 
(emphasis added): 
If the language found within the collective 'eight comers' 
of these documents clearly and unambiguously indicates 
that a duty to defend does or does not exist, the analysis is 
complete. However, if coverage is premised on information 
not contained the complaint, [this Court] must continue [its] 
inquiry to examine that information. 
Thus, the Court's review of the complaint and the policy "does not end [the 
Court's] inquiry." Therkelsen, 2001 UT 48, f 21 ("While the analysis always begins with 
an examination of the policy language and the complaint, it ends there only if the policy 
terms when compared with the allegations definitively indicate that there is or is not a 
duty to defend." EAGALA, 2011 UT 49, *[jl 1 (emphasis added)). Extrinsic evidence may 
be necessary to make a final determination as to whether a duty to defend exists. 
Therkelsen, 2001 UT 48,125; EAGALA, 2011 UT 49, ^ 19 (because the complaint did 
not allege facts clarifying whether the underlying claim triggered a policy exclusion, "the 
court's examination must go on to develop the facts relevant to answer the inquiry" — 
i.e., "extrinsic evidence may be considered to make this determination"). See also, DISH 
Network Corp. v. Arch Specialty Ins. Co., F.3d , 2011 WL 4908108, at *4 (10th 
Cir. (Colo.) 2011) (recognizing exception to Colorado's "eight comers" rule (like Utah's) 
to allow judicial consideration of an "indisputable fact that is not an element of either the 
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[underlying] cause of action or a defense in the underlying litigation" as well as the 
policy and underlying complaint because "notice pleading does not contemplate detail 
and specificity" and the underlying complaint may " 'lack detail necessary to 
conclusively establish the duty.' ") Id. 
II. ADMIRAL'S COVERAGE IS OFFENSE-BASED AND MUST BE 
ANALYZED ACCORDINGLY 
A. A Three-Part Test Applies To Evaluate Potential Coverage under 
Admiral's Policy Language 
Admiral promised to defend Basic Research "against any 'suit' 
seeking ... damages" "because of 'personal and advertising injury' to which this 
insurance applies/' including "injury ... arising out of [the offense of] 'use of another's 
advertising idea in your "advertisement."'" [R47, 107] The elements required to 
establish potential coverage under Admiral's policy are: 
(1) "Damages because of 'personal and advertising injury' to which this insurance 
applies." 
(2) "Injury . . . arising out of. . . an offense . . . ;" and 
(3) "Use of another's advertising idea in your 'advertisement/" with 
"advertisement" policy-defined as a "notice . . . published to . . . specific market 
segments about your goods . . . for the purpose of attracting customers or supporters." 
The "use of another's advertising idea in your 'advertisement'" offense has three 
principal elements: (1) "advertising idea" . . . "use;" (2) "of another's," and (3) in your 
"advertisement." Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. v. Alters Medical, Inc., No. 03-1037-CV-W-ODS, 
2005 WL 2319820, at *4 (W.D. Mo. Sept. 22, 2005). 
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B. Facts Pled in the Underlying Complaints, Not the Labels of their 
Causes of Action, Determine Potential Coverage 
Contrary to the district court's analysis (Order, p. 29), the underlying actions need 
not "specify a cause of action covered by a particular policy." Not all elements of torts 
falling within the ambit of an enumerated policy offense need be found within the 
underlying complaint. Only potential coverage need be demonstrated. Sharon Steel 
Corp. v.Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 931 P.2d 127, 135 (Utah 1997). 
Other jurisdictions agree, including a seminal Missouri Supreme Court opinion. 
McCormackBaron Mgmt. Servs., Inc. v. American Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., 989 S.W.2d 
168, 171 (Mo. 1999) ("The word 'offense' cannot be read to limit coverage only to a 
particular 'cause of action' or 'claim.' The word 'offense' simply does not have this 
meaning in either common usage or legal usage."). 
Other courts have recognized this proposition when addressing "personal injury" 
coverage for defamation or disparagement, as well as when discussing the general 
character of offense-based coverage. Bankwest v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. ofMd., 63 F.3d 
974, 981 (10th Cir. (Kan.) 1995) (dissemination of "other defamatory or disparaging 
material" evidences potential for defamation as well as disparagement based on 
inferences that claimants were not to be trusted to consummate real estate deals based on 
estoppel letters sent to their bank which harmed a legal interest that had "pecuniary 
value."). 
The elements of "personal injury" and "advertising injury" are distinct from those 
for "bodily injury" or "property damage." Judge Croskey explained in Atlantic Mut. Ins. 
1 1 
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Co. v. J. Lamb, Inc., 100 Cal. App. 4th 1017, 1032, 1034 (2002) that construing an 
insurance policy focusing on the injury or damages, which need only arise out of the 
offense, is an erroneous approach. 
Under the personal injury policy provision, "[cjoverage ... is 
triggered by the offense, not the injury or damage which a 
plaintiff suffers." . . . The triggering event is the insured's 
wrongful act, not the resulting injury to the third party 
claimant . . . The scope of the duty does not depend on the 
labels given to the causes of action in the third party 
complaint; instead it rests on whether the alleged facts or 
known extrinsic facts reveal a possibility; that the claim may 
be covered by the policy, (original italics ; bold emphasis 
added)). 
III. ADMIRAL MISSTATES THE ELEMENTS OF PROOF FOR POTENTIAL 
COVERAGE UNDER ITS APPLICABLE "ADVERTISING INJURY" 
POLICY COVERAGE LANGUAGE 
A. The "Injury Arising Out O f the Offense Is Alleged 
"Personal and advertising injury" means "injury . . . arising out of [an] offense," 
with "arising out o f meaning "originating from," "growing out of," "flowing from," 
"incident to" or "connected with." Durbano v. American Empire Ins., No. 91-4115, 91-
4142, 1992 WL 112246, at *2 (10th Cir. (Utah) 1992) (unpublished) citing Nafl Farmers 
Union Prop. & Cas. Co. v. W. Cas. & Sur. Co., 577 P.2d 961, 963 (Utah 1978): 
The term "arising out o f has a broad meaning under Utah 
law. . . . The phrase is 'commonly understood to mean 
originating from, growing out of, or flowing from, and 
requires only that there be some causal relationship between 
the injury and the risk for which coverage is provided.' " 
Admiral's policy requires no causal connection between the injury and the 
insured's advertising activity. Novell, Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 141 F.3d 983, 986 (10th Cir. 
1998) (on which Admiral has relied) analyzed different coverage language for 
"advertising injury caused by an offense committed in the course of advertising [the 
1 O 
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insureds] goods, products or services/' without articulating the distinct "causal 
connection between injury and advertising activity" language in Admiral's policy. 
Potential coverage in Novell required only that the "advertising injury" offense be 
"committed in advertising your goods, products or services." That nexus was held to be 
satisfied where an "advertising idea" is allegedly used "in your 'advertisement.'" Id. 
Neither "advertising activity" nor the undefined term "advertisement" itself was an 
element of the Novell offense. 
Admiral's policy's required causal nexus is set forth by the words "in your 
'advertisement.'" The required connection is not between an "advertising activity" and an 
"injury," but between an "advertisement" and the "use of another's 'advertising idea'" 
offense. The claimant's "injury" need only "arise out o f an enumerated offense to satisfy 
this "injury"/"advertising injury" nexus. Only advertising that "materially contrasts to 
the offense" is required.5 
Admiral has admitted that the underlying complaints allege misleading 
advertising. Admiral "does not dispute the fact that the Forlenza plaintiffs alleged that 
Basic Research made misleading claims in its advertisements . . . " [R 1258] "Admiral 
does not dispute that the Miller complaint alleges that Basic Research made . . . 
misleading claims in its advertisements of [Akavar]." [R 1249] Admiral "does not 
dispute that... others have made similar claims to advertise weight loss 
5Central Mutual Ins. Co. v. StunFence, Inc., 292 F. Supp. 2d 1072, 1079 (N.D. 111. 
2003) ("Under a straightforward reading of the revised Primary Policy language, Central 
had a duty to defend StunFence if Gallagher claimed (as it did) that it suffered an injury 
that arose out of StunFence's use of its 'advertising idea.'"). 
1 C\ 
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products." [R 1256] 
The underlying complaints allege the class members were injured or harmed by 
Basic Research's use of advertising phrases because consumers could be misled into 
buying Akavar. [R 828, 919, 921, 1014-15] They do not allege injury from the class 
members' failure to lose weight, but from their purchase of the product caused by the 
advertising. 
The Miller/Tompkins Class Certification Order, 2011 WL 818150, at *2 [R 1466-
77] indisputably confirms that the underlying claims are not premised on damages caused 
by Akavar's failure to perform as advertised instead of injury caused by Basic 
Research's advertising of the product. The certified class simply consists of: 
Persons who purchased Akavar after seeing or hearing the 
marketing slogan "Eat all you want and still lose weight" 
during the relevant damages period. 
This Order is fully consistent with the allegations of the Miller and Tompkins 
complaints, in which the class members alleged injuries (parting with money) arising out 
of their purchases of Akavar after seeing or hearing Basic Research's advertisements 
containing the accused "advertising ideas" - without regard to whether Akavar 
worked as advertised or whether they actually lost weight or even tried the product 
after buying it. Contrary to the arguments Admiral raised to the district court and to that 
court's erroneous ruling, the requisite nexus alleged and now established is between 
"injury" and the covered "offense" of "use of another's advertising idea in your 
'advertisement.'" 
Any Admiral contention that some specific connection between the advertisement 
on 
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and the advertising injury offense is required for potential coverage and a defense is error 
and should not be followed. Hudson Ins. Co. v. Colony Ins. Co., 624 F.3d 1264, 1269 
(9th Cir. (Cal.) 2010), evaluating a policy offense (infringement of slogan) that is not a 
tort, found a duty to defend a suit where the claimant NFL alleged the insured's sale of 
counterfeit football jerseys bearing the phrase "Steel Curtain" on their back: 
[I]t does not matter that the complaint never referred to "steel 
curtain' as a slogan and never listed slogan infringement as a 
cause of action. . . . The technical label on a cause of action 
does not dictate the duty to defend whether the claimed cause 
of action was omitted out of negligence or "for strategic 
adversarial reasons." 
As long as the underlying plaintiffs' injury is alleged to arise out of or is 
connected with advertisements that use advertising ideas of another, the covered offense 
("use of another's advertising idea in your 'advertisement' ") is complete. 
B. Requirement of "Damages Because of 'Advertising Injury' " Is 
Satisfied 
Admiral promised "to pay those sums that the insured becomes legally obligated 
to pay as "damages because of 'personal and advertising injury' . . . " [R 37, 97] The 
alleged wrongful act for which underlying damages are sought is misleading advertising. 
The damages thereby sought in each underlying complaint are because of an alleged 
"advertising injury." 
Correctly understood, the "injury" (i.e., the conduct alleged) must "arise out o f 
(i.e., have some connection with) the "use of another's advertising idea in your 
'advertisement,'" offense. This policy is offense-based, not injury- or damage-based.6 
6Butler v. Clarendon Am. Ins. Co., 494 F. Supp. 2d 1112, 1132, 1132 n.10 (N.D. Cal. 
2007) ("In commenting on this second type of insuring provision, California courts have 
01 
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Admiral's policy requires no causal connection between the operative offense 
("use of another's advertising idea in your 'advertisement'") and damages. It merely 
requires that a damage remedy exists for such claims triggering the offense.7 
Here, the "damages because o f element is met. The Miller First Amended 
Complaint, at [^181 alleges: "As a result of defendant's careless, unreasonable and 
negligent representations and omissions, as described herein, Plaintiffs and members of 
the class have been injured and have suffered loss of money and property, and they are 
entitled to recover damages from the Defendants." [R 851] The Tompkins Class Action 
Complaint, at [^49 alleges, "Plaintiffs and class members have all suffered . . . harm and 
damages, as a result of Defendant's unlawful and wrongful conduct. . . ." [R 923] The 
Forlenza Second Amended Class Action Complaint, at | 5 of its Prayer for Relief, 
alleges, "Plaintiffs and members of the class request that the Court enter an order or 
judgment against the Defendants as follows: . . . for compensatory and general damages 
according to proof. . . ." [R 1038] 
Damages need not be expressly articulated under any specifically-labeled claim. 
J. Lamb, Inc., 100 Cal. App. 4th at 1032 ("Coverage for [advertising injury] is not 
determined by the nature of the damages sought in the action against the insured, but by 
stated that '[i]n the world of liability insurance, personal injury coverage applies to injury 
which arises out of the commission of certain enumerated acts or offenses ... Coverage ... 
is triggered by the offense, not the injury or damage which a plaintiff suffers . . . .' The 
same provision also generally covers 'advertising injury liability.'"). 
7Banfc of the West v. Superior Court, 833 P.2d 545, 551-53 (Cal. 1992) 
(indemnification for monies paid in settlement precluded where suit sought no money 
damages within policy's meaning but only the insured's disgorgement "of ill-gotten 
gains."). 
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the nature of the claims made against the insured in that action The triggering event 
[under "advertising injury" offense-based coverage] is the insured's wrongful act, not the 
resulting injury to the third party claimant"); Syvertsen v. Great American Ins. Co., 700 
N.Y.S.2d 289, 291-92 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999).8 
"Damages because of'advertising injury'" is satisfied since all requirements are 
met by the underlying complaints' fact allegations: the nature of the offense elements, 
that injury arising out of that offense, and that damages result from such injury arising out 
of that offense. 
IV. THE MILLER, TOMPKINS AND FORLENZA CONSUMER CLAIMS 
TRIGGER ADMIRAL'S DUTY TO DEFEND UNDER THE "USE OF 
ANOTHER'S ADVERTISING IDEA IN YOUR ADVERTISEMENT" 
DEFINITION OF "PERSONAL AND ADVERTISING INJURY" 
A. "Advertising Idea Use," Which Replaced "Misappropriation of 
Advertising Ideas," is Factually Implicated Here 
1. The District Court Narrowly Construed "Advertising Idea Use" 
as if Limited to the Misappropriation or Wrongful Taking of 
Another's Advertising Idea, Thereby Misstating Applicable Law 
The district court supported its erroneous and limited interpretation of "use of 
another's advertising idea" to mean the "wrongful taking of another's advertising idea" 
by repeatedly citing and heavily relying on DISH Network Corp. v. Arch Specialty Ins. 
Co., 734 F.Supp.2d 1173 (D. Colo. 2010) [Opinion, pp. 14-17] which the Tenth Circuit 
recently reversed in a published opinion authored by Chief Judge Briscoe. DISH, 2011 
WL 4908108, at * 10. The "misappropriation of advertising ideas" policy offense was 
held to be implicated, requiring a defense: 
s
 StunFence, Inc., 292 F. Supp. 2d at 1079 ("[Analyzing the same policy language], 
Central had a duty to defend StunFence if Gallagher claimed (as it did) that it suffered an 
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[IJnsurers concede that some of [the underlying claims for 
infringement of automated wireless telecommunications 
services and related financial services and call processing] 
explicitly claim the technology's capacity for advertising 
[and] 'the patented technology could theoretically be used for 
advertising purposes." . . . The functions patented by 
[claimant] conceivably allow Dish not only to sell the product 
a consumer calls up to purchase, but also to make up-sell 
offers[fn] tailored to the specific caller. When the 
technology's patented advertising capabilities are considered 
in conjunction with the vague factual assertions made in the 
complaint, the allegations are sufficiently broad to encompass 
"distribution of promotional materials," [or to fall within any 
variant definition of'advertising ideas.'] (footnote omitted)). 
Flatly rejecting the district court's reasoning that "DISH cannot have 
misappropriated advertising ideas because it did not incorporate patented technologies as 
a substantive element of its communications and interactions with customers...." the 
Tenth Circuit found it sufficient that DISH allegedly misappropriated "a means of 
conveying content to and tailoring its interactions with its customers." Id. at * 11." The 
court specifically declined to follow other cases where courts too narrowly construed the 
potential for coverage by applying an indemnity standard. Id. at *15. 
Other cases that Admiral has cited are similarly inapposite and unpersuasive. For 
example, in Superformance, International v. Hartford Cas. Ins., 203 F. Supp. 2d 587 
(E.D. Va. 2002), the district court was confronted with "personal and advertising injury" 
policy-defined as "[c]opying, in your 'advertisement', a person's or organization's 
'advertising idea' or style of 'advertisement' . . . . " - not the offense here at issue. 
Applied Bolting Tech. Prods, v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 942 F. Supp. 1029 (E.D. Pa. 
1996) dealt with "personal and advertising injury" defined as the "misappropriation of 
injury that arose out of StunFence's use of its 'advertising idea.'"). 
o/ i 
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advertising ideas" - again, not the "use o f offense here at issue and, contrary to the 
District Court's view, not "comparable" to "use o f which lacks "misappropriation's" 
wrongful taking component. As the policy language in Superformance and Applied 
Bolting distinctly differs from Admiral's, these cases provide no guidance. 
2. The Predecessor "Misappropriation of Advertising Ideas" 
Offense is Not Limited to Common Law Misappropriation 
Under Utah law, trademarked slogans are "advertising ideas." Cloud Nine, 464 F. 
Supp. 2d at 1167. Admiral has never disputed this [R 1243], nor did the district court 
reach the issue. The salient issue is whether the facts pled by the underlying claimants 
implicated "advertising ideas," bringing their claims potentially within Admiral's policies 
"use of another's advertising idea in your 'advertisement'" offense. 
No genuine issue of material fact exists with respect to the "advertising ideas" 
alleged in those complaints. "Eat All You Want and Still Lose Weight" and "And We 
Couldn't Say It If It Wasn't True" are slogans that were registered as trademarks. [R 
1215-16]. In light of these undisputed facts, the "advertising idea" element of the 
specific type of personal and advertising injury under which Basic Research seeks 
coverage is easily met. 
"Misappropriation of advertising ideas" is not limited to common law situations. 
AMCOIns. Co. v. Lauren-Spencer, Inc., 500 F. Supp. 2d 721, 730 (S.D. Ohio 2007) 
("Much of the rationale of Advance Watch [the Sixth Circuit's ruling limiting the 
'misappropriation' policy offense to claims based on common law misappropriation] has 
often been severely criticized by other courts and represents the minority view. See Pizza 
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Magialnt'l, LLC v. Assurance Co. of Am., 447 F.Supp.2d 766, 772 (W.D.Ky.2006) 
(summarizing criticism of Advance Watch and declining to apply its holding). Notably, 
"Michigan courts have wholly rejected the Sixth Circuit's Advance Watch construction of 
Michigan law " Lauren-Spencer, Inc., 500 F.Supp.2d at 730. 
Admiral itself conceded this point. [R 1281] Nevertheless, Admiral has sought by 
implication to inconsistently limit the offense's scope to that of common law 
misappropriation, urging adoption of the reasoning of two readily distinguishable trial-
level cases, Sorbee InVlLtd. v. Chubb Custom Ins. Co., 735 A.2d 712, 714 (Pa. Super. 
Ct. 1999) and Armament Sys. & Procedures v. Northland Fishing Tackle, No. 01-C-l 122, 
2006 WL 2519225 (E.D. Wis. Aug. 28, 2006). Neither is persuasive. Sorbee, applying 
distinct Pennsylvania law, substituted the requirements for pleading the tort of common 
law misappropriation that would require the "advertising idea" to be "novel," "new" or 
"concrete." Riese v. QVC, Inc., No. CIV. A. 97-40068, 1999 WL 178545, at *3 (E.D. Pa. 
Mar. 30, 1999). But nothing in Admiral's policy supported this limit on 
"misappropriation's" scope. Moreover, it is not the operative offense here. See DISH, 
2011 WL 4908108, at *5 ("We note though, that in spite of their broad language, many of 
the cases insurers cite focus on [distinct] policy terms."). 
Armament Systems assumed that "misappropriation" means "wrongful taking," 
and then further limited coverage by claiming that the idea was too general to be 
possessed by the party using it. Like Sorbee, Armament Systems adopted a common law 
"misappropriation" standard to limit the word's meaning in the policy, albeit without 
acknowledging that it had done so. 
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This approach is analogous to that used by federal courts to determine the legal 
sufficiency of pleadings under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), which does not test whether 
there is a possibility of coverage but whether a valid claim is stated upon which relief can 
be granted. Each case improperly looked to the merits of the underlying action to 
evaluate whether that suit could pass muster as a common law misappropriation claim.9 
This approach is inconsistent with Utah law, which requires the interpretation of 
undefined policy terms like "misappropriation" in favor of coverage. Benjamin, 2006 UT 
37, J 22. 
These arguments are like those rejected by the 10th Circuit in DISH, 2011 WL 
4908108, at* 11: 
[W]e reject the district court's reasoning that Dish cannot 
have misappropriated advertising ideas because it did not 
incorporate patented technologies as a substantive element of 
its communications and interactions with customers. 
3. Even the Predecessor Coverage for "Misappropriation" is 
Ambiguous Because It Can Mean "Misuse" As Well As 
"Wrongful Taking" 
"Advertising idea" is ambiguous because it is susceptible of more than one 
reasonable interpretation. The district court acknowledged Basic Research's contention 
that "Eat All You Want and Still Lose Weight" and "And We Couldn't Say It If It Wasn't 
True" are "advertising ideas" within the meaning of Admiral's policy (which does not 
define the term). (Opinion, pp. 11-12) The district court then approvingly cited Cloud 
Nine, 464 F. Supp.2d at 1166, which explained that an "advertising idea" is an "idea for 
9Davis H. Elliott Co. v. Caribbean Utilities Co., Ltd., 513 F.2d 1176, 1182 (6th Cir. 
1975). 
0 7 
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calling public attention to a product or business, especially by proclaiming desirable 
qualities so as to increase sales or patronage." (Opinion, p. 15) But the district court did 
not decide whether these slogans fell within the definition. (Opinion, pp. 15-17). 
As held in WestfieldIns. Co. v. Factfinder Marketing Research, Inc., 860 N.E.2d 
145, 152 (Ohio App. 2006): 
Some courts have defined "advertising idea" to mean "any 
idea or concept related to the promotion of a product to the 
public." . . . [Advance Watch's] restrictive holding [limiting 
the 'misappropriation' offense to the common law tort of 
misappropriation] has been criticized as ignoring the ordinary 
meaning of the term "misappropriation." . . . [W]e resolve 
this ambiguity in the provision in favor of insurance 
coverage[.] 
There is no single meaning to these terms because "[t]here is nothing about the 
terms . . . neither of which constitutes a recognized tort, which compels [the court] to 
conclude one way or the other as to just how broadly or narrowly they should be read." 
Lebas Fashion Imports of USA, Inc. v. ITT Hartford Ins. Group, 50 Cal. App. 4th 548, 
565, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d 36, 46 (1996). 
Basic Research agrees that common law misappropriation claims potentially fall 
within the scope of the "misappropriation" offense because the term is ambiguous. 
"Misappropriation" includes both wrongful taking and misuse.10 Dictionary definitions 
also support construing "misappropriation" to include "misuse." BLACK'S LAW 
DICTIONARY 1998 (6th ed. 1990) ("Misappropriation: the unauthorized, improper or 
unlawful use of funds or other property for purposes other than that for which intended . . 
l0Winklevoss Consultants, Inc. v. Federal Ins. Co., 991 F. Supp. 1024, 1037 (N.D. 111. 
1998) ("[The plaintiff] maintains that the phrase 'misappropriation of advertising ideas or 
style of doing business' is ambiguous . . . . This Court agrees that the language is 
o o 
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. . The term may also embrace the taking or use of another's property for the sole 
purpose of capitalizing unfairly on the goodwill and reputation of property owner."). 
RANDOM HOUSE UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 1228 (2d ed. 1993) ("Misappropriate" 
means "to put to a wrong use; to apply wrongfully or dishonestly, as funds entrusted to 
one's care."). 
Numerous courts have found "misappropriation" includes misuse and false 
advertising. Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. American Hardware Mfrs. Assfn, 898 N.E.2d 216, 236 
(111. App. 2008) (allegations that the insured deceptively advertised its trade show by 
suggesting that it was the continuation of the trade show to which claimants claimed 
exclusive rights implicated both "misappropriation of advertising ideas or style of doing 
business" and "use of another's advertising idea in your 'advertisement' " under two 
policies); American Simmental Ass 'n v. Coregis Ins. Co., 282 F.3d 582 (8th Cir. (Neb.) 
2002) (insured's alleged misuse of "fullblood" to describe cattle that did not meet the 
term's requirements met the offense); Flodine v. State Farm Ins. Co., No. 99 C 7466, 
2001 WL 204786, at *3, 11 (N.D. 111. Mar. 1, 2001) ("[M]isuse of an advertising idea" 
included the insured's alleged labeling its products with descriptive tags that "falsely 
suggest [ed] that they were produced by North American Indians Capitalizing upon 
the goodwill associated with Indian-made products is a marketing idea concerned with 
how to persuade consumers to buy certain goods. The wrongful use of these ideas, or 
ways of marketing 'Southwestern style' arts and crafts, are 'advertising injuries' under 
the policy."); DecisionOne Corp. v. ITT Hartford Ins. Group, 942 F. Supp. 1038 (E.D. 
susceptible of more than one reasonable interpretation."). 
on 
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Pa. 1996) (duty to defend when the underlying plaintiff alleged the insured falsely 
designated the source of its ability to maintain the plaintiffs equipment and falsely 
advertised that it could maintain the plaintiffs equipment, all in violation of the Lanham 
Act); Applied Bolting Tech. Prods., Inc. v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 942 F. Supp. 
1029, 1032 (E.D. Pa. 1996) ("misuse" held a preferred dictionary definition for 
"misappropriation" that a layperson would use); Atlapac Trading Co., Inc. v. American 
Motorists Ins. Co., No. CV 97-0781 CBM, 1997 WL 1941512, at *7 (CD. Cal. Sept. 19, 
1997) (mislabeling mixed olive/canola oil as olive oil is a misuse that injures the public 
as well as competitors whose pricing may be disadvantageously undercut). 
Admiral's policy language does not require that the "advertising idea" have been 
previously owned or used by another (much less by a competitor), nor that the 
"advertising idea" be wrongfully taken. Basic Research's advertising activities need only 
misuse an "advertising idea." As long as injury "arises out o f the advertising, the policy 
language is satisfied. 
4. "Use" Means More Than "Misappropriation;" It Includes 
"Employment OP 
Utah has not defined the precise scope of Admiral's policy term "use" within the 
"use of another's advertising idea" offense. Admiral has attempted to fill in the gaps with 
out of state case law supporting the notion that "use" must mean "misappropriation" or 
"wrongful taking." [R 1279-81] 
Confusion as to the source of goods has readily been found to support a defense 
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where the advertising idea was not "wrongfully taken" but merely "misused."11 Limiting 
"misappropriation" to a "wrongful taking" adds words of limitation not in the policy, 
rewriting the policy for the insurer's benefit in direct contravention of Utah law. Alfv. 
State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 850 P.2d 1272, 1275 (Utah 1993). 
B. The "Of Another" Element is Met 
1. "Of Another" Merely Means "Does Not Originate With the 
Insured" 
Under Utah law, the phrase "of another" in the "use of another's advertising idea 
in your 'advertisement'" offense is ambiguous. Quaidv. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 158 P.3d 
525, 528 (Utah 2007) ("Insurance policy language is considered ambiguous if it is 
'unclear, it omits terms, or the terms used to express the intentions of the parties may be 
understood to have two or more plausible meanings.' "). It is undisputed that 
"ambiguities" in an insurance contract are construed against the insurer. Novell, Inc. v. 
Federal Ins. Co., 141 F.3d 983, 985 (10th Cir. (Utah) 1998). 
As the Ninth Circuit apropos the narrower predecessor offense of 
"misappropriation" expressly ruling that it did not require any wrongful taking of a 
competitor's advertising idea: "Nor can we discern any contextual, public-policy, or 
logical significance to who owns the legal rights to the advertising idea in question." 
Hyundai Motor Am. v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, PA, 600 F.3d 1092, 1101 
(9th Cir. 2010). Nor does Utah's law of insurance policy interpretation permit any 
11CAT Internet Services v. Providence Washington Ins. Co., 333 F.3d 138, 142 (3d 
Cir. (Pa.) 2003) ("We now hold that when a complaint alleges that an insured 
misappropriates and uses . . . ideas in connection with marketing and sales and for the 
purpose of gaining customers, the conduct constitutes 'misappropriation of an advertising 
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narrower construction. Benjamin, 2006 UT 37, f 24 (" '[Ijnsurance policies should be 
construed liberally in favor of the insured and their beneficiaries so as to promote and not 
defeat the purposes of insurance.' "). Any other result would be in derogation of the 
principle that "[t]he objectively reasonable expectations of applicants and intended 
beneficiaries regarding the terms of insurance contracts will be honored even though 
painstaking study of the policy provisions would have negated those expectations. DISH, 
2011 WL 49081088, at *8. 
The "of another" can be reasonably understood to include an entity other than 
Basic Research for five distinct reasons: 
First, consistent with dictionary definitions, "of another" means "a different one." 
Random House Unabridged Dictionary 84 and 1343 (2d ed. 1993). Draughon v. CUNA 
Mutual Ins. Soc >, 771 P.2d 1105, 1108 (Utah App. 1989) (When interpreting insurance 
contract court should construe policy as it "would be understood by the average, 
reasonable purchaser of insurance."). Cyprus Plateau Min. Corp. v. Commonwealth Ins. 
Co., 972 F. Supp. 1379, 1384 (D. Utah 1997) ("Ordinarily, a dictionary is a valuable 
resource for interpretation."). Critically, Admiral did not specifically contest this 
definition "of another" on summary judgment and is not expected to do so here. [R 1243] 
Nor did the district court address this issue in its summary judgment motion. 
Second, the policy's language does not inform a lay policyholder that "of 
another's" means only "of an underlying claimant that may sue you one day." Indeed, 
Admiral's policy language contains no definitional or contextual limit (i.e., restructuring 
idea . . . . ' "). 
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"of another" to "of a "different" underlying claimant or "of someone else.). Had 
Admiral meant "of another" to refer only to "of an underlying claimant" it could have 
said so in its policy. Dish, 2011 WL 4908108, at *16. 
Third, exclusion (g), which eliminates certain forms of "false advertising" for 
"failure to conform to representations of quality or performance" reveals that coverage 
for some forms of false advertising are contemplated. 
Fourth, construing the phrase "of another" to mean "advertising ideas" that were 
not originated by the insured poses a lesser actuarial risk to insurers who need not insure 
against newly created advertising concepts, whose originality may generate litigation 
disputes, as is true of those in the "advertising" business falling within exclusion (j)(l)-
Fifth, fact allegations of false advertising satisfy the "of another" provision where 
an "advertising idea" misuse engenders consumer confusion: General Cas. Co. of Wis. v. 
Wozniak Travel Inc., 762 N.W.2d 572, 579 (Minn. 2009) ("Hobbit Travel," used by 
insured, was not a phrase owned by claimant heirs of JRR Tolkien). Cloud Nine, 464 F. 
Supp. 2d at 1167 (consumer confusion over source and origination of product names, not 
their ownership). 
2. Admiral's Overly Restrictive Construction of the "Of Another" 
Policy Language Is Inconsistent with Utah Law 
Had Admiral intended, it could easily have clarified by definition that the "other" 
in its coverage had to be the underlying plaintiffs. Alf 850 P.2d at 1275 ("[A] court may 
not rewrite an insurance contract for the parties if the language is clear and 
unambiguous . . . . " ) . But Admiral did not. Its failure to do so when it could have created 
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an ambiguity about "of another's" meaning within the policy, requiring interpretation and 
application on behalf of Basic Research because "of another," reasonably understood to 
mean "any other," brings the Miller, Tompkins and Forlenza fact allegations potentially 
within Admiral's coverage. Sharon Steel Corp. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 931 P.2d 127, 
133 (Utah 1997). 
Speaking to an analogous defense based coverage scenario, the Tenth Circuit 
advised inDish, 2011 WL 4908108, at *10: 
It is not clear from the complaint whether or not Dish is 
alleged to have infringed advertising-related claims in 
RAKTL's patents by conveying promotional information. 
Nonetheless, Insurers have not met their "heavy burden" of 
proving that "the underlying claim [cannot] fall within policy 
coverage." 
Admiral could avoid its defense duty if there are words of limitation specifically 
expressing the limited meaning of "of another" that Admiral argues. But there are none, 
and Utah law prohibits courts from ferreting out such a restrictive meaning when the 
insurer had not expressed it. Simmons v. Farmers Ins. Group, 877 P.2d 1255, 1258 (Utah 
App. 1994) ("Language limiting an insurer's duty to defend an insured must be clear, 
unambiguous, and sufficiently conspicuous in order to give proper notice to the insured 
of the limitations on the duty to defend."). The district court erred by disregarding this 
law and finding "of another" limited to underlying claimants where Admiral did not 
express that limit. 
3. "Others" Previously Used the Accused Slogans to Advertise 
Weight Loss Products Before Basic Research Did 
The "advertising idea" of others embodied in the slogans was well known and was 
available to Admiral when Basic Research tendered the Miller, Tompkins and Forlenza 
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Suits for a defense. Both the Miller and Tompkins complaints allege that "fraudulent 
weight-loss products" have been nationally advertised "as making it easy to lose weight 
or allowing one to lose weight without diet or exercise." [R 814-15, 913] The Forlenza 
complaints similarly compare Akavar advertising to "miracle pills" advertised as 
allowing consumers to "lose weight effortlessly" without diet or exercise. [R 935] 
The Federal Trade Commission has sued other defendants than Basic Research for 
misusing this "advertising idea" and it established guidelines for its use. In 2004, the 
FTC sued another company for using the slogan "Eat All You Want and Still Lose 
Weight (Pill Does All the Work)" to advertise Bio Trim, a weight loss product. FTC v. 
Natural Products, LLC (CD. Cal. Case No. SACV 04-1279). [R 1208, 1218, 1235-36] 
The FTC identified the advertising idea "Eat all the foods you love, and still lose weight 
(pill does all the work)" as a "Red Flag Claim" in its Red Flag | Bogus Weight Loss 
Claims microsite (http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/edu/microsites/redflag/falseclaim2.html). [R 
1208, 1238] This is an "advertising idea" others used for other products. 
4. Western Holdings, LLC, an Entity Distinct from Basic Research, 
Owns the Trademarked Slogans at Issue Herein 
The "of another" component of the policy language is also readily met because, as 
Admiral concedes, "other entities may have used similar slogans and statements which 
Basic Research is using." [R 1261] Non-party Western Holdings, LLC applied on April 
18, 2007 to register with the United States Patent & Trademark Office ("USPTO") the 
trademark "Eat All You Want and Still Lose Weight," claiming that the mark was first 
used in commerce on January 26, 2007. [R 1208, 1215] Western Holdings also applied 
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to register the trademark "And We Couldn't Say It In Print If It Wasn't True" on April 
27,2007, claiming this trademark was first used in commerce on January 26, 2007. [R 
1208, 1216] Both trademark registrations were issued on June 3, 2008. [R 1208, 1215-
16] 
These dates were before the commencement dates of all three underlying lawsuits, 
as well as the inception of both Admiral policies. [R 669-71] Western Holdings is not a 
party to this case and seeks no defense. [R 1-24] If Western Holdings was not an entity 
distinct from Basic Research there would be no point in its acquiring its own equal rights 
under Admiral's policy as an "additional insured."12 
Collective action among Western Holdings and Basic Research (as Admiral has 
argued) [R 1260] does not change the coverage analysis. Such action instead proves the 
reverse - that the entities are "different from" one another. Western Holdings is owned 
separately from the Plaintiff insureds and has an arms-length informal license agreement 
with Basic Research and Dynakor permiting their use of its trademarked slogans in their 
advertisements. [R 670, 808] 
Admiral provided no evidence to disprove that Western Holdings and Plaintiff 
insureds are distinct entities. DeseretFed, 714 P.2d at 1147. Also, since Western 
Holdings and the Plaintiff insureds are distinct from the FTC defendants who earlier used 
the accused phrases, Admiral cannot avoid its defense duties. Cloud Nine, LLC, 464 F. 
Supp. 2d at 1168: 
travelers Ins. Cos. v. Dickey, 799 P.2d 625, 628 (Okla. 1990) ("An insurer's 
undertaking cannot be altered or modified by an insured's agreement with a third party in 
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Even if the court were to find that [the underlying] Complaint 
presents factual questions or an uncertainty regarding whether 
an advertising injury is alleged, the insurers still have a duty 
to defend until those uncertainties are resolved. 'Where 
factual questions render coverage uncertain, . . . the 
insurer must defend until those uncertainties can be 
resolved against coverage. "When in doubt, defend." ' " 
(emphasis added)) 
Under the commonly accepted dictionary definition of "another", there is no 
genuine issue of fact that the slogans touting Akavar, about which the plaintiffs in the 
underlying consumer lawsuits have complained, belong to "another," not to Basic 
Research. "Eat All You Want And Still Lose Weight" and "And We Couldn't Say It In 
Print If It Wasn't True" are Western Holdings' registered trademarks. [R 1208, 1215-16] 
Western Holdings is distinct from Basic Research, LLC and all of the other appellant 
insureds herein. [R670] 
Other third parties also previously used slogans and phrases substantially similar 
to those trademarked by Western Holdings and sued upon here. For example, Natural 
Products, LLC — the manufacturer and distributor of a weight loss product called 
BioTrim — was using the slogan "Eat All You Want and Still Lose Weight (Pill Does All 
the Work) when it was sued in 2004 by the Federal Trade Commission. [R 1208, 1218, 
1235-36] The FTC identified other similar claims/slogans/sayings used by other 
unidentified third parties on its Red Flag|Bogus Weight Loss Claims Internet microsite as 
well.13 [R 1208, 1238] Consequently, the "of another" portion of the offense is satisfied. 
the absence of the insurer's consent."). 
1 ^ Although Utah is a "four corners" state in which coverage disputes are typically 
resolved with reference to the policy and the underlying complaint, extrinsic evidence 
(e.g. of Western Holding's trademark application or registration, or of the FTC's prior 
enforcement actions) can be considered as "undisputable facts" that are " 'not an element 
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5. Cases Narrowly Defining "Of Another" Deviate From Utah Law 
Cases in which "use of another's advertising idea" was at issue in which 
"misappropriation/wrongful taking" was equated to "use" cannot be used to limit the 
meaning of "use" within Admiral's policy. Utah requires: "'[Insurance policies should 
be construed liberally in favor of the insured.. .so as to promote and not defeat the 
purposes of insurance.'" Benjamin, 2006 UT 37, f 24 (quoting United States Fid. & 
Guar. Co. v. Sandt, 854 P.2d 519, 521 (Utah 1993) and Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Versaw, 
2004 UT 73,124, 99 P.3d 796). 
In Cloud Nine, 464 F. Supp. 2d 1161, the only reported case in which "use of 
another's advertising injury" has been analyzed under Utah law, the District of Utah 
followed Utah's liberal construction rules. One of the salient issues was whether the 
facts pled in that allegedly violated statute governing false advertising could constitute a 
predicate offense. The policy defined "personal and advertising injury" as "use of 
another's advertising idea in your advertisement" - the same offense here at issue. Cloud 
Nine, 464 F. Supp. 2d 1161. 
Cloud Nine rejected arguments premised on cases narrowly construing the 
coverage for the prior offense of "misappropriation of advertising ideas," as the Cloud 
Nine policy insured against "use of another's advertising ideas." This fact was 
determinative as "use is broader than 'misappropriation.'" Id. at 1168, n.8. As Judge 
Campbell observed, at 1168: 
of either the [underlying] cause of action [against Basic Research], or a defense in the 
underlying litigation.' " DISH, 2011 WL 4908108, at *4. 
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Edizone alleges a claim under the Utah Truth in Advertising 
Act, which specifically requires allegations of deceptive trade 
practices occurring in advertising. "The purpose or [the Utah 
Truth in Advertising Act] is to prevent deceptive, misleading, 
and false advertising practices and forms in Utah." Utah Code 
Ann. § 13-11 a-1. Clearly, the crux of a cause of action for 
violation of the Utah Truth in Advertising Act is advertising. 
The Court should undertake the well-accepted approach of interpreting the 
meaning of "use of another's advertising idea" through the use of a dictionary. See, e.g., 
Cyprus Plateau Min. Corp, v. Commonwealth Ins, Co,, 972 F. Supp. 1379, 1384 (D. Utah 
1997) ("Dictionaries . . . are general guides to common usage. Ordinarily, a dictionary is 
a valuable resource for [insurance policy] interpretation."). Webster's Encyclopedic 
Unabridged Dictionary of The English Language at 2097 (Random House Value 
Publishing, Inc. 1996) defines "use" as "to employ for some purpose; put into service." 
Under this definition, the underlying consumer lawsuits claim injury from "use." The 
plaintiffs in those cases alleged that Basic Research employed the slogans "Eat All You 
Want And Still Lose Weight" and "And We Couldn't Say It If It Wasn't True" in the 
Akavar marketing and packaging upon which they relied and by which they were 
purportedly damaged. Thus, the allegations in the underlying consumer lawsuits 
complain of a "use" and, by extension, personal and advertising injury fall within the 
Admiral policies. 
C. "Advertising Ideas" Are Set Forth In Basic Research's 
"Advertisement" to Meet the "In Your 'Advertisement'" Element 
1. Admiral Conceded the "Advertisement" Component Is Satisfied 
The term "advertisement" is expressly defined in Admiral's policies as "a notice 
that is broadcast or published to the general public or specific market segments about 
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your goods, products or services for the purpose of attracting customers or supporters." 
[R 45, 105] Underlying claimants alleged that Basic Research's statements about Akavar 
appeared in television commercials, on Internet websites, in point-of-purchase 
advertisements and in national magazine advertisements that the claimants 
read/heard/relied upon and which injured them. [R 822, 911, 1010-13] There is no 
dispute that such items constitute "notices . . . broadcast or published to the general 
public or specific market segments" about Basic Research's "products . . . for the 
purpose of attracting customers or supporters." Admiral has not contended otherwise. 
So, the "in your advertisement" element of the personal and advertising injury is 
satisfied. 
2. Injury Need Only "Arise Out Of," That Is, Be Connected With 
Offense (f) and Offense (f) Must Occur "In Your 
'Advertisement'" 
Admiral has argued that there can be a causal connection between the alleged 
"injury" and the "use of another's advertising idea in your advertisement" offense only if 
the underlying plaintiffs have alleged a misappropriation or wrongful taking of that 
plaintiffs own "advertising idea." [R 1280-82] But this argument assumes a flawed 
interpretation of Admiral's policy that is at odds with Utah's liberal policy construction 
rules.14 As explained above, Admiral's construction of the predicate offense is far too 
limited and is not conclusively supported by Utah law. 
The district court erred by granting Admiral's summary judgment motion and 
denying Basic Research's on that sole basis. (Opinion, pp. 14-17) The district court 
uSee § IIIA & § IVA(4). 
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erred in stating that "the basis of the claim against [Basic Research] is the failed promise 
of weight loss without any behavior or lifestyle changes and not the use of the phrases 
'Eat All You Want & Still Lose Weight' and 'And We Couldn't Say It In Print If It 
Wasn't True' to advertise Akavar.'" (Opinion at 14). 
But holding that it could find no causal connection between the advertising and the 
injury, the district court articulated a definition of "use" limited to "misappropriation" or 
"wrongful taking." (Opinion at 14-15) It also assumed that a causal nexus must exist 
between injury and advertising activity even though Admiral's policy language does not 
support such a policy construction. 
This was error on both fronts as "use" is not so narrowly defined by any dictionary 
or Utah judicial decision, nor by Admiral's policy itself and injury need only be 
"connected with" offense (f) not an "advertisement," as defined in the policy. The focus 
of the "in your 'advertisement'" policy language is satisfied where the defined class is 
persons who purchased Akavar in response to the marketing slogans whether or not they 
never used the product. 
Admiral's contention and the district court's ruling against potential coverage on 
the grounds that underlying claimants' damages resulted not from Basic Research's 
advertising but from Akavar's failure to perform as advertised is further refuted by the 
Miller/Tompkins court's Class Certification Order15 (of which Basic Research requested 
the district court below to take judicial notice).16 [R 1466-77] There, the certified 
15Miller v. Basic Research, LLC, 2011 WL 818150, at *2 (D. Utah, March 2, 2011). 
16The district court did not rule on the Request for Judicial Notice, nor did it mention 
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plaintiff class broadly consists of "[p]ersons who purchased Akavar after seeing or 
hearing the marketing slogan 'Eat all you want and still lose weight' during the relevant 
damages period." 
This means a claimant need not have used Akavar without losing weight to 
recover from Basic Research. Such persons may be among the class members, provided 
that they purchased the product after exposure to the advertising. The latter is required 
for class membership; the former is not. The Order demolishes any contrary Admiral 
contention, as well as any merit to the district court's contrary conclusion. 
Broadly construing "use" as required leads to the reverse result. This Court should 
correct the district court's error. 
3. Although Not Required by Admiral's Policy, There Is a Causal 
Connection Between The Injuries Alleged By The Underlying 
Claimants And The Predicate Offense at Issue 
Although Admiral's policies do not require that the fact allegations of the 
underlying lawsuits include a causal connection between the underlying plaintiffs' 
injuries and the insured's advertising activities, here that connection is pled. The Miller, 
Tompkins and Forlenza plaintiffs allege that Basic Research's advertisements caused 
them to purchase Akavar to their financial detriment. [R 803-804, 828, 911, 919, 921, 
1014-15, 1026-27] Alleged damages include money spent on purchases, among other 
requested remedies that include an injunction prohibiting Basic Research from making 
such statements in advertising and marketing Akavar. [R 852-53, 919, 921, 1014-15] If 
the plaintiffs' injuries were not causally connected to Basic Research's advertising, 
the request or the certification order in its Opinion. 
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plaintiffs would not request an injunction against it. 
V. CASES CITED BY ADMIRAL BELOW THAT ANALYZE PRICE FIXING 
ANTITRUST COVERAGE DO NOT PRECLUDE FINDING POTENTIAL 
COVERAGE HERE 
Admiral cited to the district court several antitrust coverage cases factually 
distinguishable from the case. And they avoided coverage for antitrust suits by applying 
improperly narrow policy interpretations. Champion Labs., Inc. v. American Home 
Assur. Co., No. 09 C 7251, 2010 WL 2649848, at *5 (N.D. 111. June 30, 2010) substituted 
the term "advertising" for the term "published" within the definition of "advertising." 
That court then adopted a restricted definition of "advertising idea," formulated to assert 
policyholder interpretive provisions, that emphasized why the "misappropriation of 
advertising ideas" language could encompass trademark infringement lawsuits. But to 
encompass is not to exhaust, and nothing in Champion states or suggests that 
1 7 
interpretation was intended to exhaust the offense's definitional parameters. 
Champion also redefined the policy offense there at issue to require "the wrongful 
taking of the manner by which another advertises its goods or services," then finding that 
definition not satisfied where the insured only provided a customer with a spreadsheet, 
including outdated input costs intended to justify price increases. Ultimately no coverage 
was found because "[this] communication ... was directed at one private label customer-
not to the general public or a specific market segment as required by the relevant 
insurance policies." Id. at *5. But here, Basic Research's widespread promotional 
17 
See, J.A. Brundage Plumbing & Roto-Rooter, Inc. v. Massachusetts Bay Ins. Co., 
818 F. Supp. 553, 557 (W.D.N.Y. 1993). 
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activity is alleged. 
Rose Acre Farms, Inc. v. Columbia Cas. Co., 772 F. Supp. 2d 994 (S.D. Ind. Feb. 
18, 2011) found no "advertisement" alleged in an underlying antitrust case because of the 
absence of any references to Rose Acre's "website nor any other broadcast or publication 
making use of any animal welfare advertising idea is referenced in the Underlying 
Complaints." Id. at 1002. Concerned that the offense's "of another" component could not 
be satisfied by allegations against a co-defendant, Rose Acre presumed that the policy 
required a "wrongful taking," even though the offense implied no such language. 
The Rose Acre court's explanation that it was "hard-pressed" to find "of another" 
satisfied where the claimant's "advertising idea" was not being used was consistent with 
its finding of potential liability under applicable Indiana law, compelling a defense. 
Contrary to Indiana law, Rose Acre failed to understand or assess the ambiguity of "of 
another" within the "use of another's advertising idea in your advertisement" offense. 
The underlying cases here make no antitrust claims but repeatedly complain about 
Basic Research's advertising of Akavar using another's advertising idea, an earlier, 
allegedly misleading, idea to promote weight loss products about which the FTC had 
issued a "red flag" warning. Rose Acre is factually inapposite. It misinterpreted the 
policy and minimized advertising claims in order to avoid coverage for antitrust cases. 
The Eleventh Circuit asserted in Trailer Bridge, Inc. v. Illinois National Ins. Co., 
F. 3d _ , 2011 WL 4346579 (11th Cir. (Fla.) Sept. 19, 2011)18 that "the underlying 
18Petition for Rehearing En Banc, Trailer Bridge, Inc. v. Illinois National Ins. Co., 
U.S.C.A. Eleventh Circuit, No. 10-13913, filed September 27, 2011. 
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plaintiffs could not have recovered damages [for advertising injury] because the allegedly 
misappropriated 'advertising idea5 was not that of the underlying plaintiffs, but rather 
was alleged to have been the advertising idea of other parties altogether." But a damages 
remedy is not necessary to be pled in the underlying complaint as a claim for "false 
advertising" since "[u]nder Florida law, 'tort law principles do not control judicial 
construction of insurance contracts.'" Creative Hospitality Ventures, Inc. v. United States 
Liab. Ins. Co., 655 F. Supp. 2d 1316, 1329 (S.D. Fla. 2009). 
VI. EXCLUSION "G" DOES NOT APPLY TO RELIEVE ADMIRAL FROM 
ITS DUTY TO DEFEND 
A. The "Failure to Conform" Exclusion Only Bars Limited Forms Of 
False Advertising Where Specific Representations As To "Quality" or 
"Performance" Are At Issue 
Admiral also contended that its policy's Exclusion "g" bars a defense in the 
underlying consumer lawsuits. [R 1282] Admiral bears the burden of proving 
applicability of any exclusion, as they are strictly construed against the insurer, and in 
favor of the insured. LDS Hosp., aDiv. of Intermountain Health Care, Inc. v. Capitol 
Life Ins. Co., 765 P.2d 857, 859 (Utah 1988); Sandt, 854 P.2d at 523. Any ambiguity in 
the exclusion's language is construed as a matter of law in favor of coverage. Cyprus 
Plateau, 972 F. Supp. at 1382 (citing^// 850 P.2d at 1274). Unless coverage is "clearly 
excluded," the presumption is that coverage is available to the insured. LDS Hosp., 765 
P.2d at 859. Exclusions are "construed most strictly against the insurer." Id. 
Admiral's exclusion "g" bars coverage for "'[p]ersonal and advertising injury' 
arising out of the failure of goods, products or services to conform with any statement of 
quality or performance made in [Basic Research's] 'advertisement'." [R 38, 98] 
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Admiral's policies do not define "quality" or "performance." But "quality" is dictionary-
defined as "an essential or distinctive characteristic, property or attribute" and "high 
grade; superiority; excellence." WEBSTER'S ENCYCLOPEDIC DICTIONARY OF THE 
ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1579(2001). "Performance" is dictionary-defined as: "the manner 
in which or the efficacy with which something reacts or fulfills its intended purpose." Id. 
at 1439. 
The exclusion can therefore reasonably be read to exclude coverage only where 
there is an underlying claim that a product: (1) lacks the essential or distinctive 
characteristic, property or attribute advertised; (2) is not of a high grade, superior or 
excellent, despite advertisements so declaring; and, (3) does not react or fulfill its 
intended purpose in the manner or with the efficacy advertised. 
The advertising statements of which the underlying plaintiffs complain are: "Eat 
All You Want And Still Lose Weight" and "And We Couldn't Say It In Print If It Wasn't 
True." Neither statement provides information about "the essential or distinctive 
characteristic, property or attribute" of Akavar. Neither speaks to the grade, superiority 
or excellence of Akavar. Neither addresses the manner or efficacy, or how Akavar 
"reacts or fulfills its intended purpose." Thus, the underlying claims do not fit within 
Exclusion "g's" definitional limits. 
Admiral has never provided a reasonable competing interpretation of "quality" and 
"performance" that would invalidate this plain meaning of its exclusionary language or 
these arguments against its application. Admiral simply asserted below that the exclusion 
should be read to exclude coverage for claims alleging the product at issue did not live up 
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to what its advertisements stated about what "the product can be expected to do and/or 
how it will perform." [R 1283-84] 
Admiral's interpretation is unreasonable because it adds restrictions not present in 
the policy language. The exclusion must be construed against Admiral. LDSHosp., 765 
P.2d at 859; Sandt, 854 P.2d at 523. Even if Admiral's overbroad suggested meaning of 
Exclusion "g" were thought reasonable, Admiral would succeed only in revealing an 
ambiguity that, once judicially acknowledged, must be resolved under Utah law in favor 
of coverage. Cyprus Plateau, 972 F. Supp. at 1382. Under either scenario coverage is 
not "clearly excluded," requiring Admiral to defend. LDSHosp., 765 P.2d at 859. 
B. Cases Admiral Relies Upon Are Distinguishable 
Admiral cited Superformance Int'l, Inc. v. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co., 203 F. Supp. 2d 
587 (E.D. Va. 2002) {"Superformance 7") and Total Call Int'l, Inc. v. Peerless Ins. Co., 
181 Cal. App. 4th 161,172 (2010) to the district court to argue that "[Admiral's] non-
conformity exclusion precluded coverage" for a manufacturer's false advertising claims 
where the manufacturer used a competitor's name in marketing materials. [R 1288] 
Such arguments are of no moment here because no competitor's name is at issue. 
Superformance and Total Call were lawsuits by the insured's competitors, alleging that 
the insured's advertisements induced customers who might have purchased their goods or 
services to instead purchase the insured's goods or services. The narrow issue of the 
goods' or services' "failure to conform" to the insured's advertised statements was not at 
issue in either case. 
Even if the underlying facts were apposite to those here, a Utah court would not 
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follow Superformance and Total Call Neither case followed Utah's requirements of 
narrow policy exclusion construction. Neither found that the insurer's preferred meaning 
of the exclusion was the only one possible. 
There is a significant difference between making "misleading statements" and 
making "false statements." Only the latter could possibly implicate the exclusion; e.g., 
where the insured's "advertisement" misrepresents the service a customer can expect 
(i.e., the number of call minutes consumers would receive for a certain cost, as in Total 
Call). In contrast, here Basic Research's statements in the accused advertisements do not 
rise to the level of accusations of actual falsity. What is pled is not that the product did 
not work when tried, but that it cannot work and therefore the advertising improperly 
separated claimants from their money. [R 804, 808, 815, 826, 909-10, 911, 914-16, 924-
25, 1014-15, 1026-27] Admiral's non-conformity exclusion is ambiguous where there 
are two or more possible contextually viable interpretations of the exclusionary language 
and only one of them can trigger its application. 
C. Other Cases Have Found the Exclusion Does Not Apply 
What matters here is that there is more than one reasonable meaning for the 
exclusion. Since that is so, Admiral bears the burden of proving that its preferred 
meaning of the exclusion is the only one in all possible worlds. LDSHosp., 765 P.2d at 
859 (" '[T]hat which is not clearly excluded from the operation of [an insurance] contract 
is included in the operation thereof "). 
Admiral's exclusion has been found reasonably susceptible to more than one 
meaning. Elcom Techs Co. v. Hartford Ins. Co. of the Midwest, 991 F. Supp. 1294, 1298 
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(D. Utah 1997) (applying Pennsylvania law) ("Because Phoenex's false advertising claim 
does not allege that Elcom's product failed to rise to the level advertised, the failure to 
conform exclusion does not apply to that claim.") 
Applying Utah law, Jewelers Mut. Ins. v. Milne Jewelry Co., No. 2:06-CV-243 
TS, 2006 WL 3716112, at *3 (D. Utah Dec. 14, 2006) similarly held that where there is 
only a possibility that an exclusion may apply it cannot bar a defense. In Milne, a 
defense was required where the underlying claimant alleged the insured's fake public 
assertions that its goods were "Indian Made." The allegations were deemed a false 
advertising claim. The insurer's policy's exclusion for failure to conform to statements 
of quality of the goods did not bar a defense because the statements were not of "quality:" 
Defendant replies that the term 'quality' in the policy relates 
not to a characteristic, such as Native American authenticity, 
but rather, to the fitness of the product. The term 'quality' as 
written in the policy is reasonably susceptible to more than 
one meaning, and therefore, must be construed against 
Plaintiff. Accordingly, the policy's quality exclusion does 
not preclude coverage. 
Here too, the term "quality" in Admiral's exclusion is "reasonably susceptible to 
more than one meaning and, as such, should be construed against enforcement. 
The most recent decision addressing related exclusions for "knowledge of falsity" 
from the Eighth Circuit, applying Minnesota law,19 reversed the district court for reasons 
equally germane here: 
3M's complaint alleged that ITI committed unfair advertising 
under the Lanham Act in two separate regards . . . [But] [t]he 
district court . . . focused on some of the conduct alleged to 
prove the claim rather than the global claim itself. . . . . 
"AMCOIns. Co. v. Inspired Technologies, Inc., 648 F.3d 875, 882-83 (8th Cir. 2011) 
(italics added). 
AC\ 
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[because] AMCO failed to satisfy its burden of demonstrating 
as a matter of law that every claim in 3Mfs complaint fell 
clearly outside the Policy's coverage. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Admiral should not be permitted to continue evading its duty to defend Basic 
Research in the Miller, Tompkins and/or Forlenza lawsuits. Basic Research respectfully 
requests the Court (a) reverse the trial court's May 24, 2011 Ruling on the parties' cross-
motions for summary judgment and (b) grant its motion for summary judgment here, (1) 
declaring that Admiral has a duty to defend Basic Research in the underlying Miller, 
Tompkins, and Forlenza lawsuits and ordering Admiral to honor that continuing duty 
with respect to the consolidated Miller and Tompkins suits, which continue to be litigated, 
(2) finding that Admiral breached the insurance policies at issue when it failed to defend 
Basic Research in those actions, (3) ordering Admiral to reimburse Appellants for all 
attorneys' fees and costs incurred in defending those lawsuits, plus prejudgment interest 
at the legal rate from the date of invoice, and (4) remanding this case to the district court 
for further proceedings to determine the amount of defense fees and expenses Admiral 
must reimburse Basic Research. 
Dated: November 4, 2011 
Alan G^nidshaw
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mm DISTRICT Q O t t i n ^ " 
•TSTd Judicial District 
MAY 2 4 2011 
r ^ SALT LAKE COUNTY 
9/mt m~v Deputy Clertt 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT, SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
BASIC RESEARCH, LLC, et al, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
ADMIRAL INSURANCE COMPANY, 
Defendant. 
RULING 
Case No. 110901154 
Judge: L.A. DEVER 
The above entitled matter is before the Court on the Plaintiffs' and Defendant's 
Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment. Having reviewed the related Motions and 
Oppositions, and having heard oral arguments on the matter on March 24, 2011, the 
Court makes the following Ruling. 
Background 
The entitled matter stems from an alleged breach of breach of contract, 
specifically the Commercial Lines Policy entered into between the named parties. 
Plaintiffs' causes of action include: (1) Declaratory Relief- Duty to Defend, Miller Suit, 
(2) Breach of Contract, Miller Suit, (3) Declaratory Relief- Duty to Defend, Tompkins 
Suit, (4) Breach of Contract, Tompkins Suit, (4) Declaratory Relief - Duty to Defend, 
Forlenza Suit, and (5) Breach of Contract, Forlenza Suit. 
Plaintiffs' claims arose after parties and other unnamed class members, relied on 
Plaintiffs' claims that their product would result in weight loss without altering lifestyle. 
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Plaintiffe maintain that pursuant to the terms of the insurance policy, Defendant has a 
duty to defend Plaintiffs. 
Defendant asserts that because the suits against Plaintiffs are the result of 
Plaintiffs' false claims regarding their product, such a duty is specifically excluded under 
the terms of the insurance policy. 
Legal Discussion/Analysis 
Choice of Law 
Although noted, neither party presents an argument as to which forum's law is 
applicable in the entitled matter. Defendant's maintain that California law is the 
applicable law of choice, while Plaintiffs claim Utah law is the appropriate choice. 
Regardless, the forum selection clause, "Service of Suit," unambiguously 
provides: 
In the event of our failure to pay any amount claimed to be due, we, 
at your request, will submit to the jurisdiction of any court of competent 
jurisdiction within the United States of America or Canada and will comply 
with all requirements necessary to give such court jurisdiction and all 
matters arising hereunder shall be determined in accordance with the law 
and practice of such Court. 
(Price .bed. Ex. 1, p. 59) (emphasis added). 
In addressing choice of law matters, the Utah Supreme Court explained: 
When interpreting a contract, we begin by looking within the four 
corners of the contract to determine the parties' intentions, which are 
controlling. If the language within the four corners of the contract is 
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unambiguous, . . . a court determines the parties1 intentions from the plain 
meaning of the contractual language as a matter of law. 
Innerliqht Inc. v. Matrix Group. LLC. 2009 UT 31.1J14, 214 P.3d 854 (quotations and 
citations omittedV.see also Id. 2009 UTat1}16, n.5 ("A forum-selection clause is 
understood not merely as a contract provision, but as a distinct contract in and of 
itself—that is, an agreement between the parties to settle disputes in a particular 
forum-that is separate from the obligations the parties owe to each other under the 
remainder of the contract." (citation omitted)); compare Morris v. Health Net of 
California. Inc.. 1999 UT 95, p \ 988 P.2d 940. 
Accordingly, Utah serves as the appropriate jurisdiction for the entitled matter. 
Summary Judgment, Generally 
Summary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that 
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law. Anaya v. Crossroads Managed Care Sys.. Inc.. 195 F.3d 
584, 589-90 (10th Cir. 1999) (quotations and citation omitted). 
A disputed fact is "materiar if it might affect the outcome of the suit under the 
1
"ln the absence of an effective choice of law by the parties . . . , the contacts to be taken into 
account in applying the principles of Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws § 6 to determine the law 
applicable to an issue include:(a) the place of contracting, (b) the place of negotiation of the contract, (c) 
the place of performance, (d) the location of the subject matter of the contract, and (e) the domicile, 
residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of business of the parties." (citing Restatement 
(Second) Conflict of Laws § 188 (1971)). 
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governing law, and the dispute is "genuine" if the evidence is such that a reasonable 
jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Schutz v. Thome, 415 F.3d 1128, 
1132 (1 Oth Cir. 2005). In applying the summary judgment standard, a court views the 
evidence and draws reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the 
nonmoving party. Id: see also DISH Network Corp. v. Arch Specialty Ins. Co.. 734 F. 
Supp. 2d 1173, 1177 (D. Colo. 2010) (explaining that in a summary judgment, a court 
does not weigh the evidence in deciding whether the movant has carried its burden, 
rather a court draws all reasonable inferences from it in the light most favorable to the 
nonmovant). 
Interpretation of Insurance Contracts 
Although this issue was not briefed before the hearing, it is an important 
consideration for appropriate analysis of the specific matters presented to the Court. 
"Utah law provides that insurance contracts are interpreted under general 
contract principles and that interpretation of such contracts is a question of law to be 
determined by the courts." Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. v. Cloud Nine; LLC. 464 F. Supp. 2d 
1161, 1165 (D. Utah 2006)(citations and quotations omitted); see also Id. ("When the 
existence of a contract and the identity of the parties are not in issue and when the 
contract provisions are clear and complete, the meaning of the contract can 
appropriately be resolved by the court on summary judgment." (citation omitted)). 
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When interpreting a contract, a court is to look within the four corners of the 
contract to determine the parties' intentions, which are controlling. Innerliaht, Inc. v. 
Matrix Group, LLC, 2009 UT 31,1J14, 214 P.3d 854 (citation and quotations omitted). 
"If the language within the four corners of the contract is unambiguous, a court 
determines the parties' intentions from the plain meaning of the contractual language as 
a matter of law." jdL (citation omitted). See LPS Hosp. v. Capitol Life Ins. Co., 765 
P.2d 857, 858-59 (Utah 1988) (explaining that insurance policy language is not 
ambiguous if it is "plain to a person of ordinary intelligence and understanding, viewing 
the matter fairly and reasonably, in accordance with the usual meaning of the words, 
and in the light of existing circumstances, including the purpose of the policy.") 
A contractual term or provision is ambiguous if it is capable of more 
than one reasonable interpretation because of uncertain meanings of 
terms, missing terms, or other facial deficiencies. Contractual ambiguity 
can occur when (1) there is facial ambiguity with regard to the language of 
the contract and (2) when there is ambiguity with regard to the intent of 
the contracting parties. The first situation presents a question of law to be 
determined by the judge. The second situation presents a question of fact 
where, if the judge determines that the contract is facially ambiguous, 
parol evidence of the parties' intentions should be admitted. 
Citv of Grantsville v. Redevelopment Agency of Tooele Citv. 2010 UT 38,1J30, 233 P.3d 
461 (citations and quotations omitted). 
Additionally, the fact that the parties do not agree upon the meaning of certain 
terms does not prove contractual ambiguity. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. P & H Cattle Co.. 
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248 Fed. Appx. 942, 947 (10th Cir. Kan. 2007) (citation omitted). 
A court must construe each section of the contract in the context of and 
consistent with the entire agreement, rather than critically analyzing a single provision, 
id. at 948 (citation omitted). "A court's job is to use common sense and not to strain to 
create an ambiguity in a written instrument when one does not exist."Id. (citation 
omitted); see also Nature's Sunshine Prods., Inc. v. Watson, 2007 UT App 383,1J18, 
174 P.3d 647(explaining that a contract should be interpreted as a whole to harmonize 
all of its provisions (citation omitted)). 
In regards to insurance contracts, ambiguities in it are generally construed 
against the insurer. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Worthinqton. 46 F.3d 1005,1008 (10th Cir. 
1995). Moreover, under Utah law, courts strictly construe against the insurer provisions 
that limit or exclude coverage. See United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Sandt. 854 P.2d 
519, 523 (Utah 1993). 
Duty to Defend 
In Utah, as a general rule, an insurer's duty to defend is determined by 
comparing the language of the insurance policy with the allegations of the complaint. 
Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. v. Cloud Nine. LLC. 464 F. Supp. 2d 1161, 1165 (D. Utah 2006) 
(citing Fire Ins. Exch. v. Estate of Therkelsen. 2001 UT48, fl21, 27 P.3d 555 (Utah 
2001) (quotations omitted)); see also Benjamin v. Arnica Mut. Ins. Co.. 2006 UT 37, 
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fl16, 140 P.3d 1210 ("When we engage in a duty-to-defend analysis, we focus on two 
documents: the insurance policy and the complaint. An insureds duty to defend is 
determined by comparing the language of the insurance policy with the allegations of 
the complaint." (citations and quotations omitted)). 
A duty to defend arises "when the insurer ascertains facts giving rise 
to potential liability under the insurance policy." Sharon Steel Corp. v. Aetna 
Cas.&Sur., 931 P.2d 127,133 (Utah 1997). When the allegations, if proven, 
show "there is no potential liability [under the policy], then there is no duty to 
defend." Deseret Fed. Sav. v. U.S. Fid. & Guar.. 714 P.2d 1143,1147 (Utah 
1986).... If one claim or allegation triggers the duty to defend, the insurer 
must defend all claims (that is, covered and non-covered claims), at least 
until the suit is limited to the non-covered claims, jd- at 1216. Finally, and 
perhaps most important: "'When in doubt, defend."1 id- at 1215 (quoting 
Appleman on Ins. Law & Practice § 136.2[C] (2d ed. 2006)). 
]d. at 166: see also Benjamin. 2006 UT at fl17 ("Because the duty to defend is contractual, 
our starting point must always be the underlying policy." (citation omitted)). 
Moreover: 
Where an insurance policy obligates an insurer to defend claims of 
unintentional injury, the insurer is obligated to do so until those claims are 
either dismissed or otherwise resolved in a manner inconsistent with 
coverage. Even where the complaint details egregious, intentional conduct, 
an expected injury exclusion like the one found in the Homeowners Policy 
does not relieve an insurer of its duty to defend claims of unintentional injury. 
Inferences and assumptions about an insured's intent to injure are improper 
and inconsistent both with the well-accepted practice of alternative pleading 
and with our oft-repeated instruction that "insurance policies should be 
construed liberally in favor of the insured and their beneficiaries so as to 
promote and not defeat the purposes of insurance." 
Benjamin. 2006 UT-at 1J24 (citation omitted)(emphasis added). 
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"An insurer denying a duty to defend must establish that the claims fall outside 
the coverage of the policy or the claims are exempted from coverage." Simmons v. 
Farmers Ins. Group, 877 P.2d 1255, 1258 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). Any language limiting 
the duty to defend, "must be clear, unambiguous, and sufficiently conspicuous" to give 
the appropriate notice to the insured of the limitations. ]d. (citation omitted). 
Advertising Idea 
The relevant portion of the Commercial Lines Policy ("Policy") provides: 
Section I - Coverages... 
B1 . . . a. We will pay those sums that the insured becomes legally 
obligated to pay as damages because of "personal advertising 
injury[.]".. . [W]e will have no duty to defend the insured against 
any "suit" seeking damages for "personal and advertising injury" to 
Which this insurance does not apply... 
2. Exclusions.. . 
a. Knowing Violation of Rights of Another... 
. b. Material Published With Knowledge of Falsity... 
g. Quality or Performance of Goods - Failure to Conform 
to Statements 
"Personal and advertising injury" arising out of the 
failure of goods, products or services to conform with 
any statement of quality or performance made in your 
"advertisement.". 
Section VI - Definitions... 
1. "Advertisement" means a notice that is broadcast or published 
to the general public or specific market segments about your 
goods, products or services for the purpose of attracting customers 
or supporters.... 
8 
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14. . . f. The use of another's advertising idea in your 
advertisement!.] 
(Price Decl. Ex. 1, pp. 11, 12, 19, 21 )(emphasis added). 
1 Underlying Glass Action Suits 
Plaintiffs maintain that because of their use of another's2 advertising slogans 
"Eat All You Want And Still Lose Weight" and "And We Couldn't Say It in Print If it 
Wasn't True," several suits, including class actions suits have been filed against them. 
Plaintiffs claim that they are entitled to insurance coverage by Defendant because the 
suite arose out of Plaintiffs' use of another's advertising ideas. 
The Miller Complaint was initially filed in the U.S. District Court in Utah on 
November 9, 2007. An Amended Complaint3 was filed May 23, 2008. Miller's causes 
2The slogans are registered trademarks of Western Holding, LLC. The slogans were not 
registered until June 3, 2008, the Miller complaint was filed against Plaintiffs and others, in the U.S. 
District Court in Utah on November 9, 2007, and the Tompkins complaint was filed in California state court 
on December 6, 2007. The Policies were issued from August 20, 2007, to August 20, 2008, number 
CA000011665-01, and August 20, 2008, to August 20, 2009, number CA000011665-02. Section 1(B)(1)(b) 
provides that the "insurance policy applies to 'personal and advertising injury1 caused by an offense... if 
the offense was not committed before the Retroactive Date of August 20, 2002[.]n 
3Provides in relevant part: 
1. This nationwide class action seeks to redress the pervasive pattern of 
fraudulent, deceptive and otherwise improper advertising, sales and marketing practices 
that Defendants [in the matter before this Court, includes in-part, Plaintiffs] have engaged 
in, and are currently engaged in, with respect to weight-loss dietary supplement products; 
specifically, AkSvar 20/50 7. As part of their pervasive pattern of wrongful conduct, 
during the Class period Defendants have utilized (and continue to utilize) the U.S. mail 
and interstate wire facilities, including television, Internet, point-of-purchase 
advertisements and advertisements published in national print publications (such as 
Parade magazine) to advertise, label, offer for sale, sell and distribute Akavar by falsely 
claiming that Akavar is a "New! European Weight-Loss Breakthrough" product that offers 
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of action include: (1) Violations fo Section 1962(c),(d) of RICO, (2) Violations fo Section 
1962(c),(d) of RICO, (3) Violations of Section 76-10-1603(3), (4) of the Utah Pattern of 
Unlawful Activity Act, (4) Violations of Section 76-10-1603(3), (4) of the Utah Pattern of 
Unlawful Activity Act, (5) Fraud, (6)Violation of the Utah Consumer Services Protection 
Act and Other Consumer Protection Statutes, (7) Unjust Enrichment, and (8) Negligent 
Misrepresentation. 
The Tompkins Complaint4 was filed on or around December 21, 2007, in the 
California Superior Court, Sacramento County. Tompkins1 causes of action include: (1) 
Violations of the Unfair Competition Law, the Deceptive, False and Misleading 
a "foolproof alternative to weight loss with "guaranteed success and "WITHOUT 
GRUELING DIET AND EXERCISE REGIMENS!".. . . Defendants' advertisements for 
Akavar falsely and misleadingly state that "Studies have provide a virtual 100% success 
rate among the participants," and that by taking the product the consumer will see excess 
fat "PULLED FROM BULGING PARTS OF YOUR BODY." 
(Price Deck Ex. 3, p. 2, 7). 
4Claims in relevant part: 
Defendants [includes Plaintiffs in-part, in the entitled matter] have used television, 
the internet, and national publication to advertise Akavar as a product that offer "foolproof 
alternative to weight loss with "guaranteed success" and "WITHOUT GRUELING DIET 
AND EXERCISE REGIMENS!" These advertisements also falsely state that "Studies 
have proved a virtual 100% success rate among the participants," and that by using the 
product the consumer will see excess fat "PULLED FROM BULGING PARTS OF YOUR 
BODY." Defendants also falsely allege that the results are "scientific fact, documented by 
published medical findings" and that "a team of doctors working in a recognized medical 
university discovered the caloric-restricting qualities" of Akavar. However, in truth, Akavar 
is not a foolproof alternative to weight loss with guaranteed success, and the product has 
not been subjected to clinical trials. 
(Price Decl. Ex. 4, pp.2-3, no. 3). 
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Advertising Statutes, and (2) Violations of Consumer Legal Remedies Act. 
The Forlenza Complaint5 was filed on May 26, 2009, in the U.S. District Court 
Central District of California. Forlenza's causes of action include: (1) Violation of 
California Legal Remedies Act, (2) Unjust Enrichment, (3) Fraud, (4) Violation of 
California Business and Professions Code Sections 1700 et seq, and (5) Breach of 
Warranty. 
2 Plaintiffs' Legal Argument 
Plaintiffs' primary argument for coverage is pursuant to the terms of "advertising 
injury." Specifically, Plaintiffs maintain that because they used the advertising ideas of 
another, that is Western Holding, LLC, they are entitled to coverage pursuant to Section 
Vl(14)(f), which provides in relevant part, "'Personal and advertising injury'" means 
injury including consequential 'bodily injury' arising out of one or more of the following 
offenses... [t]he use of another's advertising idea in your 'advertisement[.]'w (Price 
5Asserts in relevant part: 
Akavar claims to be the "fastest, easiest weight loss ever." It purports to allow 
consumers to "eat all you want and lose weight." Defendants [includes Plaintiffs in-part, in 
the entitled matter] claim that Akavar makes weight loss "effortless" by "automatically 
reducing] caloric intake.. .and eliminating traditional dieting, calorie counting, strenuous 
exercise, fad diets, supermarket 'miracle' pills, Japanese wonder diets, rubber suits, belts, 
creams or anything else you have ever tried before." However, Akavar is use one of 
those "miracle pills" it derides. Defendants attempt to sell Akavar by convincing 
consumers that they can avoid the only proven and safe weight-loss method recognized 
by the FDA. 
(Price Decl. Ex. 5, p. 6, no. 21). 
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Decl. Ex. 1, p. 21)(emphasis added). 
The two specific "advertising ideas" that Plaintiffs maintain fall into the coverage 
provision are: (1) primarily, "Eat All You Want & Still Lose Weight" and, (2) "And We 
Couldn't Say It In Print If It Wasn't True." Plaintiffs' reliance on case law and the 
causes of action of the class action complaints against Plaintiffs is misplaced. 
For example, Plaintiffs rely on the two-part test set out in Novell, Inc. v. Fed. Ins. 
Co., 141 F.3d 983, 989 (10th Cir. Utah 1998), to determine an advertising injury. The 
test requires a (1) predicate offense and (2) a causal connection. ]d. The Novell court 
explained that the "predicate offense" is that which is specifically listed in the definition 
of "advertising injury." ]d. at 986. Additionally, the "advertising injury must have a 
causal connection with the insured's advertising activities before there can be 
coverage." ]d. at 989 (citation and quotations omitted). 
The predicate offenses as unambiguously provided in Defendant's Policy 
provides: 
"Personal and advertising injury" means injury including 
consequential "bodily injury" arising out of one or more of the following 
offenses: 
a. False arrest, detention, or imprisonment; 
b. Malicious prosecution; 
c. The wrongful eviction from, wrongful entry into, or invasion 
of the right of private occupancy of a room, dwelling or 
premises that person occupies, committed by or on behalf of 
its owner, landlord, or lessor; 
d. Oral or written! publication in any manner of material that 
12 
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slanders or libels a person or organization or disparages a 
person's or organization's goods, products, or services; 
e. Oral or written publication, in any manner, of material that 
violates a person's right of privacy; 
f. The use of another's advertising idea in your 
"advertisement"; or 
g. Infringing upon another's copyright trade dress or slogan in 
your "advertisement." 
(Price Decl. Ex. 1, p. 21, no. 14) (emphasis added). 
While Plaintiffs maintain that the class action suits were the result of their use of 
the noted slogans, upon review of the complaints it is apparent that the basis of the 
claim against Plaintiffs is the failed promise of weight loss without any behavior or 
lifestyle changes and not the use of the phrases "Eat All You Want & Still Lose Weight" 
and "And We Couldn't Say It In Print If It Wasn't True" to advertise Akavar. Supra nn. 
3-5 (emphasis added). 
Plaintiffs also rely on unpublished cases and cases in other jurisdictions for 
support of their argument of an "advertising idea." (Pis' Mem. In Supp. fn. 18-25); see 
McLaughlin v. Schenk. 2009 UT 64, if 17, 220 P.3d 146 (explaining that in the absence 
of Utah [i.e. jurisdictional] precedent, the court looks to Utah statutes and case law from 
other jurisdictions for guidance (citation omitted)); see also generally Huslev v. Astreue. 
280 Fed. Appx. 756, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 12006 (10th Cir. 2008) (explaining that while 
an unpublished decision is not precedential it could be cited for its persuasive value 
consistent with 10th Cir. R. 32.1, although the case relied on by the lower court was 
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found to have little persuasive value because it was materially distinguishable from the 
case at hand)(unpublished). 
However, a tenth circuit court has recently issued a decision in which "advertising 
injury" is clearly defined. DISH Network Corp. v. Arch Specialty Ins. Co.. 734 F. Supp. 
2d 1173, 1183 (D. Colo. 2010). Although this is not the verbatim language of 
Defendant's Policy, it is comparable i.e., misappropriation6 versus use7. See 
Warburton v. Virginia Beach Fed. S & L Ass'n. 899 P.2d 779, 782 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) 
(holding that ordinary meaning of contract terms are often best determined through 
standard dictionaries). The court in DISH Network explained: 
Most courts hold that "misappropriation of advertising ideas" means 
the "wrongful taking of the manner by which another advertises its goods 
or services" or the "wrongful taking of an idea about the solicitation of 
business." The misappropriation of advertising ideas must occur "in the 
elements of the advertising itself, in its text, form, logo, or pictures, rather 
than in the product being advertised." 
734 F. Supp. 2d at 1183 (citations omitted)(emphasis added). The latter sentence is 
enlightening as it applies in the matter before this Court. 
6Defined as: "to appropriate wrongIy[.]" Merriam-Webster Dictionary, 
http://w\AAA/.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/misappropriate. 
7
 Defined as: "the act or practice of employing something; the fact or state of being used; a 
method or manner of employing or applying something!.]" Merriam-Webster Dictionary, 
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/use. 
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To clarify, the Ohio Casualty court provided a definition of "advertising idea8." 
The court explained that "[a]n 'advertising idea' is an idea for calling public attention to 
a product or business, especially by proclaiming desirable qualities so as to increase 
sales or patronage." 464 F. Supp. 2d at 1166 (citations and quotations omitted). This 
definition is parallel to the Policy definition of "advertisement." See supra 8.. 
Based upon the foregoing, the "advertising injury" from the "use" of an 
"advertising idea" must arise "in the elements of the advertising itself, in its text, form, 
logo, or pictures, rather than in the product being advertised" DISH Network Inc., 734 
F. Supp. 2d at 1183 (citations omitted)(emphasis added). As is apparent from review of 
the class action complaints, the claims against Plaintiffs stem from the failed promise of 
the performance of the supplement i.e., the promise to cause weight loss without any 
changes in lifestyle. See supra nn. 3-5 (emphasis added). While there are references 
to the trademarked slogans of "Eat all You Want & Still Lose Weight" and, "And We 
Couldn't Say It In Print If It Wasn't True," this is not the basis of the complaints. See 
supra nn. 3-5. 
Accordingly, coverage is excluded pursuant to Policy Section 1(B)(2). (Price Decl. 
Ex. 1, p. 11-12): see Ohio Casualty Ins. Co.. 464 F. Supp. 2d at ("[l]n Utah, as a 
defendant's Policy does not provide a definition for "advertising idea," rather it provides a 
definition for "advertisemenfas "a notice that is broadcast or published to the general public or specific 
market segments about your goods, products or services for the purpose of attracting customers or 
supporters." (Price Decl. Ex. 1, p. 19, no. 1). 
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general rule, an insurer's duty to defend is determined by comparing the language of 
the insurance policy with the allegations of the complaint.... [T]the allegations, if 
proven, show there is no potential liability [under the policy], then there is no duty to 
defend." (citations and quotations omitted)). 
The relevant jurisdictional cases as cited by Plaintiffs, are factually 
distinguishable and therefore, not persuasive. Compare Novell, Inc., 141 F.3dat985 
(party asserting claim against plaintiff, that plaintiff "effectively appropriated and 
usurped his research, development, and marketing efforts, and undermined his ability 
to market and license his product"); DISH Network Corp., 734 F. Supp. 2d at 1176 
(explaining that plaintiff insured, cable television providers, sued for a declaratory 
judgment that defendant insurers were obligated to defend them in a suit wherein a 
patent holder alleged patent infringement from the insureds' use of automated 
telephone systems, that allowed customers to perform pay-per-view ordering and 
customer service functions over the telephone); Ohio Casualty Ins. Co.. 464 F. Supp. 
2d at 1164 ("According to Unigard, Edizone's Complaint triggers a duty to defend under 
the 'advertising injury' portion of the Policy because it alleges that the Cloud Nine 
Defendants used Edizone's 'advertising ideas' (the trade names GellyComb, Gelastic, 
and Intelli-Gel) in their advertisement, all to Edizone's detriment."); Jewelers Mut. Ins. v. 
16 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Milne Jewelry Co.. 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90551, *9-10 (D. Utah, Dec. 14, 2006) 
("Plaintiff argues that the term 'quality' refers to a certain characteristic, and that being 
of Native American origin is a quality contemplated by the policy. Defendant replies that 
the term 'quality' in the policy relates not to a characteristic, such as Native American 
authenticity, but rather, to the fitness of the product[.]"); ( Elcom Techs.. Inc. v. Hartford 
Ins. Co.. 991 F. Supp. 1294, 1295 (D. Utah 1997) ("Phoenex Corporation filed a lawsuit 
(the underlying action) against Elcom sometime in November of 1995. In the underlying 
action, Phoenex alleged that Elcom willfully and deliberately infringed upon Phoenex's 
patents by manufacturing and selling a product known as the ezPHONE. Phoenex also 
asserted that Elcom falsely claimed in its advertising brochures that the ezPHONE is 
based upon patented technology."); ( Tynan's Nissan. Inc. v. Am. Hardware Mut. Ins.. 
917 P.2d 321, 325 (Colo Ct. App. 1995) ("We agree with the trial court's interpretation 
of the policy here that a generic style of doing business not related to advertising 
activities is not covered under the policy.") 
. Conclusion 
Because Plaintiffs failed to show that as a matter of law they are entitled to 
coverage pursuant to the unambiguous terms of the Policy, Plaintiffs' Motion for 
Summary Judgment is DENIED. 
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Furthermore, because Defendant established that pursuant to the unambiguous 
exclusion provision of the Policy that Plaintiffs claims are claims premised upon 
Akavar's "performance" and not the use of the slogans "Eat All You Want & Still Lose 
Weight" and "And We Couldn't Say It In Print If It Wasn't True," Defendant's Motion is 
GRANTED. 
The following Ruling stands as the Order of the Court. No further order is 
required. 
Dated this 24th day of May, 2011. 
BY THE COURT: 
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ADMIRAL INSURANCE COMPANY 
A STOCK COMPANY 
(herein called "the Company) 
COMMON POLICY DECLARATIONS 
Policy No.: CA000011665-01 Renewal/Rewrite of: NEW 
I Named Insured and Mailing Address 
COVARKLLC 
DBA: BASIC RESEARCH LLC 
5742 W HAROLD GATTY DRIVE 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84116 
Policy Period: From 08/20/2007 To 08/20/2008 At I2til AM. Standard Time at the address of the Named Insured as staled herein 
THE NAMED INSURED IS: D Individual; •Partnership; D Corporation; D Joint Venture; 0 Other 
BUSINESS DESCRIPTION: VITAMINS, HERBAL & NATURAL SUPPLEMENTS ^ 
AUDIT PERIOD: 0 Annual; D Other 
IN RETURN FOR THE PAYMENT OF THE PREMIUM AND SUB JECT TO ALL TI3E TERMS OF THIS POUCY, WE AGREE 
WITH YOU TO PROVIDE THE INSURANCE AS STATED IN THIS POLICY. 
THIS POLICY CONSISTS OF THE FOLLOWING COVERAGES FOR WHICH A PREMIUM IS INDICATED. THIS PREMIUM 
TUA v UR STmmrrrTn AnTTTSTK4T7NrT M Y BE UBJECT O DJU ME . 
NOTICE Commercial Property Coverage
 r ^ M ,' t " WllU  $ 
*3j3«W ** ®*& axfcta ce may otherwise be provided 
ConmK1cialGCneralLua,iKtyC0vCragc '^^Tg£fjffJSfiBf $ $ 6 8 7 ' ° ° a 0 0 
Equipn.entBreakdovmCbverBg. *"*" ^ * * *<»»* 8fleM " * * » • $ 
Coverage $ 
PREMIUM: $ $687,000.00 
TERRORISM PREMIUM: $ 
^ • TOTAL PREMIUM: $ $687,000.00 
Form(s) and Endorsements) made a part of this poHcy at inception: 
REFER TO SCHEDULE OF FORMS, Al 0018 03 98 
This policy is not binding unless countersigned by Admiral IhsuTance Company or it's authorized representative. 
Countersigned On: 10/10/07 
At Seattle, WA •_ Br' 
\^J Authorized Representative vl 
THESE COMMON POLICY DECLARATIONS AND, IF APPLICABLE, THE COMMERCIAL PROPERTY COVERAGE, THE COMMERCIAL GENERAL 
LIABILITY DECLARATIONS TOGETHER WITH THE COMMON POLICY CONDITIONS, COVERAGE PART(S), FORM(S> AND ENDORSEMENTS, IF 
ANY, ISSUES TO FORM A PART THEREOF, COMPLETE THE ABOVE NUMBER POLICY. 
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DECLARATIONS 
Policy No.: CA000011665-01 Effective Date: 08/2072007 12:01 A. M., Standard Time 
LIMITS OF INSURANCE 
General Aggregate Limit 
(Other Than Products- Completed Operations) 
Products - Completed Operations Aggregate limit 
Personal and Advertising Injury limit 
Each Occurrence limit 
Damage To Premises Rented To You Limit 
Medical Expense Limit 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
5,000,000 
5,000,000 
5,000,000 
5,000,000 
50,000 
EXCLUDED 
Any One Premises 
Any One Person 
RETROACTIVE DATES 
Coverages A and B of this insurance does not apply to "bodily injury", "personal injury", "property damage" or "advertising 
injury* which occurs before the Retroactive Date, if any, shown here: 08/20/2002 
(Enter Date or "None" if no Retroactive Date Applies) 
PREMIUM 
I {Code NoTj 1 Premium Basis Rate Per 11 Advance Premium I Classification 
DERATIONS RATED AS: VITAMINS, HERBAL & NATURAL 
JUPPLEMENTS 
52343 $106,860,840 (3) $1,580 $1,000 $168,840.00 
Cosmectics 
$101,139,158 (3) $3,790 $1,000 $383,317.00 
Ingestables 
$52,000,000 (3) $2,593 $1,000 $134,843.00 
Foreign 
Total Advanced Premium 
Minimum Term Premium 
$687,000.00 
$618300.00 
ADDITIONAL DECLARATIONS 
When used as a Premium basis: 
(1) "remuneration" means the entire remuneration earned timing the policy period by proprietors and by all employees of the Named Insured other 
man chauffeurs (except operators of mobile equipment) and aircraft pilots and co-pilots, subject to any overtime earnings or 
limitation or remuneration rule applicable in accordance with the manuals in use by the Company, 
(2) "cost" means me total cost to the Named fcisured with respect to operations perfbmied for fte Named msured during the policy period by 
independent contractors of all work let or sub-let in connection with each specific project, including the cost of all labor, materials and 
equipment furnished, used or delivered for use in the execution of such work, whether furnished by the owner, contractor or sub-contractor, 
including all fees, allowances, bonuses or commissions made, paid or due. 
(3) "sales" means the gross amount of money charged by the Named msured, his concessionaires, and others ttading under his name, for goods and 
products sold or distributed, operations performed (installation, repair or servicing), dues or fees and rentals during me policy term, and 
includes taxes, other man taxes which the Named msured and such others collect as a separate item and remit directly to a governmental 
division. 
THESE DECLARATIONS ARE PART OF THE POLICY DECLARATIONS CONTAINING THE NAME OF THE INSURED AND 
THE POLICY PERIOD 
>E20 02 0700 Page 1 of 1 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
J/W Case 2:09-cv-0087PCW Document 24-3 Filed 05/0SK)10 Page 7 of 59 Rl 
COMMERCIAL GENERAL IIABILTTY 
CG 00 02 12 04 
COMMERCIAL GENERAL LIABILITY COVERAGE FORM 
COVERAGES A AND B PROVIDE 
CLAIMS-MADE COVERAGE 
PLEASE RE AD THE ENTIRE FORM CAREFULLY 
Various provisions in this policy restrict coverage. Read the 
entire policy carefully to determine rights, duties and what 
is and is not covered. 
Throughout this policy the words "you* and "your* refer to 
the Named Insured shown in the Declarations, and any 
other person or organization qualifying as a Named Lisured 
under this policy. The words "we", "us" and "our" refer to 
the Company providing this insurance. 
The word "insured" means any person or organization 
qualifying as such under Section II - Who Is An Insured. 
Other words and phrases that appear in quotation marks 
have special meaning. Refer to Section VI - Definitions. 
SECTION I - COVERAGES 
COVERAGE A BODILY INJURY AND PROPERTY 
DAMAGE LIABILITY 
1. Insuring Agreement 
a. We will pay those sums that the insured becomes 
legally obligated to pay as damages because of 
"bodily injury" or "property damage" to which this 
insurance applies. We will have the right and duty 
to defend the insured against any "suit" seeking 
those damages. However, we will have no duty to 
defend the insured against any "suit" seeking dam-
ages for "bodily injury" or "property damage" to 
which this insurance does not apply. We may, at 
our discretion, investigate any "occurrence" and 
settle any claim or "suit" that may result. But: 
(1) The amount we will pay for damages is lim-
ited as described in Section HI - Limits Of 
Insurance; and 
(2) Our right and duty to defend ends when we 
have used up the applicable limit of insurance 
in the payment of judgments or settlements 
under Coverages A or B or medical expenses 
under Coverage C. 
No other obligation or liability to pay sums or per-
form acts or services is covered unless explicitly 
provided for under Supplementary Payments -
Coverages A and B» 
b. This insurance applies to "bodily injury" and 
"property damage" only if: 
(1) The "bodily un'roy" or "property damage" is 
caused by an "occurrence" mat takes place in 
the "coverage territory"; 
(2) The "bodily injury" or "property damage" did 
not occur before the Retroactive Date, if any, 
shown in the Declarations or after the end of 
the policy period; and 
(3) A claim for damages because of me "bodily 
injury" or "property damage" is first made 
against any insured, in accordance with Para-
graph c. below, during the policy period or 
any Extended Reporting Period we provide 
under Section V - Extended Reporting Peri-
ods. 
c. A claim by a person or organization seeking dam-
ages will be deemed to have been made at the ear-
lier of the following times: 
(1) When notice of such claim is received and re-
corded by any insured or by us, whichever 
comes first; or 
(2) When we make settlement in accordance with 
Paragraph l.a. above. 
.All claims tor damages because of "bodily injury" 
to the same person, including damages claimed by 
any person or organization for care, loss of serv-
ices, or death resulting at any time from the "bod-
ily injury", will be deemed to have been made at 
the time the first of those claims is made against 
any insured. 
All claims for damages because of "property dam-
age" causing loss to the same person or organiza-
tion will be deemed to have been made at the time 
the first of those claims is made against amy in-
sured. 
2. Exclusions 
This insurance does not apply to: 
a. Expected Or Intended Injury 
"Bodfy hrjnry" or "property damage" expected or 
intended from the standpoint of the insured This 
exclusion does not apply to "bodily injury" result-
ing from the use of reasonable force to protect per-
sons or property. 
b. Contractual Liability 
"Bodily injury"1 or "property damage" for which 
the insured is obligated to pay damages by reason 
of the assumption of liability in a contract or 
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This exclusion does not apply to the loss of use of 
other property arising out of sudden and accidental 
physical injury to "your product" or "your work" 
after it has been put to its intended use. 
n. Recall Of Products, Work Or Impaired 
Property 
Damages claimed for any loss, cost or expense in-
curred by you or others for the loss of use, with-
drawal, recall, inspection, repair, replacement, 
adjustment, removal or disposal of: 
(1) "Ycro product"; 
(2) "Your work*; or 
(3) "Impaired property*1; 
if such product, work, or property is withdrawn or 
recalled from the market or from use by any per-
son or organization because of a known or sus-
pected defect, deficiency, inadequacy or dangerous 
condition in i t 
o. Personal And Advertising Injury 
"Bodily mjury" arising out of "personal and ad-
vertising injury". 
p» Electronic Data 
Damages arising out of me loss o£ loss of use of, 
damage to, corruption o£ inability to access, or in-
ability to manipulate electronic data. 
As used in this exclusion, electronic data means in-
formation, facts or programs stored as or on, cre-
ated or used on, or bransmitied to or from com-
puter software, including systems and applications 
software, hard or floppy disks, CD-ROMS, tapes, 
drives, cells, data processing devices or any other 
media which are used with electronically con-
trolled equipment. 
Exclusions c through n- do not apply to damage by fire 
to premises while rented to you or temporarily occu-
pied by you with permission of the owner. A separate 
limit of insurance applies to this coverage as described 
in Section HI — Limits Of Insurance. 
COVERAGE B PERSONAL AND ADVERTISING 
INJURY LIABILITY 
1. Insuring Agreement 
a. We will pay those sums that the insured becomes 
legally obligated to pay as damages because of 
"personal and advertising injury" to which this in-
surance applies. We will have the right and duty to 
defend me insured against any "suit" seeking those 
damages. However, we will have no duty to defend 
the insured against any "suit* * seeking damages for 
"personal and advertising injury" to which mis in-
surance does not apply. We may, at our discretion, 
investigate any offense and settle any claim or 
"suit" that may result But: 
(1) The amount we will pay for damages is lim-
ited as described in Section IH - Limits Of 
Insurance; and 
(2) Our right and duty to defend end when we 
have used up the applicable limit of insurance 
in the payment of judgments or settlements 
under Coverages A or B or medical expenses 
under Coverage C. 
No other obligation or liability to pay sums or per-
form acts or services is covered unless explicitly 
provided for under Supplementary Payments -
Coverages A and B. 
b. This msurance applies to "personal and advertising 
injury" caused by an offense arising out of your 
business, but only if: 
(1) The offense was cxmimrttedin tic "coverage 
territory"; 
(2) The offense was not committed before the 
Retroactive Date, if any, shown in the Decla-
rations or after the end of the poKcy period; 
and 
(3) A claim for damages because of the "personal 
and advertising injury" is first made against 
any insured, in accordance with Paragraph c. 
below, during the policy period or any Ex-
tended Reporting Period we provide under 
Section V - Extended Reporting Periods. 
c A claim made by a person or organization seeking 
damages will be deemed to have been made at the 
earlier of the following tunes: 
(1) When notice of such claim is received and re-
corded by any insured or by us, whichever 
comes first; or 
(2) When we make settlement in accordance with 
Paragraph 1 .a. above. 
All claims for damages because of "personal and 
advertising injury" to the same person or organi-
zation as a result of an offense will be deemed to 
have been made at the time the firs: of those 
claims is made against any insured. 
Exclusions 
This insurance does not apply to: 
a. Knowing Violation Of Rights Of Another 
"Personal and advertising injury" caused by or at 
the direction of the insured with the knowledge 
that the act would violate the rights of another and 
would inflict "personal and advertising injury". 
b. Material Published With Knowledge Of Falsity 
"Personal and advertising injury" arising out of 
oral or written publication of material, if done by 
or at the dire 
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c. Material Published Prior To Policy Period 
"Personal and advertising injury" arising out of 
oral or written publication of material whose first 
publication took place before the Retroactive Date, 
if any, shown in the Declarations. 
d. Criminal Acts 
'Personal and advertising injury" arising out of a 
criminal act committed by or at the direction of the 
insured. 
e. Contractual Liability 
"Personal and advertising injury" for which the in-
sured has assumed liability in a contract or agree-
ment. This exclusion does not apply to liability for 
damages that the insured would have in the ab-
sence of the contractor agreement 
L Breach Of Contract 
"Personal and advertising injury*' arising ont of a 
breach of contract, except an implied contract to 
use another's advertising idea in your "advertise-
menr". 
g. Quality Or Performance Of Goods - Failure To 
Conform To Statements 
"Personal and advertising injury" arising out of the 
failure of goods, products or services to conform 
with any statement of quality or performance made 
in your "advertisement". 
h. Wrong Description Of Prices 
"Personal and advertising injury" arising out of the 
wrong description of the price of goods, products 
or services stated in your "advertisement". 
i Infringement Off Copyright, Patent, Trademark 
Or Trade Secret 
"Personal and advertising injury" arising out of the 
infringement of copyright, patent, trademark, trade 
secret or other intellectual property rights. 
However, this exclusion does not apply to in-
fringement, in your "advertisement", of copyright, 
trade dress or slogan 
j . Insureds In Media And Internet Type Bus*-
"Personal and advertising injury" corniuttedbyan 
insured whose business is: 
(1) Advertising, broadcasting, publishing or tele-
casting; 
(2) Designing or determining content or web-sites 
for others; or 
(3) An Internet search, access, content or service 
provider. 
However, this exclusion does not apply to Para-
graphs 14a., b. and c. of "personal and advertising 
injury" under the Definitions Section 
For the purposes of this exclusion, the placing of 
frames, borders or links, or advertising, for you or 
others anywhere on the Internet, is not by itself, 
considered the business of advertising, broadcast-
ing, publishing or telecasting. 
k. Electronic Chatrooms Or Bulletin Boards 
"Personal and advertising injury" arising out of an 
electronic chatroom or bulletin board the insured 
hosts, owns, or over which the insured exercises 
control. 
I. Unauthorized Use Of Another's Name Or 
Product 
"Personal and advertising injury" arising our of the 
unauthorized use of another's name or product in 
your e-mail address, domain name or metatag, or 
any other similar tactics to mislead another's po-
tential customers. 
m. Pollution 
'Personal and advertising injury" arising out of the 
actual, alleged or threatened discharge, dispersal, 
seepage, migration, release or escape of "pollut-
ants" at any time. 
n. Pollution-Related 
Any loss, cost or expense arising out of any: 
(1) Request, demand, order or statutory or regu-
latory requirement that any insured or others 
test for, monitor, clean up, remove, contain, 
treat, detoxify or neutralize, or in any way re-
spond to, or assess the effects o£ "pollutants"; 
or 
(2) Claim or suit by or on behalf of a govern-
mental authority for damages because of test-
ing for, monitoring, cleaning up, removing, 
containing, treating, detoxifying or neutraliz-
ing, or in any way responding to, or assessing 
the effects of, "rwtfutants". 
o. War 
'Personal and advertising injury", however caused, 
arising, directly or mdirectly, out of: 
(1) War, mcluding undeclared or civil war; 
(2) Warlike action by a military force, including 
action in hindering or defending against an 
actual or expected attack, by any government, 
sovereign or other authority using military 
personnel or other agents; or 
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b. This insurance applies to such liability assumed by 
Reinsured; 
c The obligation ID defend, or the cost of the defense 
o£ that indemnitee, has also been assumed by the 
insured in the same "insured contract"; 
d. The allegations in the "suit" and the information 
we know about the "occutxence" are such that no 
conflict appears to exist between the interests of 
the insured and the interests of the indemnitee; 
e. The indemnitee and die insured ask us to conduct 
and control the defense of that indemnitee against 
such "suit" and agree that we can assign the same 
counsel to defend the insured and the indemnitee; 
and 
f. The indemnitee: 
(1) Agrees in writing to: 
(a) Cooperate with us in the investigation, 
settlement or defense of the "suit"; 
(b) immediately send us copies of any de-
mands, notices, summonses or legal pa-
pers received in connection with the 
"suit"; 
(c) Notify any other insurer whose coverage 
is available to the indemnitee; and 
(d) Cooperate with us with respect to coordi-
nating other applicable insurance avail-
able to the indemnitee; and 
(2) Provides us with written authorization to; 
(a) Obtain records and other information re-
lated to the "suit"; and 
(b) Conduct and control the defense of the 
indemnitee in such "suit". 
So long as the above conditions are met, attorneys' fees 
incurred by us indie defense of that indemnitee, neces-
sary litigation expenses incurred by us and necessary 
litigation expenses incurred by the indemnitee at our 
request will be paid as Supplementary Payments. Not-
withstanding the provisions of Paragraph 2.b.(2) of 
SectionI- Coverage A-Bodily injury And Property 
Damage liability, such payments will not be deemed to 
be damages for "bodily injury4' and "property damage" 
and will not reduce the limits of insurance. 
Our obligation to defend an insured's indemnitee and to 
pay for attorneys' fees and necessary litigation ex-
penses as Supplementary Payments ends when: 
a. We have used up the applicable limit of insurance 
in the payment of judgments or settlements; or 
b. The conditions set forth above, or the terms of the 
agreement described in Paragraph £ above, are no 
longer met 
SECTION H - WHO IS AN INSURED 
1. If you are designated in the Declarations as: 
a. An individual, you and your spouse are insureds, 
but only with respect to the conduct of a business 
of which you are the sole owner. 
b. A partnership or joint venture, you are an insured. 
Your members, your partners, and their spouses 
are also insureds, but only with respect to the con-
duct of your business. 
c A limited liability company, you are an insured 
Your members are also insureds, but only with re-
spect to the conduct of your business. Your man-
agers are insureds, but only with respect to their 
duties as your managers. 
d. An organization other than a partnership, joint 
venture or limited liability company, you are an in-
sured Your "executive officers" and directors are 
insureds, but only with respect to their duties as 
your officers or directors. Your stockholders are 
also insureds, but only with respect to their liabil-
ity as stockholders. 
e. A trust, you are an insured. Your trustees are also 
insureds, but only with respect to their duties as 
trustees. 
2. Each ofthe following is also an insured: 
a. Your "volunteer workers" only while perfonning 
duties related to the conduct of your business, or 
your "employees", other than either your "execu-
tive officers" (if you are an organi2ation other than 
a partnership, joint venture or limited liability 
company) or your managers (if you are a limited 
liability company), but only for acts within the 
scope of their employment by you or while per-
forming duties related to the conduct of your busi-
ness. However, none of these "employees" or 
"volunteer workersM are insureds for: 
(1) "Bodfly injury" or f,personal and adverb i^ng 
h^ury": 
(a) To you, to your partners or members (if 
you are a partnership or joint venture), to 
your members (if you are a limited liabil-
ity company), to a co-"employee" while 
in the course of his or her employment or 
performing duties related to the conduct 
of your business, or to your other "vol-
unteer workers" while perfonning duties 
related to die conduct of your business; 
(b) To the spouse, child, parent, brother or 
sister of that co-"employee" or "volunteer 
worker" as a consequence of Paragraph 
(l)(a) above; 
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(c) For which there is any obligation to share 
damages with or repay someone else who 
must pay damages because of the injury 
described in Paragraphs (l)(a) or (b) 
above; or 
(d) Arising out of his or her providing or 
failing to provide professional health care 
services. 
(2) "Property damage" to property: 
(a) Owned, occupied or used by, 
(b) Rented to, in the care, custody or control 
of, or over which physical control is be-
ing exercised for any purpose by 
you, any of your "employees", "volunteer 
workers", any partner or member (if you are ai 
partnership or joint venture), or any member 
(if you are a limited liability company). 
b. Any person (other than your "employee'1 or "vol-
unteer worker") or any organization while acting 
as your real estate manager. 
c. Any person or organization having proper tejnpo-
rary custody of yourproperty if you die, but only: 
(1) With respect to liabiKty arising out of the 
maintenance or use of that property; and 
(2) Until your legal representative has been ap-
pointed. 
d. Your legal representative if you die, but only with 
respect to du&es as suck That representative will 
have all your rights and duties under this Coverage 
Part 
3, Any organization you newly acquire or form, other 
than a partnership Joint venture or limited liability 
company, and over which you maintain ownership or 
majority interest, will qualify as a Named Insured if 
there is no other similar insurance available to that or-
ganization. However: 
a. Coverage under this provision is afforded only un-
til the 90th day after you acquire or form the or-
ganization or the end of the policy period, which-
ever is earlier; 
b. Coverage A does not apply to "bodily injury" or 
"property damage" that occurred before you ac-
quired or formed the organization; and 
c Coverage B docs not apply to "personal and ad-
vertising injury" arising out of an offense commit-
ted before you acquired or formed the organiza-
tion. 
No person or organization is an insured with respect to the 
conduct of any current or past partnership, joint venture or 
limited liability company that is not shown as a Named 
Insured in the Declarations. 
SECTION m - LIMITS OF INSURANCE 
1. The Limits of Insurance shown in the Declarations and 
the rules below fix the most we will pay regardless of 
the number of: 
a. Insureds; 
b. Claims made or "suits" brought; or 
c Persons or organizations making claims or bring-
ing ,,suitsH. 
2. The General Aggregate Limit is the most we will pay 
forthesumof: 
a. Medical expenses under Coverage C; 
b. Damages under Coverage A, except damages: 
because of "bodily injury" or "property damage" 
included in the "products-completed operations 
hazard"; and 
c. Damages under Coverage B. 
3. The Pmd^:ts-Campleted Operations Aggregate Limit 
is the most we will pay under Coverage A for damages 
because of "bodily injury" and "property damage" in-
cluded in the "products-completed operations hazard". 
4. Subject to 2. above, the Personal and Advertising 
Injury limit is the most we will pay under Coverage B 
for the sum of all damages because of all "personal and 
advertising injury" sustained by any one person or or-
5. Subject to 2. or 3. above, whichever applies, the Each 
Occurrence limit is the most we will pay for the sum 
of: 
a. Damages under Coverage A; and 
b. Medical expenses under Coverage C 
because of all "bodily injury" and "property damage" 
arising out of any one "occurrence". 
6. Subject to 5. above, the Damage To Premises Rented 
To You Limit is the most we will pay under Coverage 
A for damages because of "property damage" to any 
one premises, while rented to you, or in me case of 
damage by fire, while rented to you or temporarily oc-
cupied by you with permission of the owner. 
7. Subject to 5. above, the Medical Expenses Limit is the 
most we will pay under Coverage C for all medical ex-
penses because of "bodily injury" sustained by any one 
person. 
The limits of Insurance of this Coverage Part apply sepa-
rately to each consecutive annual period and to any re-
maining period of less than 12 months, starting with the 
beginning of the policy period shown in the Declarations, 
unless the policy period is extended after issuance for an 
additional; period of less than 12 months. In that case, the? 
additional period will be deemed part of the last preceding 
period for purposes of determining the Limits of Insurance. 
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tai Extended Reporting Period, including a provision to 
the effect that the insurance afforded for claims first re-
ceived during such period is excess over any other 
valid and collectible insurance available under policies 
in force after the Supplemental Extended Reporting Pe-
riod starts. 
6. If the Supplemental Extended Reporting Period is in 
effect, we will provide me supplemental aggregate 
limits of insurance described below, but only for claims 
first received and recorded during the Supplemental 
Extended Reporting Period. 
The supplemental aggregate limits of insurance will be 
equal to the dollar amount shown in the Declarations in 
effect at the end of the policy period for such of the 
following limits of insurance for which a dollar amount 
has been entered: 
General Aggregate limit 
froducts-Completed Operations Aggregate Limit 
Paragraphs 2. and 3. of Section m - Limits Of Insur-
ance will be amended accordingly. The Personal and 
Advertising Injury Limit, the Each Occurrence Limit 
and the Damage To Premises Rented To You limit 
shown in the Declarations will then continue to apply, 
as set forth in Paragraphs 4., 5. and 6. of that Section. 
SECTION VI - DEFINITIONS 
1, "Advertisement" means a notice that is broadcastor 
published to the general public or specific market seg-
ments about your goods, products or services for the 
purpose of attracting customers or supporters. For the 
purposes of this definition: 
a. Notices that are published include material placed 
on the Internet or on similar electronic means of 
communication; and 
b. Regarding web-sites, only that part of a web-site 
that is about your goods, products or services for 
the purposes of attracting customers or supporters 
is considered an advertisement. 
2. "Auto" means: 
a. A land motor vehicle, trailer or semitrailer de-
signed for travel on public roads, including any 
attached machinery or equipment; or 
b. Any other land vehicle that is subject to a compul-
sory or financial responsibility law or other motor 
vehicle insurance law in the state where it is li-
censed or principally garaged. 
However, "auto" does not include "mobile equipment". 
3. "Bodily injury" means bodily injury, sickness or dis-
ease sustained by a person, including death resulting 
ftom any of these at any time. 
4. "Coverage territory" means: 
a. The United States of America (including its terri-
tories and possessions), Puerto Rico and Canada; 
b. International waters or airspace, but only if the 
injury or damage occurs in the course of travel or 
transportation between any places included in a. 
above; or 
c. All other parts of the world if the injury or damage 
arises out of: 
(1) Goods or products made or sold by you in the 
territory described in a. above; 
(2) The activities of a person whose home is in 
the territory described in a. above, but is away 
for a short time on your business; or 
(3) "Personal and advertising injury" offenses that 
take place through the Internet or similar 
electronic means of communication 
provided the insured's responsibility to pay damages is 
determined in a "suit" on the merits, in me territory de-
scribed in a. above or in a settlement we agree to. 
5. "Employee" includes a 'leased worker". "Employee" 
does not include a "temporary worker". 
6. "Executive officer" means a person holding any of the 
officer positions created by your charter, constitution, 
by-laws or any other similar governing document 
7. "Hostile fire" means one which becomes uncontrolla-
ble or breaks out from where it was intended to be. 
8. "Impaired property" Tpfrflftfl tangible property, other 
than "your product" or "your work", that cannot be 
used or is less useful because: 
a. It incorporates "your product" or "your work" that 
is known or thought to be defective, deficient, in-
adequate or dangerous; or 
b. You have failed to fulfill the terms of a contract or 
agreement; 
if such property can be restored to use by: 
a. The repair, replacement, adjustment or removal of 
"your product* or "your work"; or 
b. Your fulfilling the terms of the contract or agree-
ment. 
9. "Insured contract" means: 
a. A contract for a lease of premises. However, that 
portion of the contract for a lease of premises that 
indemnifies any person or organization for damage 
by fire to premises while rented to you or tempo-
rarily occupied by you with permission of the 
owner is not an "insured contract"; 
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b. A sidetrack agreement; 
c. Any easement or license agreement; except in 
connection with construction or demolition opera-
tions on or within 50 feet of a railroad; 
d. An obligation, as required by ordinance, to indem-
nify a municipality, except in connection with 
work for a municipality; 
e. An elevator maintenance agreement; 
f. That part ofany other contract or agreement per-
taining to your business (including an indemnifi-
cation of a municipality in connection with work 
perfoimed for a municipality) under which you as-
sume me tort liability of another party to pay for 
"bodily injury" or "property damage" to a third 
person or organization. Tort liability means a li-
ability that would be imposed by law in the ab-
sence ofany contract or agreement 
Paragraph f. does not include that part of any con-
tract or agreement; 
(1) That indemnifies a raifcoad for "bodify injury" 
or "property damage" arising out of construc-
tion or demolition operations, within 50 feet 
ofany railroad property and affecting any rail-
road bridge or trestle, tracks, road-beds, tun-
nel, underpass or crossing; 
(2) That indemnifies an architect, engineer or sur-
veyor for injuiy or damage arising out of: 
(a) Preparing, approving, or failing to pre-
pare or approve, maps, shop drawings, 
opinions, reports, surveys, field orders, 
change orders or drawings and specifica-
tions; or 
(b) Giving directions or instructions^ or fail-
ing to give them, if that is the primary 
cause of the injury or damage; or 
(3) Under which the insured, if an architect, engi-
neer or surveyor, assumes liability for an in-
. jury or damage arising out of the insured's 
rendering or failure to render professional 
services, including those listed in (2) above 
and supervisory, inspection, architectural or 
engineering activities. 
10. "Leased worker" means a person leased to you by a 
labor leasing firm under an agreement between you and 
the labor leasing firm, to perform duties related to the 
conduct of your business. "Leased worker" does not 
include a "temporary worker". 
11- "Loading or unloading" means the handling of prop-
erty: 
a. After it is moved from the place where it is ac-
cepted for movement into or onto an aircraft, wa-
tercraftor^auto"; 
b. While it is in or on an aircraft, watercraft or 
"auto"; or 
a While it is being moved from an aircraft, water-
craft or "auto" to the place where it is finally de-
livered; 
but "loading or unloading" does not include the move-
ment of property by means of a mechanical device, 
other than a band truck, that is not attached to the air-
craft, watercraft or "auto". 
12. "Mobile equipment" means any of the following types 
of land vehicles, including any attached machinery or 
ecniipment 
a. Bulldozers, farm machinery, forklrf is and other 
vehicles designed for use principally off public 
roads; 
b. Vehicles maintained for use solely on or next to 
premises you own or rent; 
e. Vehicles that travel on crawler treads; 
d. Vehicles, whether self-propelled or not, rnarn-
tained primarily to provide mobility to perma-
nently mounted: 
(1) Power cranes, shovels, loaders, diggers or 
drills; or 
(2) Road construction or resurfacing equipment 
such as graders, scrapers or rollers; 
e. Vehicles not described in a., b., c or d. above that 
are not self-propelled and are maintained primarily 
to provide mobility to permanently attached 
equipment of the following types: 
(1) Air compressors, pumps and generators, in-
cluding spraying, welding, building cleaning, 
geophysical exploration! lighting and well 
servicing equipment; or 
(2) Cherry pickers and similar devices used to 
raise or lower workers; 
f. Vehicles not described in a., b., c. or d. above 
maintained primarily for purposes other than the 
transportation of persons or cargo. 
However, self-propelled vehicles with the follow-
ing types of permanently attached equipment are 
not "mobile equipment" but will be considered 
"autos": 
(1) Equipment designed primarily for: 
(a) Snow removal; 
(b) Road maintenance, but not construction 
or resurfacing; or 
(c) Street cleaning; 
(2) Cherry pickers and similar devices mounted 
on automobile or truck chassis and used to 
raise or lower workers; and 
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(3) Ak compressors, pumps and generators, in-
cluding spraying, welding, building cleaning, 
geophysical exploration, lighting and well 
servicing equipment 
However, "mobile equipment" does not include land 
vehicles that are subject to a compulsory or financial 
responsibility law or other motor vehicle insurance law 
in the state where it is licensed or principally garaged. 
Land vehicles subject to a compulsory or financial re-
sponsibility law or other motor vehicle insurance law 
are considered "autos". 
13. "Occurrence" means an accident, including continuous 
or repeated exposure to substantially the same general 
harmful conditions. 
14. "Personal and advertising injury" means injury, in-
cluding consequential "bodily injury", arising out of 
one or more of the following offenses: 
7u False arrest, detention or irnprisonment; 
b. Malicious prosecution; 
c The wrongful eviction from, wrongful entry into, 
or invasion of the right of private occupancy of a 
room, dwelling or premises that a person occupies, 
committed by or on behalf of its owner, landlord 
or lessor; 
d. Oral or written publication, in any manner, of ma-
terial that slanders or hbels a person or organiza-
tion or disparages a person's or organization's 
goods, products or services; 
e. Oral or written publication, in airy maimer, of ma-
terial that violates a person's right of privacy; 
1 The use of another's advertising idea in your "ad-
vertisement"; or 
g. Infringing upon another's copyright, trade dress or 
slogan in your "advertisement*. 
15. "Pollutants" mean any solid, liquid, gaseous or thermal 
irritant or contaminant, including smoke, vapor, soot, 
fumes, acids, alkalis, chemicals and waste. Waste in-
cludes materials to be recycled, reconditioned or re-
claimed. 
16. "Products-completed operations hazard'*: 
a. Includes all "bodily injury" and "property damage" 
occurring a way from premises you own or rent and 
arising out of "your product" or "your work" ex-
cept 
(1) Products that are still in your physical posses-
sion; or 
(2) Work that has not yet been completed or 
abandoned. However, "your work" will be 
deemed completed at the earliest of the fol-
lowing times: 
(a) When all of the work called for in your 
contract has been completed. 
(b) When all of the work to be done at the 
job site has been completed if your con-
tract calls for work at more man one job 
site. 
(c) When that part of the work done at a job 
site has been put to its intended use by 
any person or organization other than an-
other contractor or subcontractor working 
on the same project 
Work that may need service, maintenance, 
correction, repair or replacement, but which is 
otherwise complete, will be treated as com-
pleted. 
b. Does not include "bodily injury" or "property 
damage" arising out of: 
(1) The transportation of property, unless the in-
jury or damage arises out of a condition in or 
on a vehicle not owned or operated by you, 
and that condition was created by the "loading 
or unloading" of that vehicle by any insured; 
(2) The existence of tools, unmstalled equipment 
or abandoned or unused materials; or 
(3) Products or operations for which the classifi-
cation, listed in the Declarations or in a policy 
schedule, states that products-completed op-
erations are subject to the General Aggregate 
Limit 
17. "Property damage" means: 
a. Physical injury to tangible property, including all 
resulting loss of use of that property. All such loss 
of use shall be deemed to occur at the time of the 
physical injury that caused it; or 
b. Loss of use of tangible property that is not physi-
cally injured. All such loss of use shall be deemed 
to occur at the time of the "occurrence" that 
caused it 
For the purposes of this insurance, electronic data is 
not tangible property. 
As vscd in this definition, electronic data means infor-
mation, facts or programs stored as or on, created or 
used on, or transmitted to or from, computer software, 
including systems and applications software, hard or 
floppy disks, CD-ROMS, tapes, drives, cells, data 
processing devices or any other media which are used 
with electronically controlled equipment. 
18. "Suit" means a civil proceeding in which damages 
because of "bodily injury", "property damage" or "per-
sonal and advertising injury" to which this insurance 
applies are alleged. "Suit" includes: 
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Policy Number CA000011665-01 CG20 26 0704 
Effective Date: 08/20/2007 
THIS ENDORSEMENT CHANGES THE POLICY. PLEASE READ FT CAREFULLY. 
ADDITIONAL INSURED - DESIGNATED 
PERSON OR ORGANIZATION 
This endorsement modifies insurance provided under the following: 
COMMERCIAL GENERAL LIABILITY COVERAGE PART 
SCHEDULE ' 
Name Of Additional Insured Person(s) Or Organizations) 
AS REQUIRED BY WRITTEN CONTRACT PRIOR TO AN "OCCURRENCE" OR LOSS 
Information required to complete this Schedule, if not shown above, will be shown in the Declarations. 
Section II - Who Is An Insured is amended to include 
as an additional insured the person(s) or organization^) 
shown in the Schedule, but only with respect to liability 
for "bodily injury", "property damage" or "personal and 
advertising injury" caused, in whole or in part, by your 
acts or omissions or the acts or omissions of those acting 
on your behalf: 
A. In the performance of your ongoing operations; or 
B. In connection with your premises owned by or rented 
to you. 
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Policy No.: CAOOOOt 1665-02 
ADMIRAL INSURANCE COMPANY 
A STOCK COMPANY 
(heofc called *the Company) 
COMMON POLICY DECLARATIONS 
1 Named Insured and Mailing Address 
COVARZX LLC 
DBA BASIC RESEARCH LLC; 
See Named Insured Schedule A 0 0785 
5742 W HAROLD GATTY DRIVE 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84116 
Renewiil/Rewritcaf: CA0OQ011665-01 
The insurer issuing this poficy does not hold a certificate 
of authority to do business in this state and thus is not 
fufly subject to regulation by the Utah Insurance 
CommrssJoher. Ttiife policy receives no protection from 
any of the guaranty associations created under Chapter 
28. Title 31A{0C31A45-103{8}f: 
Worldwide Facilities, Inc. - License #91434 
Policy Period: ftom OS/2O/20OS To 08/20/2009 At 12:0] AJ^StsuodaidTmieaitbeaddr^ofliifiN^ 
THE NAMED INSURED IS: D Individual; D Partnership; O Corporation; D Joint Venture; 0 Other 
BUSINESS DESCRIPTION: 
AUDIT PERIOD: 
VITAMINS J£ERBAL & NATURAL SUPPLEMENTS 
Ef Annual; D Other 
IN RETURN FOR THE PAYMENT OF THE P 
WITH YOU TO PROVIDE THE INSURANCE AS STATED IN THIS POLICY. 
THIS POLICY CONSISTS OF THE FOLLOWING COVERAGES FOR WHICH A PREMIUM IS INDICATED. THIS PREMIUM 
MAY BE SUBJECT TO ADJUSTMENT. 
Commercial Property Coverage 
Commercial General liability Coverage 
Products/Convicted Operations Liability Coverage 
Equipment Breakdown Coverage 
. . ,. Coverage 
BROKER FEIU2£222£L 
PREMIUM; 
TERRORISM PREMIUM: 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
S 
$475,000,00 
5475,000.00 
TC^TJOfUM: $ $475,000.00 
Form(s) and Bndoisement(s) made a part of this 
, ftEFBR TO SCHEDULE €>F FORMS, Al 00 18 03 
extent as may otherwise be provided herein, the coverage of this 
hi limited generally to liability for only those claims that are firat made against 
the wsurad while the policy h in fore* Pfeeae review the policy carefully and casctisa 
(he coverage thereunderwith your insurance agent or broker 
This policy is not binding unless countersigned by Admiral Insurance Company or it*s aumoroed representative, 
Countersigned On: 
A t 
09/30/08 
Seattle, WA By: * X < r * T ^ &£ 
Authorized Rfipresentative 
THESE COMMON TOUTY EQUATIONS AWK & A**UCABLE,THE COMMERCE PRQEERTY COVERAGE* THE COMMERCIAL GENERAL 
OABHJXY: mcij^iibm7o0 CONDXiipNS, COVERAGE*A$Li(i& K»MGS) AND efebRSEMENts. IF 
ANY, testes to FORM A £ART THE*SOF, coMFiETjs THE ABOVE mtiJmk *6UCY. 
DE20O1 0700 
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COMMERCIAL GENERAL LUBDQITY COVERAGE PART 
DECLARATIONS 
PoDcyNo.: CA000011665-02 Effective Date: 03/20/2008 J 2:01 A. fcL, Standard Time 
LIMITS OF INSURANCE 
General AggregateIw 
(Other Than Products- (krnpieted Operations) 
Products ~ Completed .Operations Aggregate Limit 
Personal and Advertising Injury Limit 
Each Occurrence Limit 
Damage To Premises Rented To Yo<i limit 
Medical Expense Limit 
$ 
$ 
i 
$ 
$ 
1 
5,000,000 
5,000,000 
5,000,000 
5,000,000 
50,000 
EXCLUDED 
Airy One Premises 
Any One Person 
RETROACTIVE DATES 
Coverages A and B of this insurance does not apply to ,1x>dily injury", "personal injury", ^ property damage" or "advertising 
injury" which occurs before die Retroactive Date, if any, shown here: 08/02/2002 
(Enter Date or "None1* if no Retroactive Dace Applies) 
PREMIUM 
Classification tfCodTNoJ | IVemium Basis | j ££» \ f Per | j AdvancePremium j 
OPERATIONS RATED ASr VITAMINS, HERBAL &1SATURAL 
SUrTLEMENIS 
52343 $263,4^,336(3) $L$00 SK0O0 
Total Advanced Premium 
Minimum Term Premium 
$475,000.00 
$475,000.00 
S427.500.00 
ADDmOttAL DECLARATIONS 
When usedas.a Premiumbaste 
<!} "roxiuaaalitMi" means the entire remitaetaaan eariied during the policy, period by proprietors and by all employees of the Named Insured other 
than diauififenra (except operators of mobile eompmenr) and aircraft jatots and iJD-pilois, subject to any overtime earnings or 
HH^f l* or itmiineraiibarule-appiioab je in aecckoance with the manuals m use by me Company;. 
{2} "cosT means to total cost to &e Named fai*u^^ 
mdcj>endent contactors of allwoii: let ^ r $nb-tet in connection yitb tack tpecinc project, inelnjing the coat o/aUlab^T materials and 
oqnipfliciit fijqmii&bd, used or dctfvtsrtd for use in theexecution of web work, whether rmuisbed by me owner, extractor or sub-contraictoi •„ 
including all feta* allowance, bonuses or comrntwiona made, paid «r'"one. 
(3) H s a l e s * t w a n s t ^ g n w a m o ^ a ^ d j a } | y d i r i » y i y jbr jpod»aa< 
piooWits sold or distfifarte^ dues orfecsi and ratals during me policy ierni; and 
jnctudes taxes, other man taxes which ctie Named Insured and such others co! tect as-a separate item and remit directly to a governmental 
division.. 
THESEDEC&ARATIOKS AREPART OF THE POLICY DEGtARATIONS^QNTAJNING THE NAME OF THE INSURED AJ© 
THE POLICY PERIOD 
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COMMERCIAL GENERAL LIABILITY 
CG00021207 
COMMEROAL GENERAL LIABILITY COVERAGE FORM 
COVERAGES A AND B PROVIDE CLAJMS-MADE COVERAGE 
PLEASE READ THE ENTIRE FORM CAREFULLY 
Various provisions in this policy restrict coverage. Read the 
entire policy carefully to determine rights, duties and what 
is and is not covered 
Throughout this polity the word* "yon" and "you** ttftrio 
the Named Insured shown in the Declarations, and any 
other person or organization qualifying as a.Named Insured 
under this policy. The words wweff4 "us" and "our" refer to 
the Company providing this insurance. 
The word "insured" means any person or organization 
qualifying as such under Section U - Who Is An Insured. 
Other words and phrases that appear in quotation marks 
have special meaning. Refer to Section VI - J>efmitions. 
SECTIONI-COVERAGES 
COVERAGE A BODILY INJURY AND PROPERTY 
DAMAGE LIABILITY 
1- Insuring Agreement 
a. We will pay those sums that the insured becomes 
legally obligated to pay as damages because of 
"bodiry injury" or "property damage" to which this 
insurance applies. We will have the right and duty 
to defend the insured against any -suit" seeking 
those damages* However, we will have no duty to 
defend the insured against any "suit" seeking dam-
ages for "bodiry injury* or "property damage" to 
which this insurance does not apply. We may, at 
our discretion, investigate any "occurrence* and 
settle any claim or "suit* that may result But* 
(1) The amount we wiilpay for damages is lim-
ited as described in Section 10 -l imits Of 
insurance; and 
{2) Our right and duty to defend ends when we 
have used up the applicable limit of insurance 
in the payment of judgments ox settlements 
under Coverages A or B or medical expenses 
under Coverage C. 
No other obUgation or liabihty to pay sums or per-
forin acts or services Is covered unless explicitly 
provided for under Supplementary Payments ~ 
Coverages A and B. 
b. This insurance applies to "bodily injury" and 
Hrxorjcrty damage11 only if: 
(1) The "bodily injury"'or "property damage* is 
caused by an ^ occurrence" that takes place in 
the "coverage territory*; 
(2) The"bodilymjury"or"propertydamage"did 
not occur before the Retroactive Date, if any, 
shown in the Declarations or after tiit end of 
the policy period; and 
(3) A claim for damages because of the "bodily 
injury" or "property damage" is first made 
against any insured, m accordance with Para-
graph c, below, during the policy period or 
any Extended Reporting Period we provide 
under Section V - Extended Reporting Peri-
ods. 
c. A claim by a person or organization seeking dam-
ages will be deemed to have been made at the eax-
fiar of the following times: 
(1) When notice of such claim is received and re~ 
corded by any insured or by us, whichever 
comes first; or 
(2) When we make settlement in accordance with 
Paragraph a^  above* 
All claims for damages because of* *bodiIy injury" 
to the. same person, including damages claimed by 
any person or organization for care, loss Of ser~ 
vices, or death resulting at any time fx<m tjhe "bod-
ily injury*, will be deemed to have been made at 
the time the first of mose claims is made against 
any insured. 
All claims for damages because of "property dam-
age" causing loss to the same person or organiza-
tion will be deemed to have been made at the time 
the first of those claims is made against any in-
sured* 
2. Exclusions 
This insurance does not apply to; 
a. Expected Or Intended Injury 
"Blodiiy injury" or "property damage* expected or 
intended from the standpoint of the insured this 
exclusion does not appfy to "bodily injury* result-
ing from the use of reasonable force to protect per-
sons or property. 
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0) A claim
 vfordamages because of the "personal 
and advertising injur/* is first made against 
any insure^ in accordance with Paragraph c* 
below, during the policy period OF any .fix-
tended Reporting Period we provide under 
Section V—Extended Reporting Periods. 
c A claim made by a person or organization seeking 
damages will be deemed to have been made at me 
earlier of the following times: 
(1) When notice of such claim is received and re* 
corded by any insured of by us, whichever 
comes first; or 
(Z) When we make settlement m accordance with 
Paragraph it above. 
All claims for damages because of "persona} and 
advertising injury" to the same person or organiza-
tion as a result of an offense will be deemed to 
have been made at the time the first of those 
claims is nxade against any insured. 
Exclusions 
This insurance does riot apply to: 
a. Knowing Violation Of Rights Of Another 
''Personal and advertising: injury" caused by or at 
the direction of the insured with the knowledge 
that the act would violate the rights of another and 
would inflict "personal and advertising injury0. 
b. Material Published WitJb Knowledge Of Falsity 
"Personal and advertising injury* arising out .of 
oral or written publication of material, if done by 
or at the direct ion of tbe insured with knowledge 
of its falsity. 
c Material Publisl ed Prior To Policy Period 
"PetsonalantfaoVertfe^ 
oral or written publication of material whose first 
publication took place before the Retroactive Date, 
if any, shown in the Declarations, 
d\ Criminal Acts 
"Personal and advertising mjury^ arising out of a 
criiiiinal act eornrnittod by or at tbe direction of the 
Triarrrnd 
e. Contractual Liability 
"Personal and advertistng injury for which the in-
sured has assumed liabihty in a contract or agree-
ment This exclusion does not apply to -liability for 
damages that she uiisured would have in the ab-
sence of the contract or agreement 
1 Breach Of Contract 
"Personal and advertising injury" arising out of a 
breach of contract, except an implied contract to 
use another's advertising idea in your "advertise-
ment". 
g. Quality Or Performance Of Goods - Failure To 
Conform To Statements 
"Personal and advertising injury" arising out of the 
failure of goods* products or services to conform 
with any statement of quality or performance made 
in your "advertisement". 
hi. Wrong Description Of Prices 
"Personal and advertising Injury" arising out of tbe 
wrong description of the price of goods, products 
or services stated in your "advertisement". 
i. Infringement Of Copyright, Patent, Trademark 
Or Trade Secret 
"Personal and advertising injury" arising out of the 
infringement of copyright, patent, trademark, trade 
secre or other intellectual property rights. Under 
this exclusion; such other intellectual property 
rights do not include the use of another's advertis-
ing idea in your "adveitisemeut". 
However, this exclusion does not apply to in-
Erihgement, in your "advertisement", of copyright, 
trade dress of slogan. 
J. Insureds In Media And Internet Type 
Basin esses 
"Personal and advertising injury" committed by an 
insured whose business is: 
11) Advettistag^ ra-oadcastings publishing or tele-
casting; 
(2) De%amgordereiim^mgcor^^ 
for others; or 
(3) An Internet search, access, content orservice 
provider. 
However, this exclusion does not apply to Para-
graphs 144U, b. and c. of "personal and advertising 
injury* under 1b& Derrnitions Section. 
For the purposes of this exclusion, the placing of 
fiames borders or b^,ccadvcitmng; for you or 
others anywhere on the Internet is not by itself; 
considered the business; of advertising, broadcast-
kg, pu pushing or telecasting. 
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kv Electronic Chairooms Or Bulletin Boards 
"Personal and advertising injury* arising out of an 
electronic cbatroom or bulletin board the insured 
hosts, owns, or over which the insured exercises 
control. 
I. Unauthorized Use Of Another*s Name Or 
Product 
"Personal and advertising injury1* arising out of the 
unauthorized use of another's name or product in 
your e-mail address, domain name or metatag, or 
any other: similar tactics to mislead another's po-
tential customers, 
m. Pollution 
"Personal and advertising injury^ arising out of the 
actual, alleged or threatened discharge, dispersal, 
seepage, migration, release or escape of "pollut-
ants* at anytime. 
n» Pollution-Related 
Any loss, cost or expense arising out of any: 
(1) Request, demand, order or Statutory or regula-
tory requirement that any insured or others 
test for, monitor, clean up, remove, contain, 
treat, detoxify of neutralize, or in any way re-
spond to, or assess the effects o£ "pollutants"; 
or 
(2) Claim or suit by or on behalf of a governmen-
tal authority for damages because of testing 
lor, monitoring,, cleaning up, removing, con-
taining, dealing, detoxifying or neutralizing, 
or in any way responding to, or assessing the 
effects o£ "pollutants". 
o. War 
"Personal and advertising injuryn, however caused, 
arising, directly or in directly, cait ofe 
(1) War, including undeclared or civil war; 
(2) Warlike action jbya militaryforce., including 
action in hindering or defending a gainst an ac-
tual cor expected attack, by any govemment, 
sovereign orother authority using military 
personnel orother agents; 
(3) Insurrection, rebellion, revolution, usurped 
power, or action takeii by goverraiietiial au-
thority in hindering or defending against any 
Ofinese; 
p. Distribution Of Materia!Is VIolaiio a Of 
Statutes 
"Personal and advertising injury* arising directly 
OT radirectly out of any action or omission that vio-
lates or is alleged to violate; 
I 
(1) TheTelepixme<^sumerRrote^ 
(tCPAX including any amendment of or addt-
tion to such law; or 
(2) TT3*CAN^PAMAetof20O3,niclu4mgaiiy 
amendment of or addition to such law; or 
(3) Any statute, ordinance or regulation, other 
than the TCPA orCJW-SPAM Act of 2003, 
that prohibits or limits the sending, transmit-
ting, communicating or distribution of mate-
rid or information. 
COVERAGE C MEDICAL PAYMENTS 
J .Insuring Agreement 
a. We will pay medical expenses as described below 
for "bodily injury" caused by an accident: 
(1) On premises you own or rent; 
(2) On ways next to premises you own or rent; or 
(3) Because of your operations; 
provided that: 
(a) The accident takes place in the "coverage 
territory" and during the policy period; 
(b) The expenses are incurred and reported to 
us within one year of the date of the acci-
dent; and 
(e) The injured person submits to examina-
tion, at our expense, by physicians of our 
choice as often as we reasonably require. 
b. We will make these payments regardless of fault 
These payments will not exceed the applicable 
limit of insurance. We will pay reasonable 
expenses for: 
(1) First aid administered at me time of an acci-
dent; 
(2) Necessary medical, surgical, x-ray and dental 
services^ including prosthetic devices; and 
(3) Necessary ambulance, hospital, professional 
nursing and funeral services. 
2. Exclusions 
We will not pay expenses for "bodily injury* :• 
a. Any Insured 
To any insured, except Volunteer workers\ 
b. Hired Person 
To a person hired to do work for or oh behalf of 
any insured or a tenant of any insured 
c. Injury On Normally Occupied Premises 
To apersc* injured on that partofpremies you 
own or rent that the person normally occupies. 
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Our obligation to defend an insured's indernuitee and to 
pay for attorneys' fees and necessary litigation ex-
penses as Supplementary Payments endis wjben we have 
used up the applicable limit of insurance in the pay -
meet of judgments ox settlements or the conditions set 
forth above, or the terms of the agreement described in 
Paragraph £ above, are no longer mat 
SECTION n - WHO IS AN INSURED 
L If you are designated in die Declarations as: 
a. An individual, you and your spouse ate insureds, 
but only with respect to the conduct of a business 
of which you are the sole owner. 
b. A partnership or joint venture, you are an insured. 
Your members^  your partners, and their spouses 
are also insureds, but only with respect to the con-
duct of your business. 
c. A limited liability company, you are an insured. 
Your members are also insureds, but only with re-
spect to the conduct of your business. Your man-
agers arc insureds, but only with respect to i&eir 
duties as your managers. 
& An organization other than a partnership, joint 
venture or limited liability company, you are an in-
sured Your "executive officers" and directors are 
insureds, but only with respect to their duties as 
your officers or directors. Your stockholdenj are 
also insureds, but only with respect to their liabil-
ity as stockholders. 
e, A trusty you are an insured. Your trustees are also 
insureds, but only with respect to their duties as 
trustees, 
2. Each of the following is also an insured: 
a* Your "volunteer workers" only while performing 
duties related to the conducts your business, or 
your "employees", other than either your "execu 
tive officers0 (if you are an organization other than 
a partnership, joint venture or limited liability 
company) or youi ruanagers (if you are a limited 
liability company;^ , but only for acts within the 
scope of their crimloyment by you or while per-
forming duties related ito the conduct of your btisi* 
ness. However, none of these "employees'* or 
"volunteer workers" are insureds for; 
(1) "Bodily injury" or "personal and adverriring 
injury1': 
(a) To you, to your partners or members (if 
you are a partnership or joint venture), to 
your members (if you arc a limited liabil-
ity company), to a co-wempkjyeen while 
' in the course of his or h<^  employment or 
performing duties related to the conduct 
of ypur business, ox to your other "volun-
teer workers* while performing duties re-
lated to the conduct of your business; 
(b) To the spouse, child, parent, brother or 
sister of that co-*employee* or Volunteer 
worker" as a consequence of Paragraph 
(a) above; 
(c) For which there is any obligation to share 
damages with or repay someone else who 
must pay damages because of the injury 
described in Paragraphs (a) ox (b) above; 
or 
(d) Arising out of his or her providing or fail-
ing to provide professional health care 
services. 
(2) "i^per^ damage" to rjmpe^ ty: 
(a) Owned, occupied or used by, 
(b) Rented to, inthe care,custody or control 
o£ or over which physical control k be-
ing exercised for any purpose by 
you, any of your "employees", "volunteer 
workers", any partner or member (if you are a 
partnership or joint venture), or any member 
(if you are a limited liability company); 
&• Any p erson (other than your "employee" or * vol-
unteer worker") or any organization while acting 
as your real estate manager, 
c. Ally person or organization having proffer tempo-
rary custody of your properly if you die, but only: 
(1) With respect to liability arising out of the 
maintenance or use of that property; and 
(2) Until your legal representative has been ap« 
pointed 
d. Your kgalrepresentariveif you die, but only with 
respect to duties as such. That representative will 
have all youf rights and duties under this Coverage 
Part; 
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3- Any organization you newly acquire or form, other 
tharl a partnership Joint venture or limited liability 
company, and oyer which you maintain o wnecship or 
majority interest, will qualify as a Named Insured if 
mere is no other similar insurance available to that or-
ganization. However: 
a. Coverage under this provision is afforded only un-
til the 90th day after you acquire or form the or-
ganization ox the end of the policy period, which-
ever is earlier; 
fa. Coverage A does not apply to *bodily injury * or 
"property damage* that occurred before you ac-
quired or formed the organization; and 
c* Coverage B does not apply to "personal and adver-
tising injury" arising out of an offense committed 
before you acquired or formed the organization. 
No person or organization is an insured with respect to the 
conduct of any current or past partneraiup, joint venture or 
limited liability company that is not shown as a Named 
Insured in the Declarations. 
SECTION m - LIMITS OF INSURANCE 
} * Hie limits of Insurance shown m die Declarations and 
Hie rules below fix the most we will pay regardless of 
the number of; 
a* Insureds; 
b. Claims made or "suits* brought; or 
c Persons or organrzatiom making claims or bring-
ing "suits "\ 
2. The General Aggregate Limit is the most we will pay 
far the sum of: 
a. Medical expenses under Coverage C; 
b» Damages under Coverage A» except damages be* 
cause of ^ bodilyinjury*1 or ^ property Sdlamage" in-
dueled in the "products-completed operations haz-
ard"; and 
& Damages under Coverage B* 
3. The Products<:ompleted Operations Aggravate Limit 
is the most we will pay under Coverage A for damages 
because of "bodily injury* and "property damage* in-
cluded in the "producte-completed operations hazard". 
4 Snbjedt to Paragraph X above, the Personal and Adver-
tising Injury limit is the most we will pay under Cov-
erage B for the sum of all damages because of all "per-
sonal and advertising injury* sustained by any one 
person or organization. 
5. Subject to Paragraph 2. or & above, whichever applies, 
the Each Occurrence Limit is the most we will pay for 
die sum of} 
a. Damages under Coverage A; and 
b. Medical expenses under Coverage. C 
because of all "bodily injury* and "property damage" 
arising out of any one "occurrence". 
6. Subject to Paragraph 5. above, the Damage To Prem-
ises Rented To You limit is the most we will pay un-
der Coverage A for damages because of "property 
damage" to any one premises, while rented to you, or 
in the ease of damage by fire, while rented to you or 
temporarily occupied by you with permission of the 
owner. 
7. Subject to Paragraph 5. above, the Medical Expense 
Ltmtt is the most we will pay under Coverage C for all 
medical expenses because of "bodily injury" sustained 
by any one person; 
The Limits of Insurance of this Coverage Part apply sepa-
rately to each consecutive annual period and to any remain-
ing period of less than 12 months, starting with the begin-
ning of the policy period shown in the Declarations, unless 
the policy period is extended after issuance for an addi-
tional period of less than 12 months. In teat case, die addi-
tional period will be deemed part of the last preceding 
period for purposes of determining the Limits of insurance. 
SECTION IV - COMMERCIAL GENERAL 
LIABILITY CONDITIONS 
1, Bankruptcy 
Bankruptcy or insolvency of the insured or of the in-
sured's estate will not relieve us of our obligations un-
der this Coverage Part. 
X .Duties In The Event Of Occurrence, Offense, Claim 
OrSott 
a. You roust see to it mat we are notified as soon as 
practicable of an "occurrence** or offense which 
may result in a claim. To the extent possible, no-
tice should rnclude: 
(J) How, when and where the ^ occurrence" or of-
fense took place; 
(2) The names and addresses of any injured per-
sons awl witnesses; and 
(3) The naturearid locationof any injury or dam-
age arising out of the "occurrence* or offense 
Notice of an "occurrence" or offense is not notice 
ofaclaim. 
b. If a claim is received by any insured, you must 
(1) irhhiediatdyrecorrln^ 
and the date received; and 
(2) Notify us as soon as practicable. 
YoumustseetoftrriatYv^recdvewrit^ 
the claim ais soon as practicable. 
c You and any other involved insured must* 
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6L If me Supplemental Extended Reporting Period is in 
effect, we will provide the supplemental aggregate lim-
its of insurance described below, but only for claims 
first received and recorded Airing the Supplemental 
Extended Reporting Period. 
The supplemental aggregate limits of insurance will be 
equal to the dollar amount shown in the DecUuatioas in 
effect at the end of the policy period for such of the fol-
lowing limits of insurance for which a dollar amount 
has been entered; 
General Aggregate 'limit 
Products-Completed Operations Agg^gafe Limit 
Paragraphs 2, and 3. of Section £0 - Limits Of Insur-
ance will be amended accordingly. The Personal and 
Advertising Injury Limit, the Bach Occurrence Limit 
and the Damage To Premises Rented To You Limit 
shown in the Declarations will then continue to apply, 
as set forth in Paragraphs 4., 5. and & of that Section. 
SECTION VI - DEFINITKWS 
1. "Advertisement" means a notice that is broadcast or 
published to the general public or specific market seg-
ments about your goods, products or services for the 
purpose of attracting customers or supporters. For the 
purposes of mts definition: 
a» Notices that are published include material placed 
on the Internet or on similar electronic means of 
communication; and 
b. Regarding web-sites, only that part of a web-site 
that ss about your goods* products or services for 
the purposes of attracting customers or supporters 
is considered an advertisement 
2, "Auto* means: 
a* A land motor vehicle* trailer or semitrailer de-
signed for travel on public roads, including any at-
tached machinery or equipment; or 
b* Any other land vehicle that is subject to a compul-
sory or financial i esponsibinry law or other motor 
vehicle insurance law tit the state where ft is li-
censed or priric ipaUy garaged. 
However, "auto1* does not include ''mobile equipment*. 
3* "Bodily injury* means bodily injury, sickness or dis-
ease sustained by a person, including death resulting 
fiomanyoftbeseatanymrje, 
4. *f^eragetcixito^ 
a* The United States of Arnoica (including its terri-
tories and possessions), Puerto Rico and Canada; 
b. International waters or airspace, but only if the in-
jury or damage occurs in the course of travel or 
transportatian between any places included in 
Paragraph a. above; or 
c All i^ tber parts of the world if the: injury ox damage 
arises out of: 
CO Goods or pipduicts made or sold by you in the 
temtory described in Paragraph iu above; 
(2) The activities of a person wrtose home is in 
the territory described in Paragraph a- above, 
but is away for a short time on your business; 
or 
(3) 'Personal and advertising rr^ uxy" offenses that 
take place through the Internet or similar elec-
tronic means of communication 
provided the insured's responsibility to pay damages is 
detennined in a "suit" on the merits, in the territory de-
scribed k\ Paragraph a. above or in a settlement we 
agree to. 
5. "Employee" includes a "leased worker". "I&iployee" 
does not include a "temporary worker^ 
6. "Executive officer" means a person holding any of the 
officer positions created by your Charter, constitution, 
by-laws or any other similar governing document. 
7. "Hostile fire* means one which becomes uncontrolla-
ble or breaks out from where it was intended to be. 
& "Impaired property" means tangible property, other 
than "you; product*' or "your work*, that cannot be 
used or is less useful because: 
a. It kcorpoi»tes*your product" or "your work" that 
is known or thought to be. defective, deficient, in-
adequate or dangerous; or 
b. You haye failed to fulfill the terms of a contract or 
agreement; 
if such property can be restored to use by the repair, 
replacement, adjustment or removal of "your, product" 
or "your work * or your fulfilling the terms of the con-
tract or agreement; 
9> 'Insured contract" means; 
a. A contract for a lease of premises. However, that 
portion of the contract for a Jease of premises that 
mdetrxnifies any person or orgamzaiion ibr damage 
by fire to premises while rented to yon or tempo-
rarily occupied by you with pentussion -of the 
owner is not an 'insured contract"; 
• b. A sidetrack agreement; 
C Any easement or license agreement, except in 
connection with construction or demolition opera-
licmsbnorwitnm^ 
d. An obii gation, as required by ordinance* to indem-
nify a mtmicipality, except in connection with 
workforamurik^alhy; 
c. An elevator maintenance agreement 
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f. That part of any other contract or agreement per-
taining to your, business (including an indemnifica-
tion of a municipality in connection with work per* 
formed for a municipality) under which you 
assume the tort liability of another party to pay for 
"bodily iirjttry* or "property damage" to a third 
person or organization. Tort liability means a li-
ability that would be imposed by taw in the ab-
sence of any contract or agreement 
Paragraph f. dbe£ not include, that part of any con-
tract or agreement; 
(1) IhatindermiifiesaTdhioadfor 
or "property damage* arising out of construc-
tion or demolition operations, wi thin 50 feet 
of any railroad property and affecting airy rail-
road bridge or trestle, tracks, road-beds, tun* 
nel, underpass or crossing; 
(2) That indemnifies an architect, engineer or sur-
vey or for injury or damage arising out of; 
(a) Preparing, approving, or failing to pre-
pare or approve, maps, shop drawings, 
opinions, reports, surveys, field orders, 
change orders or drawings and specifica-
tions; or 
(b) Giving directions or instruc rions. or fail-
ing to gfve them, rf that is the primary 
cause of the injury or damage; or 
(5) Under which the insured, if an architect, engi-
neer or surveyor, assumes liability for an in-
jury or damage arising out of the insured's 
rendering or foil ure to render professions 1 
services, including those fisted in Paragraph 
(2) above and supervisory* inspection, archi-
tectural or engineering activities, 
10. "Leased worker" means a person leased to you by a 
labor leasmg firm under an agreement between you and 
the labor leasing firm, to perform duties related to the 
conduct of your business. "Teased worker" does nor 
include a "temporary worker". 
11. "Loading or unloading" means the handling of prop-
erty: 
«* After it is mo ved from the place where it is ac-
cepted for movement into or onto an jiircrafl, wa» 
ter^raStor^auto^ 
b While it is in or on an aircraft, watercraft or 
"auto*; or 
c* While it is being moved from an aircraft, water-
craft or "auto" to the place where it is finally de-
livered; 
but "loading or unloading" does not include the move-
ment of property by means of a mechanical device, 
other than a hand truck, that is not attached to the air-
craft, watercraft or "auto", 
12. "Mobile equipment" means any of the following types 
of land vehicles, including any attached machinery or 
equipment: 
a* Bulldozers, farm machinery, forkbfts and other 
vehicles designed for use principally off public 
roads; 
b. Vehicles maintained for use solely on or next to 
premises you own or rent; 
c Vehicles that travel on crawler treads; 
<L Vehicles, whether self-propelled or not, main-
tained primarily to provide mobility to perma-
nently mounted: 
(1) Power cranes, shovels, loaders, diggers or 
drills; or 
(2) Road construction or resurfacing equipment 
such as graders, scrapers or rollers; 
e. Vehicles not described in Paragraph a^b^c or d. 
above that are not self-propelled and arc main-
tained primarily to provide mobility to perma-
nently attached equipment of the following types: 
(1) Air compressors, pumps and generators, in-
cluding spraying, welding, building cleaning, 
geophysical exploration, lighting and well 
servicing equipment; or 
(2) Cherry pickers and similar devices used to 
raise or lower workers; 
f. Vehicles not described in Paragraph a^hn cord , 
above maintained primarily for purposes other 
than the transportation of persons or cargo. 
However, self-propelled vehicles with the follow-
ing types of permanentlyattached equipment are 
not "mobile equipment" but will be considered 
(i) Equipment designed primarily ft>n 
(a) Snowremoval; 
(b) Road maintenance, but not construction 
or resurfacing; or 
(c) Street cleaning; 
(2) Gberry pickers and similar devices mounted 
on automobile or truck chassis and used to 
raise or lower workers; and 
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(3) Air compressors, pumps and generators, in-
cluding spraying, welding, building cleaning 
geophysical exploration, lighting and well 
servicing equipment. 
However, "mobile equipment" does not include land 
vehicles that are subject to a compulsory or financial 
responsibility law or other motor vesicle insurance law 
in the state where H is licensed or principal^ garaged 
Land vehicles subject to a compulsory or financial re* 
sponsibiBty law or other motor vehicle insurance law 
are considered "autos\ 
1& ^Occurrence* means an accident, mcludkg continuous 
or repeated exposure to substantially the same general 
harmful conditions. 
14* "Personal and advertising injury1 means injury, includ-
ing consequential "bodily injury", arising out of one or ^ 
more of the following offenses: 
a. False arrest dettaition or imprisonment; 
b. Mafcknis prosecution; 
c. The wrongful eviction from, wrongful entry into, 
or invasion of the right of private occupancy of a 
room, dwelling or premises that a person occupies, 
committed by or on behalf of its owner, landlord 
or lessor; 
d. Oral or written publication, in any manner, of ma-
terial that slanders or libels a person or organiza-
tion or disparages a person's or organization's 
goods^ products or services; 
e. Oral or written publication, in any manner, of ma-
terial that violates a person's right of privacy; 
f. The use of another's advertising idea in your "ad-
vertisement"; or 
g. Infringing upon another's copyright, trade dress or 
slogan in your Advertisement", 
15. "Poilutants'' mean any solid, liquid, gaseous or thermal 
iiritant or contaminant; including smoke, vapor, soot, 
fumes, acids, alkalis, chemicals and waste. Waste In-
cludes materials to be recycled, reconditioned or re-
claimed. 
16. "Products-compfeted operations hazard*: 
a. Includes all "bodily injury" and "property damage" 
occurringaway from premises you own or rent and 
arising out of ''your product" or "your work." ex-
cept: 
(1); Products that are still in your physical posses-
sk>n;or 
(2) Work that has not yet been completed or ^ 
ahaadpnep!- rtyweyer, *ypur work" will be 
deemed completed attbe earliest of the fol-
lowing titnes: 
(a) When all of the work called for in your 
contract has been completed. 
(b> When all of the work to be done at the 
job site has been completed if your con-
tract calls for work at more than one job 
site. 
(c) Wbmu^partoftheworkdkmeatajob 
site has been put to its intended use by 
any person or organization other than an-
other contractor or subcontractor working 
on the same project. 
Work that may need service* maintenance, 
correction* repair or replacement, but which is 
otherwise complete, will be treated as com* 
pleted 
Does not include "bodily injury" or "property 
damage" arising out of: 
(1) The transportation of property, unless the in-
jury or damage arises out of a condition in or 
on a vehicle not owned or operated by you, 
. and thatcondition was created by * e "loading 
or unloading" of that vehicle by any insured; 
(2) The existence of tools, uninsnilled equipment 
or abandoned or unused materials; or 
(3) Products or operations for which the classifi-
cation, listed in the Declarations or in a policy 
schedule, states that pK>dudts-coorpleted op* 
erations are subject to the <jeneral Aggregate 
Limit 
17. "Property dunnage" means: 
a. Physical injury to tangible property, including ail 
resulting loss of use of that property, All such loss 
of use shall be deemed to occur at the time of the 
physical injury that caused ft; or 
b. Loss of use of tangible property that is not physi-
cally injured All such loss of use shall be deemed 
to occur at the time of the "occurreoce" that 
causedit 
For the purposes of ibis insurance; electronic data is 
nottan|^bl»propert3^ 
As used in this definition, electronic data means infor-
mation, facts or programs stored as or on, created or 
used on, or transmitted to or from, computer software, 
including systems and applications software, hard or. 
flopjpy <h^C3>-ROMS,tapes, drives, cells, data 
processing devices or any other media which are used 
with electro nicaily controlled equipment 
"$ufi* means a dvil proceeding in which damages 
because of Tbodiry hiiiury ,^ "property damage" or "per-
sonal and advertising injury" to. which this insurance 
applies are alleged. "Suit" includes: 
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Issued Date: 10717/2Q08 Effective Date; 0&20/2008 
THIS ENDORSEMENT CHANGES THE POLICY. PLEASE READ IT CAREFULLY. 
NAMED INSURED ENDORSEMENT 
This endorsement modifies insurance provided under the following; 
COMMEIUC^.GENERAL LIABILITY COVERAGE PART 
It is agreed die Named Insured as shown on me Common Policy Declarations is as follows: 
COVARIXLLC 
DBA; BASIC RESEARCH LLC; 
COVARIX, LLC AND SUBSIDIARIES; 
WESTERN HOLDINGS, LLC AND SUBSIDIARIES; 
COMMAND ENTERPRISE, LLC AND SUBSIDIARIES; 
PC MANAGEMENT AND SUBSIDIARIES; 
5742 HOLDINGS LLC 
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employment by you or while performing duties related to the 
conduct of your business. 
SECTION VI - DEFINITIONS 
1. "Advertisement" means a notice that is broadcast or published to the 
general public or specific market segments about your goods, products 
or services for the purpose of attracting customers or supporters. For 
the purposes of this definition: 
a. Notices that are published include material placed on the Internet 
or on similar electronic means of communications; ... 
5. "Employee" includes a "leased worker." ... 
10. "Leased worker" means a person leased to you by a labor leasing firm 
under an agreement between you and the labor leasing firm, to perform 
duties related to the conduct of your business. 
14. "Personal and advertising injury" means injury, including 
consequential "bodily injury", arising out of one or more of the 
following offenses: 
f. The use of another's advertising idea in your "advertisement" 
[emphasis added] [Id. at flf 2 & 3, Exhs. " 1 " & "2."] 
8. The named insured under the Admiral Policies, Basic Research, is designated as a 
limited liability company in the declarations pages of the policies. [Id.] Dennis Gay is the 
manager of Basic Research. [Id. at f 5.] 
9. Gay, Mowrey, and Friedlander are each employed by Bydex Management, LLC, 
an employee management and labor leasing company. [Id. at ^ 6.] Each provides services to 
Basic Research pursuant to an agreement between Bydex and Basic Research. [Id] The Admiral 
Policies provide coverage for Basic Research "employees," including "leased workers." [Id. at 
THf 2 & 3, Exhs. " 1 " & "2."] The conduct of Gay, Mowrey, and Friedlander as alleged in the 
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underlying lawsuits concerns their duties as Basic Research "employees": 
Defendants Gay, Mowrey and Friedlander have knowingly engaged in a 
deliberate pattern of wrongful, illegal and fraudulent practices in conducting the 
affairs of Defendants Basic Research[, et aL] [Id. at f 8, Exh. "3" (Miller 
Amended Complaint), f L] 
Defendant Gay is an officer and a principal shareholder of, among other 
companies, Defendants Basic Research and Dynakor... [and] directs, controls, or 
participates in the acts or practices of Defendants, including Basic Research and 
Dynakor Defendant Mowrey is a principal shareholder of, and the Director of 
Scientific Affairs at, Defendant Basic Research . . . [and] serves as a consultant 
for Defendant Dynakor . . . Defendant Friedlander, the self-proclaimed marketing 
guru of Basic Research . . . is a marketing consultant to, among others . . . Basic 
Research and Dynakor. [Id. at If 9, Exh. "4" (Tompkins Complaint), ffij 12, 13 and 
14.] 
DENNIS GAY ('Gay') is an individual and an owner and operator of Dynakor 
and Basic Research DANIEL B. MOWREY . . . ("Mowrey") is the director 
of scientific affairs at Defendant Basic Research, serves as a consultant to 
Defendant Dynakor, and owns and operates . . . a business organization used by 
Defendants as an instrumentality of the Defendants to develop, market, endorse 
and promote products for Defendants Basic Research and Dynakor. . . . 
MITCHELL K. FRIEDLANDER is an individual who controls and operates 
Defendants. [Id. at J 13, Exh, "5" (Forlenza Complaint), Iffl 12, 13 and 14.] 
10. A named insured endorsement to each Admiral policy includes Covarix, LLC and 
its subsidiaries as named insureds under the policy. [Id. at fflf 2 & 3, Exhs. " 1 " and "2."] 
Dynakor, Carter-Reed and Zoller Labs are all subsidiaries of Covarix, LLC. [Id. at \ 7.] 
Covarix, LLC does business as Basic Research, LLC. [Id.] 
11. Collectively, Basic Research, LLC, Dynakor Pharmaceutical, LLC, The Carter-
Reed Company, LLC, Zoller Laboratories, LLC* Dennis Gay, Daniel B. Mowrey and Mitchell K. 
Friedlander are insureds under Admiral's Policy (the "Plaintiffs"). 
B. The Underlying Suits 
1. The Miller Suit 
12. On November 9, 2007, Pamela Miller, Randy Howard and Donna Patterson filed 
a putative class action complaint against Basic Research, Dynakor, Gay, Mowrey and 
Friedlander, among others, in a lawsuit styled as Pamela Miller, Randy Howard and Donna 
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44. On December 8, 2009, counsel for Basic Research again e-mailed Admiral to 
request that it honor its acknowledged defense obligations. In its response, Admiral confirmed 
that it has accepted the defense of Basic Research under a reservation of rights and that it was 
having the invoices for the incurred defense costs reviewed by counsel. [Id. at ff 5 & 6 & Exh. 
"20."] 
45. By letter dated January 11,2010, Admiral belatedly advised Basic Research it had 
appointed "an associated counsel" for Basic Research who would also serve as "panel counsel" 
for Admiral. [Id. at ^ f 7 & Exh. "21."] However, the appointed counsel did not participate in the 
defense of Basic Research in the Forlenza Suit. [Id. at 18.] 
46. On April 7, 2010, Admiral filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings in this 
action, arguing for the very first time that it has no duty to defend the Forlenza Suit. [Admiral's 
Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings [Docket. No. 20].] Admiral never previously asserted that 
the allegations in the Forlenza Suit do not establish a potential for coverage under the second 
Admiral policy. 
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DECLARATION OF RONALD F. PRICE 
1. I am an Associate General Counsel for Basic Research, LLC. The facts set forth 
in this declaration are true and correct based on my personal knowledge thereof and, if called to 
testify, I could and would testify competently thereto. Part of my duties as Associate General 
Counsel for Basic Research involves overseeing each of the lawsuits which is identified below, 
including reviewing all of the invoices which are received from the law firms which have been 
retained to represent the defendants in those cases. My duties also include overseeing the tender 
of the defense of those lawsuits to Admiral Insurance Company. 
DEFENDANT ADMIRAL AND THE ADMIRAL POLICIES 
2. Admiral Insurance Company ("Admiral") issued to named insured and Plaintiff 
Basic Research, LLC ("Basic Research") a commercial general liability (CGL) insurance policy 
(policy no. CA000011665-01) with a policy period from August 20, 2007 - August 20, 2008. A 
copy is attached as Exhibit "1" ("2007-2008 Policy"). 
3. Admiral subsequently issued to named insured and Basic Research, a CGL 
insurance policy (policy no. CA000011665-02) with a policy period from August 20, 2008 -
August 20,2009. A copy is attached as Exhibit "2" ("2008-2009 Policy"). 
4. Both Policies were issued in Utah. Payments for both Policies* premiums were 
also made from Utah. 
DEFENDANTS IN THE UNDERLYING LITIGATION 
5. Dennis Gay serves as the manager of Basic Research. 
6. Dennis Gay, Daniel B. Mowrey and Mitchell K. Friedlander are each employed 
by Bydex Management, LLC, an employee management and labor leasing company whose 
employees provide services to other companies, including Basic Research. Each individual 
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provides services to Basic Research pursuant to an agreement between Bydex and Basic 
Research. 
7. Dynakor, Carter-Reed and Zoller Labs are all distinct, separate corporate entities, 
and are all subsidiaries of Covarix, LLC. Western Holdings, LLC is a separate and distinct 
corporate entity from Basic Research and the other plaintiffs in this action. Until June of 2009, 
Western Holdings was a Wyoming limited liability company. In May of 2009, Western 
Holdings was merged into a Nevada limited liability company named Western Holdings, LLC 
with its primary place of business in Nevada. 
THE UNDERLYING MILLER/TOMPKINS CONSOLIDATED CLASS ACTION SUIT 
8. On November 9, 2007, a lawsuit styled as Pamela Miller, Randy Howard and 
Donna Patterson, et ah v. Basic Research, LLC, et al9 (the "Miller suit") was filed in the District 
of Utah against Plaintiffs (herein). On May 23, 2008, the underlying claimants filed a First 
Amended Class Action Complaint ("Miller Amended Complaint"), attached here as Exhibit "3." 
9. On December 6, 2007, a class action lawsuit styled as Mary Tompkins, et al v. 
Basic Research, LLC, et al, (the "Tompkins suit") was filed in California State Superior Court 
against Plaintiffs (herein). A copy of the Tompkins Complaint is attached here as Exhibit "4." 
10. Subsequently, the Tompkins suit was removed to the United States District Court, 
Eastern District of California and then ordered transferred to the United States District Court, 
District of Utah, Central Division. The "Notice of Transfer" order is attached as Exhibit "28." 
11. Thereafter, the Tompkins suit was ordered consolidated with the Miller suit, under 
the case name and case number as the Miller suit ("Miller/Tompkins suit.") The Order granting 
consolidation of the Miller and Tompkins suits is attached here as Exhibit "29." 
PLAINTIFFS' CLAIM FOR COVERAGE FOR THE 
MILLEIVTOMPKINS SUIT AND ADMIRAL'S DENIAL 
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12. Basic Research gave notice to Admiral, its commercial general liability insurer, of 
both the original complaint and the Miller Amended Complaint as early as January 31, 2008 and, 
subsequently, the Tompkins Complaint. Basic Research's January 31, 2008 tender letter is 
attached here as Exhibit "9." Admiral subsequently denied a defense for the Miller/Tompkins 
suit on June 6,2008. Admiral's denial letter is attached here as Exhibit "10." 
THE UNDERLYING FORLENZA SUIT 
13. On May 26, 2009, a class action law suit styled as Nicole Forlenza, et al v. 
Dynakor Pharmacal, LLC, et al, (the "Forlenza suit") was filed against the Forlenza Insureds. 
A copy of that complaint ("Forlenza Complaint") is attached as Exhibit "5." 
14. On June 11, 2009, Nicole Forlenza and Shaiden Monroe filed a first amended 
complaint in the Forlenza suit, and is attached here as Exhibit "6." 
15. On August 10. 2009, a second amended class action complaint ("Forlenza second 
amended complaint") was filed in the Forlenza suit, and is attached here as Exhibit "7." 
16. On October 28. 2009, a third amended class action complaint ("Forlenza third 
amended complaint") was filed in the Forlenza suit, and is attached here as Exhibit "8." 
17. On January 4, 2010, a fourth amended class action complaint ("Forlenza fourth 
amended complaint") was filed in the Forlenza suit, and is attached here as Exhibit "18. 
NOTICE OF FORLENZA SUIT AND ADMIRAL'S RESPONSE 
18. Basic Research provided written notice of the Forlenza suit along with a copy of 
the Forlenza Complaint to Admiral on or about June 4, 2009, and requested that Admiral 
respond and defend the suit. 
19. By letter dated June 25, 2009, Admiral acknowledged notice of the Forlenza suit 
and agreed to defend under a reservation of rights. A copy is attached here as Exhibit "11." 
20. By letter dated July 6, 2009, Admiral further acknowledged receiving notice of 
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the Forhnm suit tod agreed to defend under a reservation of rights- A copy of the letter is 
atiafj&i as Exhibit ^12,w 
21. By letter dated July 15, 2009, Basic Research gave Admiral notice of the 
Forlenza first amended complaint, and thai the underlying defendants they had retained counsel 
to defend them. Admiral did not respond, nor participate in the defense, A copy of the letter is 
attached as Exhibit "13," 
22. By letter dated August 11, 2009, Basic Research gave Admiral notice of the 
Jw/e^tf 3 ^ confirmed it was proceeding with the defense. Admiral 
#$*iot tt i^Oitdj riof ffi& &parUd|«te Sn the defense. A espy ofttoi^etier is attached as E&hibit 
23. To date, Plaintiffs have incurred significant expenses defending themselves and in 
securing counsel to enforce their rights under the insurance policies issued by Admiral. 
1 declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States of America that, to 
the best of my knowledge, information and belief, the foregoing is true and correct. 
E x e c u t e d ^ ,2tHQ. 
RONALD F. PRICE 
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8. As part of their pervasive pattern of wrongful conduct, during the Class Period 
Defendants have utilized (and continue to utilize) the U.S. mail and interstate wire facilities, 
including telephones, facsimile machines and Internet to receive consumer solicitations to 
purchase Defendants' products, and Defendants' business activities have affected interstate 
commerce. 
JURISDICTION AND V E N U E 
9. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this nationwide class action 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, relating to federal question jurisdiction; Section 1964(c) of 
RICO, 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c); and Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Venue is 
properly laid in this District pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391 and Section 1965 of RICO, 18 
U.S.C § 1965. 
PARTIES 
Plaintiffs 
10. Plaintiff, Pamela Miller, is a resident of Gilbert, Arizona. During the Summer of 
2007, while conducting an Internet search on nutrition, Ms. Miller observed an 
advertisement for Akavar which, upon information and belief, was designed, sponsored and 
maintained by Defendants. This Internet advertisement, adorned with a picture of the 
product box and prominent yellow and orange colors, represented that Akavar was 
scientifically proven that it was a "EUROPEAN WEIGHT LOSS BREAKTHROUGH," 
and professed in bold print that the user could "EAT ALL YOU WANT & STILL LOSE 
W E I G H T . . . " Based upon this advertising disseminated by Defendants, Ms. Miller 
purchased a supply of Akavar through Defendants' Internet website, wwwA.kavar.net. After 
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25 days of taking Akavar as directed on the package labeling, Ms. Miller gained 10 pounds, 
and she ceased taking the product. Thereafter, Ms. Miller sent several e-mail inquiries 
concerning Akavar to Defendant Dynakor and she also made several interstate telephone 
calls, leaving messages on telephone answering machines maintained by Defendants, but she 
received no response to her e-mail or voicemail messages: 
11. Plaintiff, Randy Howard, is a resident of Morton, Illinois. In or around October 
2007, Mr. Howard observed an Akavar cardboard point-of-purchase advertising display 
while shopping at a Wal-Mart store located in Morton, Illinois. Upon information and belief, 
the point-of-purchase display that Mr. Howard saw was designed and produced by 
Defendants and supplied by Defendants to the Wal-Mart store. This display, which stood 
about five feet tall and was approximately 30 inches wide, with a light-colored background 
and the figure of a person on it, was positioned in the middle of an aisle. The advertising 
display represented that users of Akavar could "Eat All You Want and Still Lose 
Weight... ," and stressed that users could lose weight without changing eating habits. The 
advertising display also represented that the product was something new from Europe that 
would work. (A copy of an advertisement similar to the advertisement observed by Mr. 
Howard is attached hereto as Exhibit A). Based upon these representations made as part of 
Defendants' in-store advertising materials, Plaintiff Howard purchased two bottles of Akavar 
at the Wal-Mart store at a cost of approximately $40 per botde. After two weeks of taking 
Akavar as directed on the package labeling, without changing his eating habits, Mr. Howard 
had gained five or six pounds and he ceased taking Akavar. 
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21. Defendant Western Holdings is a limited liability company established under the 
laws of the State of Utah with its principal place of business located at 1821 Logan Avenue, 
Cheyenne, Wyoming 82001. 
22. Defendant Western Holdings, an affiliate of Defendant Basic Research, is used 
by Basic Research and the other Defendants for the sole purpose of registering creative (or 
trade) names with the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office for licensing to Defendants in 
furtherance of their collective illegal activity. 
23. Western Holdings customarily licenses such trademarks or trade names to 
Defendant Basic Research for the development and manufacturing of cosmetics, nutritional 
supplements and dietary supplements. The phrases or slogans "Dynakor Pharmacal,'' "Basic 
Research," "Eat All You Want & Still Lose Weight," "and we couldn't say it in print" and 
"and we couldn't say it in print if it wasn't true" are registered trademarks of Western 
Holdings. Defendant Western Holdings has licensed these various registered trademarks to 
Defendants for use in Defendants' scheme or artifice to defraud Plaintiffs and Class 
members. 
Defendant Bydex 
24. Bydex is a limited liability company established under the laws of the State of 
Utah with its principal place of business located at 5742 Harold Gatty Drive, Salt Lake City, 
Utah, 84116-3762. 
25. Defendant Bydex serves as the employer of the principals and other employees 
who operate Defendants Basic Research and Dynakor. Bydex shares the same business 
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48. Previously, Defendant Friedlander has been the subject of "Cease and Desist" 
Orders and "False Representation" Orders issued by the U.S. Postal Service in connection 
with his activities concerning the marketing and sale of weight-loss dietary supplements 
called "Intercal-SX" and "Metabolite-2050," both of which were falsely advertised as causing 
weight loss in virtually all users, as causing weight loss without willpower or caloric 
restricting diets or exercise, as preventing foods from being converted into stored fat, as 
being supported by scientifically sound clinical studies, and as allowing obese persons to lose 
weight while continuing to eat all the food that such persons wanted. In the Matter of the 
Complaint Against W.G. Charles Company, Customer Service Distribution Center, Inc., Mitchell JL 
Friedlander, Harris Friedlander, and Michael Meade, U.S. Postal Service Docket No. 19/10 (Sept. 
10,1985) & In the Matter of the Complaint Against The Robertson-Taylor Company, Intra-Medic 
Formulations, Inc., Customer Service Distribution Center, Inc., Mitchell K Friedlander, Harris 
Friedlander, and Michael Meade, U.S. Postal Service Docket Nos. 19/104 and 19/162 (Sept. 10, 
1985). (A copy of the September 10, 1985 Order is attached hereto as Exhibit D). 
Doe Defendants 
49. Doe Defendant Nos. 1-50 are other individuals and entities who are part of, or 
have aided and abetted, the fraudulent activities and conspiracy alleged in this FAC. The 
identities of Does Defendant Nos. 1-50 are unknown to Plaintiffs at this time. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
50. Fraudulent weight loss products are an enormous problem in the United States. 
In an October 2007 Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") study entitled Consumer Fraud in the 
United States: The Second FTC Survey (the "FTC Study"), the FTC stated that an estimated 
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2.1% of all consumers nationwide - representing a total of 4.8 million U.S. adults - purchased 
and used fraudulent weight-loss products during the preceding year. The FTC Study found 
that "[m]ore consumers were victims of fraudulent weight-loss products than of any of the 
other specific frauds covered in the survey." The FTC study describes the prototypical 
fraudulent weight-loss claim as products that were promoted "as making it easy to lose 
weight or allowing one to lose weight without diet or exercise." As alleged in this FAC, the 
Akavar dietary supplement marketed, advertised and sold by Defendants during the Class 
Period is a prototypical fraudulent wTeight-loss product. 
History of Defendants' Enterprises 
51. Defendants are all well experienced in the promotion, marketing and sale of 
alleged weight-loss products through false and deceptive advertising. As alleged in [^ 17 of 
this FAC, Defendants Gay, Mowrey and Friedlander are each the subject of the FTC 
Injunction. These Defendants' activities with regard to the marketing, advertising and sales 
of Akavar during the class period constitute a violation of the FTC Injunction, and such 
violation is evidence of Defendants' scheme or artifice to defraud Plaintiffs and Class 
members. As a result, every act that each of the Defendants undertook, or caused the other 
Defendants to undertake, to market, advertise and sell Akavar in the United States was part 
of a scheme or artifice to defraud Plaintiffs and Class members. 
52. At the center of Defendants' interrelated business enterprises lies Basic Research, 
which was created to capitalize on the above-referenced obesity and overweight epidemic 
and resulting interest in weight-loss products. It is reportedly one of the largest nutraceutical 
companies in the U.S. with over $50 million in annual sales revenues. Basic Research 
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throughout the United States. Such sales of the product to consumers have continued to 
date. 
72. Since May 2007, Defendants have caused false and misleading advertisements for 
Akavar to be sent through the U.S. mail, published in national magazines, posted on the 
Internet, displayed in retail stores across the country ("point-of-purchase"), and broadcast on 
television. The acts and practices of Defendants as alleged have been in or affecting 
interstate commerce. (Copies of certain of the print and Internet advertisements 
disseminated by Defendants are attached hereto as Exhibit E.) 
73. Defendants' marketing blitz, engineered by Defendant Friedlander and approved 
and endorsed by Defendants Gay, Mowrey, Basic Research and Dynakor, was designed to 
saturate television, Internet, point-of-purchase and print media with Defendants' false and 
misleading claims concerning Akavar. 
74. The core of Defendants' fraudulent representations regarding Akavar consists of 
the following statements which were presented in most, if not all, of Defendants' television, 
Internet, point-of-purchase and print advertisements, including those advertisements viewed 
by Plaintiffs: 
"Eat all you want & still lose weight." 
"European Weight-Loss Breakthrough" 
"Automatic Caloric Restriction" 
75. Defendants' false and misleading advertising for Akavar also asserts a number of 
other so-called "facts," including the following: 
Akavar-20/50 literally causes excess fat to be pulled from bulging 
parts of your body! 
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February 7, 2007, Defendants intentionally misled consumers as to the evaluation and testing 
of the product, claiming that Defendant Mowrey (a psychologist) had "reviewed the 
substantiation for [Akavar's claims]" on behalf of Defendant Dynakor. In the same 
interview/press release for Business Wire, Defendants presented Mowrey as an "independent 
reviewer" who was not involved with the development of the product. To falsely portray 
Mowrey as "independent," Mowrey was even presented as questioning the "flamboyant" 
advertising for Akavar, even though he personally approved the advertisement(s) in question. 
In addition to falsely presenting Mowrey as an "independent reviewer" and someone "not 
involved with the development of the product," Defendants purposefully misled consumers 
who saw the interview/press release by presenting Mowrey as a "Doctor." 
83. In fact, Defendant Mowrey is not a medical doctor. Nor is he even remotely 
"independent." As previously alleged, Mowrey is a principal shareholder of Defendant Basic 
Research, he is a paid "consultant" to Defendant Dynakor, and is a key figure in Defendants' 
illegal enterprise. 
84. The above-referenced interview/press release quoted Mowrey, who was speaking 
on behalf of all Defendants, as saying: 
Frankly I don't like the way the ad looks, either, and I certainly 
wouldn't be as flamboyant with the headlines. . . . But forget about the way 
the ad looks. The real question is whether or not a diet pill can really let you 
eat all you want and still lose weight? In regards to Akavar-20/50, the facts are 
the facts and scientific documentation has confirmed that virtually everyone in 
the study who used Akavar's active compound — 23 out of 24 participants, to 
be exact — lost weight. That's the bottom line." 
85. The February 7, 2007 press release goes on to quote "Dr. Mowrey" as saying that 
after the supposed first "study" of Akavar: "I suggested a second clinical trial, which has yet 
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records maintained by, and in the possession and control of, Defendants, they have 
acknowledged that as of January 25, 20008: (a) sales of Akavar in the State of California 
exceeded $2 million; (b) more than $10 million of product inventory was located on retail 
store shelves throughout the country; (c) Defendants had spent over $5 million on Akavar 
print advertising; and (d) in California alone, Defendants had spent over $450,000 on 
television advertising. Accordingly, the Class consists of many thousands of Class members. 
90. The claims of the representative Plaintiffs are typical of the claims of the Class 
because the representative Plaintiffs, like all Class members, purchased Akavar and have 
suffered injury as a result. 
91. Moreover, the factual bases of Defendants' misconduct are common to all Class 
members, and Defendants' misrepresentations, omissions and acts of concealment resulted 
in injury to all members of the Class. 
92. There are numerous questions of law and fact common to all Class members and 
those questions predominate over any questions that may affect only individual Class 
members, including, but not limited to the following: 
a. Whether Defendants engaged in a pattern of fraudulent, deceptive and 
misleading conduct targeting the public through their marketing, advertising, promotion and 
sale of Akavar; 
b. Whether Defendants misrepresented the efficacy of Akavar; 
c. Whether the acts and omissions of Defendants violated RICO; 
d. Whether the acts and omissions of Defendants violated Section 76-10-1603(3) 
and (4) of UPUAA,Utah Code Ann. § 76-10(3) and, (4); 
e. Whether Defendants should be enjoined from the continued unlawful 
marketing, advertising, promotion, distribution and sale of Akavar; 
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were in a superior position than Plaintiffs and the members of the Class to know the material 
facts. 
177. In their marketing, advertising and promoting of Akavar and in making the 
careless, unreasonable and negligent misrepresentations and omissions alleged herein, 
including the representations made to Plaintiffs and the members of the Class, Defendants 
should have reasonably foreseen that Plaintiffs and members of the Class were likely to rely 
upon the misrepresentations. 
178. Defendants' careless, unreasonable and negligent misrepresentations and 
omissions, as set forth in this FAC, are material in that they relate to matters to which 
reasonable persons, including Plaintiffs and the members of the Class, would attach 
importance in their purchasing decisions or conduct regarding the purchase of Akavar. 
179. Under the circumstances, Defendants had a duty to disclose material, truthful 
information that they omitted in their careless, unreasonable and negligent 
misrepresentations and omissions, as set forth in this FAC. 
180. As alleged in this FAC, Plaintiffs and the members of the Class uniformly relied 
on Defendants' careless, unreasonable and negligent misrepresentations and omissions, and 
under the circumstances described above such reliance was reasonable and justifiable. 
181. As a result of Defendants' careless, unreasonable and negligent statements and 
omissions as described herein, Plaintiffs and the members of the Class have been injured and 
have suffered loss of money and property, and they are entitled to recover damages from 
Defendants. 
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PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, 
pray for judgment against Defendants as follows: 
A. An order certifying a Class pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure, certifying Plaintiffs as the representatives of the Class, and designating their 
counsel as counsel for the Class; 
B. On the First Cause of Action, against Defendants joindy and severally 
in an amount equal to treble the amount of damages suffered by Plaintiffs and members of 
the Class as proven at trial plus interest and attorneys' fees and expenses; 
C. On the Second Cause of Action, against Defendants joindy and 
severally in an amount equal to treble the amount of damages suffered by Plaintiffs and 
members of the Class as proven at trial plus interest and attorneys' fees and expenses; 
D. On the Third Cause of Action, against Defendants joindy and severally 
in an amount equal to two times the amount of damages suffered by Plaintiffs and members 
of the Class as proven at trial plus interest and attorneys' fees and expenses; 
E. On the Fourth Cause of Action, against Defendants joindy and 
severally in an amount equal to two times the amount of damages suffered by Plaintiffs and 
members of the Class as proven at trial plus interest and attorneys' fees and expenses; 
F. On the Fifth Cause of Action, against Defendants joindy and severally, 
in an amount equal to the actual damages suffered by Plaintiffs and members of the Class as 
proven at trial plus interest, as well as punitive damages in an amount sufficient to punish 
Defendants and deter similar future conduct; 
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G. On the Sixth Cause of Action, against Defendants jointly and severally, 
in an amount equal to the actual damages suffered by Plaintiffs and members of the Class as 
proven at trial plus interest, together with all allowable penalties and damage multipliers 
available under the UCSPA and other state consumer protection laws, and attorneys' fees 
and expenses; 
H. On the Seventh Cause of Action, against Defendants jointly and 
severally, for disgorgement of Defendants' unjust enrichment and/or imposition of a 
constructive trust upon Defendants' ill-gotten monies, freezing Defendants' assets, and 
requiring Defendants to pay restitution to Plaintiffs and the Class and to restore all funds 
acquired by means of any act or practice declared by this Court to be unlawful, deceptive, 
fraudulent or unfair, and/or a violation of laws, statutes or regulations; 
I. On all Causes of Action, such other civil penalties and punitive 
damages to the fullest extent permitted by applicable law; 
J. An order requiring Defendants to immediately cease their wrongful 
conduct as set forth above, as well as enjoining Defendants from continuing to falsely market 
and advertise, conceal material information and conduct business via the unlawful and unfair 
business acts and practices complained of herein; an order requiring Defendants to engage in 
a corrective notice campaign; and an order requiring Defendants to refund to Plaintiffs and 
all members of the Class the funds paid to Defendants for their fraudulent, defective 
product; 
K. For the reasonable attorneys' fees and the costs of prosecuting this 
action; 
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1 Defendants Basic Research, L.L.C. ("Basic Research"), Dynakor Pharmacal, L.L.C. ("Dynakor"). 
I Western Holdings, L.L.C. ("Western Holdings"), Dennis Gay ("Gay"), Daniel B. Mowrey 
3 | | ("Mowrey") d/b/a American Phytotherapy Research Laboratory, and Mitchell K. Friedlander 
411 ("Friedlander'*) (collectively, the "Defendants). 
5 NATURE OF THE CLASS ACTION 
6 1. Defendants manufactured, advertised, marketed and sold the dietary supplement 
7 Akavar 20150 ("Ak2varM) that is the subject of this action. During the Class Period, Defendants have 
8 knowingly engaged in a deliberate campaign of widespread fraud and deception intended to dupe 
9 unsuspecting consumers, including Plaintiff and the members of the Class, into purchasing millions 
10 [J of dollars worth of Akavar, purportedly designed to cause weight loss and improve bodily 
11 appearance, which is manufactured, marketed, advertisedand sold by Defendants. Plaintiff, on behalf! 
12 of herself and the members of the Class (as defined in Paragraph 43 of this Complaint), assert claims 
13 against Defendants for violations of California's Unfair Competition Act (Bus. & Prof. Code § 
14 17200) ("UCL"); False Advertising Act (Bus. & Prof. Code § 17500) ("FAL"), and Consumer Legal 
15 Remedies Act (Civil Code § 1780) ("CRLA"). 
16 2. With regard to Akavar and numerous other alleged dietary supplements, Defendants 
17 have perpetrated their schemes to defraud through a web of interrelated, closely-held limited liability 
18 companies that oversee the "research," publication, manufacturing, marketing, sales and distribution! 
19 of AkSvar. During the Class Period, Defendants have operated a common business enterprise while] 
20 engaging in the deceptive acts and practices alleged in this Complaint and are, therefore, jointly and 
21 severally liable for such acts and practices. 
22 3. Defendants have used television, the internet and national publications to advertise 
23 AkSvar as a product that offers a "foolproof alternative to weight loss with "guaranteed success" and 
24 "WITHOUT GRUELING DIET AND EXERCISE REGIMENS!" These advertisements also falsely 
2 5
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state that'' Studies have proved a virtual 100% success rate among the participants,' * and that by using 
the product the consumer will see excess fat "PULLED FROM BULGING PARTS OF YOUR 
BODY. " Defendants also falsely allege that the results are "scientific fact, documented by published 
medical findings" and that "a team of doctors working in a recognized medical university discovered] 
the potent caloric-restricting qualities" of Akavar. However, in truth, Akavar is not a foolproof] 
alternative to weight loss with guaranteed success, and the product has not been subjected to clinical 
trials. 
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 
4. This Complaint is filed, and these proceeding instituted, pursuant to California 
Business and Professions Code §§ 17203 and 17204 and California Civil Code § 1780. Plaintiff] 
seeks to recover, inter alia, restitution of lost monies suffered by Plaintiff and members of the Class 
due to Defendants' violations of UCL, the FAL, and the CLRA. Plaintiff also seeks injunctive relief. 
The Court has jurisdiction over this action pursuant to Code of Civil Proc. § 410.10. 
5. The Court may apply California law to all class members who are California residents. 
Further, Defendants' false advertising and deceptive marketing partially occurred in California and 
was directed toward California residents. 
6. Venue is proper in this Court pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 393, 395(a), and 
395.5 and Civil Code § 1780(c), because (a) injuries to property described herein occurred in this 
county; (b) acts and transactions described herein occurred within this county; and (c) Defendants did 
business in this county by marketing, advertising and selling Akavar in this country. 
7. No portion of this Complaint is brought pursuant to federal law. Plaintiff states and] 
intends to state causes of action solely under state law and expressly denies any attempt to state a 
cause of action under federal law or a cause of action in excess of $74,999 for the Plaintiff and each] 
individual Class member. The individual claims of Plaintiff and Class members are worth less thanl 
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1 $75,000 and cannot possible exceed this amount given the cost of refunding individual purchases of 
2 AkSvar; the proportionally limited amount of punitive damages allowable under controlling authority, 
3 and the relatively modest individual value of other compensatory damages incurred and recoverable 
4 by Plaintiff and each Class member. 
5 PARTIES 
6 8. Plaintiff, Mary Tompkins, is a citizen of Sacramento, California. Based on 
7 Defendants' advertising, Ms. Tompkins purchased a supply of Akivar through a California retailer. 
8 After approximately 2 weeks of taking Akavar as directed on the package labeling, Ms. Tompkins 
9 had not lost any weight. She ceased taking the product. 
10 9. 'Defendant Basic Research is a limited liability company established under the laws of 
11 the State of Utah with its principal place of business located at 5742 West Harold Gatty Drive, Salt 
12 Lake City, Utah 84116. Basic Research is one of the largest nutraceutical companies in the United 
13 States with annual sales revenues in excess of $50 million. Basic Research develops and 
14 manufacturers scores of cosmetics, nutritional supplements and dietary supplements that are marketed! 
15 under the names of nearly a dozen companies. Defendant Basic Research is the subject of a 
16 permanent injunction by the United States Federal Trade Commission for the marketing and sale on 
17 products promising weight loss without diet or exercise. 
18 10. Defendant Dynakor is a limited liability company established under the laws of the] 
19 State of Tfch with its principal place of business located at 5742 West Harold Gatty Drive, Salt Laka 
20 City, Utah 84116. Dynakor, an affiliate of Defendant Basic Research, markets and sells certain th^ 
21 products developed by Defendant Basic Research, including Akavar. 
22 j i, Defendant Western Holdings is a limited liability company established under the lawi 
23 of the State of Utah with its principal place of business located at 1821 Logan Avenue, Cheyenne 
24 Wyoming 82001. Western Holdings, an affiliate of Defendant Basic Research, licenses itfe 
- 4 -
CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Case 2:09-cv-0(W8-CW Document 43-4 Filed 07/0&W Page 7 of 22 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
14. Defendant Friedlander, the self-proclaimed marketing guru of Basic Research, is a 
citizen and resident of the State of Utah with a place of business located at 5742 West Harold Gatty 
Drive, Salt Lake City, Utah 84116. Defendant Friedlander is a marketing consultant to, among 
others, Defendants Gay, Basic Research and Dynakor. Defendant Friedlander develops and endorses 
products marketed by Defendants Basic Research and Dynakor. Although not an employee of either 
Basic Research or Dynakor, Defendant Friedlander maintains his offices at Defendant Basic 
Research. Defendant Friedlander is the subject of a permanent injunction by the United States 
Federal Trade Commission for the marketing and sale of products promising weight loss without diet 
or exercise. 
15. Akavar is advertised, marketed and sold in California. Each Defendant, through its 
associations with the manufacture, marketing and sale of Akavar, is qualified to do and is doing 
business in California. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
16. Fraudulent weight loss products are an enormous problem in the United States. In an 
October 2007 Federal Trade Commission study, "Consumer Fraud in the United States. The Second 
FTC Survey," the FTC notes that an estimated 2.1%of all consumers nationwide — representing a 
total of 4.8 million U.S. adults purchased and used fraudulent weight-loss products during the 
year prior to the survey. The Study found that "[M]ore consumers were victims of fraudulent weight 
loss products man of any of the other specific frauds covered in the survey." The report describes the! 
prototype fraudulent weight-loss claim as involving products that were promoted "as making it easy 
to lose weight or allowing one to lose weight without diet or exercise." 
17. Basic Research was created to capitalize on the fraudulent weight loss product 
epidemic. It is one of the largest nutraceutical companies in the U.S., with over $50 million in annual 
sales revenues. Basic Research puts out scores of products, which are marketed under the names of 
- 6 -
CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
)Wi Case 2:09-cv-00878-CW Document 43-4 Filed 07/0 gffi Page 8 of 22 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
21 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
nearly a dozen companies a practice that Defendant Gay has stated is intended to confuse competitors 
and "protect our brands in the Wild West atmosphere that exists today in the supplement industry." 
18. Defendant Dynakor was created by Defendants with the intent to mislead consumers 
into believing there was a real, independent "lab" behind AkSvar 20/50. This fiction was openly 
acknowledged in internal meetings by Basic Research and its management, including Gay, Mowrey, 
and Friedlander. 
19. The web of interlocking entities created to "confuse competitors" is, not 
coincidentally, equally confusing to consumers. 
DEFENDANTS* FALSE AND MISLEADING ADVERTISING 
20. On December 12, 2006, the United States Patent and Trademark Office ("USPTO") 
listed an application for the trademark "Akavar 20/50" to Defendant Dynakor Pharmacal IP Holdings. 
Subsequently, on May 3, 2007, the USPTO listed a trademark application for Akavar to Defendant 
Dynakor. Starting on or about this date, Defendants began marketing Akavar throughout the United 
States. 
21. In advertising, Defendants claim that AJc&var is the "European weight-loss 
breakthrough." In fact, Akavar was not available in Europe prior to its U.S. introduction and was| 
created by Defendants in Utah, at their headquarters, 
22. Defendants' marketing blitz, engineered by Friedlander, was designed to saturate thej! 
television, internet, and print media with Defendants' claims - including "infomercials," created b) | 
Friedlander, used to promote Akavar to the public. 
23. The core of Defendants' fraudulent representations regarding Akavar is summarized iij 
Defendants' slogan: "Eat all you want and still lose weight." The phrase "Eat all you want and stil 
lose weight" is a registered trademark of Defendant Western Holdings. 
-7 
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24. In support of their claims that Akavar allows you to "Eat all you want and still lose* 
2
 weight," Defendants' advertising asserts a number of facts, including the following: 
31 AkSvar-20/50 literally causes excessfat to be pulledfrom bulging ports of your 
body! 
As AkSvar-20/50 restricts caloric intake to below your daily caloric requirement, you 
literally pull excess fat from all over your body, including your waist, hips, thighs and 
buttocks, . . leaving your body thinner, trimmer and sexier than you ever thought 
possible. Akavar-20/50 helps draw out bulging pockets dfat and prevents the 
6II further conversion and storage d excessfat all over your body This remarkably 
effective formula works so fast and is so easy to use that before you have time to be 
7 discouraged you will have lost pounds and inches of ugly, hard-to-get-at, figure-
destroying fat. (emphasis added). 
8 
Akavar-20/SO will produce an extraordinary, unparalleled loss of body weight! 
a Akavar-20/50 is the perfect weight-loss compound for tough weight-loss problems. 
This zmixzmgformulation is the result of years 6 intensive research and scientific 
evaluation. Not one, but a team d doctors working in a recognized medical 
I
 ° university discovered the potent caloric-restricting qualities of the Akavar-20/50 
formulation, and the research team at Dynakor Pharraacal is proud to have played a 
111 major role in bringing this new generation of fast-acting caloric restrictors to the 
general public. . . at an affordable price, (emphasis added) 
12 
Tests prove virtually 100% success. 
j 3 That's right. While no diet pill can possibly work for everybody (that's why there's a 
money-back guarantee), scientific documentation has confirmed that virtually 
everyone in the study who used AkSvar-20/50's active compound (23 out of 24 
1 4
 participants, to be exact) lost weight. The research results are staggering. In a 
controlled, randomized clinical trial (the only type of proof accepted by both 
15 scientific and medical communities), doctors tested a group of overweight patients. 
And among those who took the active, patented Akavar-20/50 compound, 23 out of 24 
16 people lost a substantial amount of weight. But there's more! Not one of the subjects 
who continued taking the active Ak^var-20/50 weight-loss compound for a period of 
J 7J| one full year experienced rebound weight gain. Not one! In other words, Aktivar-
1
' I 20/50 caused easy, automatic weight loss without calorie counting and without diet 
rebound (emphasis added). 
18 
j An entirely new generation of "diet pills" 
19 An entirely new generation d powerful, foolproof, bio-active weight-loss compounds 
that automatically reduce caloric intake. . . eliminating traditional dieting, calorie 
20 ] counting, strenuous exercise, fad diets, supermarket• 'miracle" pills, Japanese wonder 
diets, rubber suits, belts, creams or anything else you have ever tried before, (emphasis 
2j added). 
^ The only thing you haveto do is remember to takeyour easy-to-swaffowAkovar-
I I
 20/50 tablets each and every day That's it! 
23 Akavar-20/50 is the only weight-loss compound that works automatically. There is 
absolutely no need to count calories, no need to consciously lower your caloric intake, 
24 I no need for expensive, pre-measured meals. . . and no need to give up your favorite 
8 
CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Case 2:09-cv-00878-CW Document 43-4 Filed 07/08/TO Page 10 of 22 
l | foods! Why? Because Akavar-20/50 reduces caloric intake. . .automatically, 
(emphasis added). 
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25. Consumers can purchase Akavar directly from Defendants through Defendants' 
websites: www.dynakorpharmacal.com and www.AKAVAR2050.com, or by calling 1-800-235-
8715. 
26. Through their websites and toll-free number, Defendants sell a "full 60-capsule| 
supply" of Akavar for $39.99. Alternatively, consumers can purchase two bottles for $79.98 and 
receive a third bottle free. Akavar is also available in stores and on-line through third-party| 
distributors such as General Nutrition Center (GNC), Rite-Aide, Walgreens and WalMart. 
27. As part of their advertising campaign for Akavar, Defendants use the phrases' 'and wel 
couldn't say it in print" and "and we couldn't say it in print if it wasn't true", both registered^ 
strademark phrases of Defendant Western Holdings. 
28. In fact, Defendants' advertising claims are false, misleading, deceptive and inaccurate 
Contrary to Defendants' advertising claims, Akavar's formulation is not the result of years of 
intensive research. Nor is Akavar a new generation of powerful, foolproof, bio-active weight-toss 
compound. 
29. Although tbe ingredients of Akavar are npt listed in the advertising, and are not 
available on the website, the product packaging claims that Akavar-20/50 is "A Proprietary Blend 
Containing:" 
D Yerba Mate (Leaf) SE 
D Trimethylxanthine(U-e. Caffeine) 
D Guarana (Seed) SE 
0 Damiana (Leaf, Seed) SE 
0 Green Tea (Leaf) SE 
D Ginger (Root) 
0 Kola Nut SE 
D Schinsandra (Fruit) 
0 Scutellaria (Root) SE 
0 Tibetan Ginseng (Root) SE 
D Cocoa Nut SE 
•
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m. Whether the defendants should be declared financially responsible for 
21 notifying all Class members of the true nature of Akavar and for the cpsts and 
31 expenses of a recall or buy-back. 
41 n. Whether plaintiff and Class members are entitled to compensatory damages, 
5 I and the amount of such damages; and 
611 o. Whether defendants should be ordered to disgorge, for the benefit of the Class 
71 and the general public, all or part of their ill-gotten profits received firm the 
81 sale of Akavar, and whether defendants should be ordered to make full 
911 restitution to plaintiffs and Class members. 
101| 47. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class 
11II members. Plaintiff has retained California counsel who have substantial experience in prosecuting 
12II consumer class actions under the laws of this state. Plaintiff and her counsel are committed to 
131| ^vigorously prosecuting this action on behalf of the Class in this Court, and they have the financial 
14II resources to do so. Neither plaintiffs nor her counsel have any interests adverse to those of the Class, 
15 48. Plaintiff and the members of the Class suffered, and will continue to suffer, harm as a| 
16II result of Defendants' unlawfid and wrongful conduct. A class action brought by California plaintiff: 
17II under California law in a California state court is superior to other available methods for the fair am 
18] efficient adjudication of the controversy. Absent a class action, most members of the Class likelj 
191| would find the cost of litigating their damages claims to be prohibitive, and will have no effectiv< 
201| remedy at law. Because of the relatively small size of individual Class member's claims, few Class 
21J members likely could afford to seek legal redress on ah individual basis for defendants' misconduct. 
22 Absent a class action, Class members will continue to incur damages and be at risk of irreparable 
231| harm and defendants' misconduct will proceed without remedy. Class action treatment of common 
24 
25 
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1II questions of law or fact is also superior to multiple individual actions or piecemeal litigation because 
2 | | it conserves the resources of the litigants, and promotes consistency and efficiency of adjudication. 
3|U 49. Plaintiff and Class members have all suffered, and will continue to suffer, barm and 
damages as a result of defendants' unlawful and wrongful conduct, and have been and are at risk ofj 
irreparable harm. Additionally, the prosecution of separate actions by individual Class members! 
against defendants would create a risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to 
individual members of the Class that would establish incompatible standards for defendants and 
would create a risk of adjudications with respect to individual Class members that would, as a 
practical matter, be dispositive of the interests of other Class members or substantially impair or 
impede their ability lo protect their interests, thereby making class certification appropriate. 
50. Defendants have acted and failed to act on grounds generally applicable to plaintiffs 
and Class members, thereby making appropriate final injunctive, declaratory, or other equitable relief | 
as to the Class as a whole. 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
Violations of the Unfair Competition Law, the Deceptive, False and 
Misleading Advertising Statutes 
51. The preceding paragraphs of this Complaint are realleged and incorporated by 
reference. This cause of action, which alleges violations of the UCL, FAL, and the CLRA, is asserted 
against all of the defendants. 
52. Under Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17204 and 17535, and Civ. Code § 1780, plaintiffs have 
standing to assert these claims on behalf of themselves, the members of the Class, and the genera*! 
i 
53. In violation of the UCL, the FAL, and the CLRA, defendants committed and/or aided » 
and abetted unlawful, unfair and deceptive business acts and practices, thereby obtaining unlawful 
15 
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profits and injuring plaintiffs, Class members and the general public, through the dissemination of 
advertising other representations that consumption of Akavar according to its directions would cause 
weight loss without diet and exercise. 
54. As a direct and proximate result of defendants' unlawful, unfair and deceptive business 
acts or practices, pursuant to the UCL, the FAL, and the CLRA plaintiffs, Class members and the 
general public are entided to (a) injunctive relief in the form of recall or buy-back of the Akavar; (b) 
restitution of defendants' unjust enrichment and/or disgorgement of defendants' improperly gained 
profits; (c) recovery of compensatory damages; and (d) recovery of punitive or exemplary damages as 
provided by statute. Pursuant to Civ. Code § 1780 and Code Civ. Proc. § 1021.5, plaintiffs are also 
entitled to recover reasonable attorney's fees and the costs of bringing this action. 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Violation of Consumer Legal Remedies Act, Civil Code §§ 1750, eL seq.) 
55. Plaintiff incorporates each and every preceding paragraph stated above, inclusive, as 
though the same were fully set forth hereafter. 
56. Defendants are "persons" as defined by Cal. Civil Code section 1761(c). 
57. Plaintiff and Class members are "consumers" as that terms is defined under the CLRA. 
58. Through their own actions, and those of their employees, agents and servants] 
Defendants engaged in unlawful conduct in violation of the CLRA by engaging, inter alia, in the! 
following conduct, while actively concealing and failing to disclose the material information in itq 
possession regarding the quality and characteristics of Akavar: 
i. representing that Akavar caused weight loss without diet and exercise, 
ii. representing that AkSvar caused weight loss while consumers could "eat all you want" 
iii. representing that AkSvar had been scientifically tested and proven to cause weight losl 
in controlled, clinical trials, 
- 1 6 -
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iv. representing that Defendants' could not make its representations concerning AkSvai 
21| '"unless their were true" and that Akavar is a "European weight loss breakthrough." 
31 plaintiff requests that this Court enter such orders and judgments as may be necessary to restore to 
41 any person in interest any money and profits which may have been acquired by defendants by means 
5II of aforementioned wrongful business practices and acts and to prevent future wrongdoing by 
6 i^njunction, as provided by Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17203 and 17535 and Civ. Code § 1780. 
71| 59. Plaintiffand the Class seek restitution in the full amount of the AkSvar purchased and/or 
81| disgorgement of Defendants' profits reasonably attributable to its unjust enrichment as a result of the 
9II imisconduct alleged herein, and any other relief which the court deems proper. 
60. Plaintiff and the Class further intend to seek compensatory damages and, in light of] 
Defendants' willful and conscious disregard for the rights and safety of the Plaintiff, the Class and the 
public, and Defendants' intentional and fraudulent concealment of material facts, Plaintiff and the 
members of the Class also intend to seek an award of punitive damages. Pursuant to Civil Code 
§ 1782(a), Plaintiff sewed Defendants with notice of its alleged violations of the CLRA by certified mail 
return receipt requested. Defendants have failed to provide appropriate relief for its violation of the 
CLRA. Plaintiff seeks monetary (both compensatory and punitive) damages under the CLRA. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs and the Class pray for relief as set forth below, including reasonable 
attorneys'fees and costs of suit. 
10 
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company n entity of unknown origin; 
JOSEPH BODE, an individual; SHEILA 
ERICKSON, an individual; WALGREEN 
COMPANY dba WALGREENS, an Illinois 
corporation; GENERAL NUTRITION 
CORPORATION, dba GNC, a 
Pennsylvania corporation; 
DRUGSTORE.COM, a Washington 
corporation; WESTERN HOLDINGS, 
LLC, a limited liability company of 
unknown origin; DENNIS GAY, an 
individual; DANIEL B. MOWREY dba 
AMERICAN PHYTOTHERAPY 
RESEARCH LABORATORY; 
MITCHELL K. FRJJEDLANDER, an 
individual; and DOE DEFENDANTS 1-
J0, Inclusive, 
Defendants. 
i ^B^ 'age 3 of 26 
L INTRODUCTION 
Defendants are defrauding hundreds of thousands of unwary consumers by 
selling a diet pill ("Akavar") with a simple (and absolutely false) tagline: "Eat all you 
want and still lose weight We couldn't say it in print if it wasn't true." Defendants 
also claim that, by using Akavar, consumers will experience "clinically proven weight 
loss of up to 1603%" without changing eating or exercise habits." 
These claims are absolutely false. Plaintiffs bring this lawsuit to enjoin these lies 
and to recover the many millions of dollars generated by Defendants via the false and 
misleading claims. 
H. THE PARTIES 
1. Plaintiffs Nicole Forlenza and Shaiden Monroe are residents of California 
and have purchased Akavar from Walgreen's or GNC. 
AKA01-M:S03448_I.DOC:5-26-<)9 -_2_-
CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT 
nt*x<\ 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
)lft Case 2:09-cv-008re-CW Document 43-5 Filed 07/0 m F Page 6 of 26 
of the DOE Defendants is in some manner legally responsible for the damages suffered 
by Plaintiffs and the members of the class as alleged herein. Plaintiffs will amend this 
complaint to set forth the true names and capacities of these Defendants when they have 
been ascertained, along with appropriate charging allegations, as may be necessary. 
HI. JURISDICTION AND VENUE 
16. This Court has jurisdiction over all causes of action asserted herein. 
17. Venue is proper in this Court because Plaintiffs purchased Akavar in this 
Judicial District and because Defendants received substantial compensation from sales 
in this Judicial District. 
18- Defendants and other out-of-state participants can be brought before this 
Court pursuant to state and federal law. 
IV. FACTS 
19. The weight-loss industry is a multi-billion-dollar industry in the United 
States. Hundreds of new products appear on the market every year, many of them 
claiming to be a quick and easy solution to the weight loss problem. In an effort to 
promote real weight loss and to prevent Americans from being defrauded by "miracle 
pills." The U.S. Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") instructs that "[a]ny claims 
that you can lose weight effortlessly are false. The only proven way to lose weight is 
either to reduce the number of calories you eat or to increase the number of calories you 
bum off through exercise. Most experts recommend combination of both,"1 
1
 U.S. Food and Drug Administration, The Facts About Weight Loss Products and Programs, FDA/FTC/NAAG 
Brochure*: 1992. Available at: htqF>://www.cf3an.fda^ov/--dms/wgtloss.htniI: See also Linda Bren, Losing Weight: Start By 
Counting Calories^ FDA CONSUMER JanTFeb. 2002. Available at* http://www.fda.gDV/fdac/^ 
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20. Akavar is a dietary supplement marketed by Defendant as a weight loss 
product Its key ingredients are yerba mat£, caffeine, and green tea. Attached as 
Exhibit A hereto are true and correct copies of the false claims. 
21. Akavar claims to be the "fastest, easiest weight loss ever." It purports to 
allow consumers to "eat all you want and still lose weight." Defendants claim that 
Akavar makes weight loss "effortless" by "automatically reduc[ing] caloric intake . , . 
[and] eliminating traditional dieting, calorie counting, strenuous exercise, fad diets, 
supermarket 'miracle' pills, Japanese wonder diets, rubber suits, belts, creams or 
anything else you have ever tried before." However, Akavar is just one of those 
"miracle pills" it derides. Defendants attempt to sell AkMvar by convincing consumers 
that they can avoid the only proven and safe weight-loss method recognized by the 
FDA. 
22. Defendants claim that Akavar "cause[s] easy, automatic, permanent weight 
loss" all "within a few short weeks," To prove this assertion Defendants claim that a 
group that used Akavar experienced 1603% more weight loss over a six-week period 
than those who did not use their product—and that group never had to exercise or diet. 
Defendants further claim ''thousands of men and women . . . [have] experienced a 
fantastic and incredible loss of weight without ever dieting" by using Akavar, These 
false claims mislead consumers to believe that they can achieve the same results. 
23. Defendants assert that Akavar "reduces caloric intake automatically" so 
that you will never have to "consciously change your diet or exercise habits!" 
Defendants promise that those who take AkSvar can eat what they want because it alters 
your desire to overeat. Defendants' description of how this results in weight loss is false 
and misleading to consumers. First, Akavar cannot automatically reduce caloric intake; 
individuals may reduce the number of calories ingested by choosing to eat less or to eat 
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(c) Even if the stimulants in Zantrex-3 increased energy levels (and 
presumably physical activity), such an increase would be vastly 
insufficient to produce 546% more weight loss than the leading 
ephedrine-based diet pill. 
(d) Any permanent weight loss program includes a long-term change in 
eating and exercise habits, the very practices Zantrex-3 suggests can 
be avoided 
(e) Zantrex-3 Insta-Shot has no effect on male potency. 
28. Plaintiffs Batiz and Winzen thus are informed and believe, in summary, 
that Defendants' claims regarding Zantrex-3 are false because (A) permanent weight 
loss cannot occur automatically without a change in caloric intake or increased physical 
activity; (B) a short term decrease in appetite and increase in energy from ingesting 
stimulants contained in Zantrex-3 does not correspond with the permanent weight loss 
Defendants promise; and (C) the testing results advertised by Defendants are spurious 
and of no practical significance. 
29. On information and belief, Defendants knew that Zantrex-3 did not have 
the properties Defendants claimed, and that it was defective as set forth above, but 
nevertheless manufactured and marketed the product as set forth above. 
30. Defendants sell Zantrex-3 at prices often exceeding $40.00 per package 
based on the preceding false claims. As a result, Defendants have wrongfully made tens 
of millions of dollars in profits from California consumers. 
2. Akgvar 20/50 and Akavar Slimming Gel 
31. Akavar 20/50, and AkSvar Slimming Gel are dietary supplements and 
topical creams marketed by Defendants as weight loss products. Their key ingredients 
are yerba mate, caffeine, and green tea7 Defendants make the following claims for the 
Akavar products: 
(a) "'Eat What You Want And Still Lose Weight'.... They're the eight 
most provocative words in the English language (at least for those of 
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us who've tried diet after diet and failed)." Effectively, Defendants 
claim that no change in diet or behavior is required to lose weight 
while taking Akavar 20/50. A true and correct copy of Defendants' 
online claim on this point is attached hereto as Exhibit 6. 
(b) "Akavar 20/50 literally causes excess fet to be pulled from bulging 
parts of your body! As AkSvar 20/50 restricts caloric intake to 
below your daily caloric requirement, you literally pull excess fat 
from all over your body, including your waist, hips, thighs and 
buttocks (the body's natural fat storage sites) ... leaving your body 
thinner, trimmer and sexier than you ever thought possible." A true 
and correct copy of Defendants' online claim on this point is 
attached hereto as Exhibit 7. 
(c) "Clinical trial shows success. That's right While no diet pill can 
possibly work for everyone (that's why there's a money-back 
guarantee), the peer-reviewed clinical trial revealed that virtually 
everyone in the study who used AkSvar 20/50' s active compound 
(23 out of 24 participants, to be exact) lost a significant amount of 
weight." A true and correct copy of Defendants' online claim on 
this point is included in Exhibit 7. 
(d) "It might sound too good to be true, but no less than the famed 
Washington Post dubbed Akavar Slimming Gel's functional 
compound "The Dream Cream.' Akavar Slimming Gel's remarkable 
topical formula permits you to reduce the appearance of bulging 
pockets of unsightly fat wherever they appear... including around 
your behind. Got'saddlebags'? Wobbly thighs? Use Slimming Gel 
to slim down the appearance of bulges where you don't want them 
and accentuate the sexy curves where you do want them. Wherever 
you've got those unsightly lumps and bumps, there's nothing better 
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for bulges than topically applied Akavar Slimming Gel... *The 
Dream Cream.'" A true and correct copy of Defendants' online 
claim on this point is attached hereto as Exhibit 8. 
32. Plaintiffs Forlenza, Monroe and I. Bodor are informed and believe that 
Defendants5 claims for Akavar 20/50 and AkSvar Slimming Gel are false and 
misleading for the following reasons: 
(a) AkSvar 20/50 cannot automatically reduce caloric intake; individuals 
may reduce the number of calories ingested by choosing to eat less 
or to eat healthier foods. No supplement can ever control caloric 
intake "automatically." 
(b) Even if AkSvar 20/50 could suppress appetite and reduce the number 
of calories consumed, that decrease would have to be coupled with 
an increase in physical activity in order to lose weight. 
(c) Even if the stimulants in Akavar 20/50 increased energy levels (and 
presumably physical activity), such an increase would be vastly 
insufficient to produce the drop in weight Defendants claim. 
(d) The Washington Post has not dubbed AkSvar Slimming Gel's 
functional compound "The Dream Cream." Moreover, Akavar 
Slimming Gel does not permit a user to "reduce the appearance of 
bulging pockets of unsightly fat wherever they appear," nor does it 
"slim down the appearance of bulges where you don't want them 
and accentuate the sexy curves where you do want them." 
33. Plaintiffs Forlenza, Monroe and I. Bodor are informed and believe, in 
summary, that Defendants' claims regarding AkSvar 20/50 and AkSvar Slimming Gel 
are false because (A) permanent weight loss cannot occur "automatically" without a 
change in caloric intake or increased physical activity; (B) a short term decrease in 
appetite and increase in energy from ingesting stimulants contained in Akavar 20/50 
does not correspond with the permanent weight loss Defendants promise; (C) the testing 
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results advertised by Defendants are spurious and of no practical significance because 
the sample population (twenty-four subjects) tested was insufficient to create a basis 
upon which to reject the null hypothesis; and (D) Akavar Slimming Gel has no 
pharmaceutical value. 
34. On information and belief, Defendants knew that Akavar 20/50 and 
Akavar Slimming Gel did not have the properties Defendants claimed, and that it, was 
defective as set forth above, but nevertheless manufactured and marketed the product as 
set forth above. 
35. Defendants sell Akavar 20/50 and AkSvar Slimming Gel at prices up to 
$40.00 per package based on the preceding false claims. As a result, Defendants have 
wrongfully made tens of millions of dollars in profits from California consumers. 
3* Relacore 
36. Defendants Carter-Reed and Basic Research manufacture Relacore under 
the names "Relacore Extra," "Relacore PM," "Relacore Stress Reducer/Mood 
Elevator," "Relacore Cortisol Control," and other names. Defendants make the 
following claims for Relacore products: 
(a) Relacore is an agent that targets "belly fat" and controls nervous 
binge eating and anxiety. 
(b) Relacore "...reduce[s] tummy bulge by controlling the Cortisol 
increase generated by diet-related stress and anxiety that can lead to 
stubborn belly fat retention ... not to mention ... that all time diet 
killer 'Nervous Binge Eating.'" A true and correct copy of 
Defendants9 online claims on these points is attached hereto as 
Exhibits 
37. Plaintiff M. Bodor is informed and believes that the claims for Relacore 
are false and misleading for the following reasons: 
/ / / 
/ / / 
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(a) Relacore in fact does not reduce or eliminate "belly fat" or cause the 
"thinner waist and "flatter tummy" that Defendants contend it 
produces. 
(b) Relacore in fact does not reduce nervous anxiety or the "nervous 
binge eating" that such anxiety engenders. 
38. Plaintiff M Bodor is informed and believes that Defendants make each of 
these spurious claims to entice Plaintiff M. Bodor and others to purchase Relacore in its 
various incarnations with the hope that the fat around their waists will be reduced and 
their diet-related fears and anxieties will be alleviated. 
39. On information and belief, Defendants knew that Relacore did not have the 
properties Defendants claimed, and that it was defective as set forth above, but 
nevertheless manufactured and marketed the product as set forth above. 
40. Defendants sell Relacore at prices up to about $35.00 per package based on 
the preceding false claims. As a result, Defendants have wrongfully made tens of 
millions of dollars in profits from California consumers. 
D. Plaintiffs' Purchase Of Defendants5 Products In Reliance On 
Defendants' Claims 
41. Prior to the filing of this action, on numerous occasions since 2008, and 
continuing through June or July of 2009, Plaintiff Forlenza purchased AkSvar 20/50 
from Walgreens and/or GNC in the Central District of California for her own personal 
use. In so doing, Plaintiff Forlenza believed and relied specifically on the 
representations contained in the marketing materials for the product, which were present 
at and displayed by the Walgreens and/or GNC where she purchased the product. 
Those representations explicitly state that a consumer heed not change his or her diet 
and exercise routine in order to lose weight because the product produces weight loss 
"automatically." Plaintiff Forlenza has consumed Akfivar 20/50, but the product has not 
worked as advertised. Specifically, Plaintiff Forlenza has found that she has not lost 
any weight as a consequence of using the product, and in fact has not lost any weight 
537280 l.DOC:8-10-09 - 1 4 -
SECOND AMENDED CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT 
i r \ 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
)Sre-
l 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
CALL. JENSEN A 
A PROFESSIONAL 
CORPORATION 
Case 2:09-cv-0(W8-CW Document 43-7 Filed 07/08/10 Page 16 of 67 
Case 2:09-cv-03730-AG-SS Document 78 Filed 08/10/2009 Page 15 of 66 
without changing diet or exercise. Plaintiff Forlenza has thus suffered injury and 
damage because she purchased a product based on false advertising and because the 
product has not woriced as advertised. 
42. Prior to the filing of this action, on numerous occasions since 2008, and 
continuing through June or July of 2009, Plaintiff Monroe purchased Akavar 20/50 
from Walgreens and/or GNC in the Central District of California for her own personal 
use. In so doing, Plaintiff Monroe believed and relied specifically on the 
representations contained in the marketing materials for the product, which were present 
at and displayed by the Walgreens and/or GNC where she purchased the product 
Those representations explicitly state that a consumer need not change his or her diet 
and exercise routine in order to lose weight because the product produces weight loss 
"automatically." Plaintiff Monroe has consumed Akavar 20/50, but the product has not 
worked as advertised. Specifically, Plaintiff Monroe has found that she has not lost any 
weight as a consequence of using the product, and in fact has not lost any weight 
without changing diet or exercise. Plaintiff Monroe has thus suffered injury and 
damage because she purchased a product based on false advertising and because the 
product has not worked as advertised. 
43. Prior to the filing of this action, on numerous occasions since 2008, and 
continuing through June or July of 2009, Plaintiff Batiz purchased Zantrex-3 and/or 
Zantrex-3 Insta-Shot from Walgreens, GNC, Wal-Mart, CVS, and/or Target in the 
Central District of California for her own personal use. In so doing, Plaintiff Batiz 
believed and relied specifically on the representations contained in the marketing 
materials for the product, which were present at and displayed by the Walgreens, GNC, 
Wal-Mart, CVS, and/or Target where she purchased the product Those representations 
explicitly state that Zantrex-3 will cause 546% more weight loss than the leading 
ephedrine-based diet pill, that the weight loss will be rapid due to the fast acting product 
and would also be long lasting, and that the product would cause a very high energy 
boost Plaintiff Batiz has consumed Zantrex-3, but the product has not woriced as 
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representations concerning Akavar products and purchased the product based on those 
representations. 
72. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the 
Class. Plaintiff has retained counsel with substantial experience in handling complex 
class action litigation, as detailed above. 
73. Plaintiff and the members of the Class suffered, and will continue to suffer, 
harm as a result of Defendants' unlawful and wrongful conduct A class action is 
superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the present 
controversy for the reasons stated above. 
74. Adjudication of individual class members' claims with respect to the 
Defendants would, as a practical matter, be dispositive of the interests of other members 
not parties to the adjudication, and could substantially impair or impede the ability of 
other class members to protect their interests. 
VL CAUSES OF ACTION 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
VIOLATION OF CALIFORNIA CONSUMERS LEGAL REMEDIES ACT 
(By Plaintiffs Forlenza and Monroe, and On Behalf of the 
Zantrex-3, Relacore, and Akavar Classes) 
75. Plaintiffs incorporate by this reference the preceding allegations as if fully 
set forth herein and, to the extent necessary, plead this cause of action in the alternative. 
76. As alleged hereinabove, Plaintiffs have standing to pursue this claim as 
Plaintiffs have suffered injury in fact and have lost money or property as a result of 
Defendants' actions as set forth herein. Specifically: 
(a) Prior to the filing of this action, Plaintiffs Forlenza, Monroe and I. 
Bodor purchased Akavar products for their own personal use. In so 
doing, Plaintiffs Forlenza, Monroe and I. Bodor believed and relied 
specifically on the representations contained in the marketing 
materials for the products, which they had viewed on television, on 
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the Internet, and in the premises of the Retailer Defendants where 
they purchased the product, and which explicitly state that a 
consumer need not change his or her diet and exercise routine in 
order to lose weight with the product, and that Akavar 20/50 
automatically reduces caloric intake and causes weight loss 
accordingly. Plaintiffs Forlenza, Monroe and I. Bodor have used 
Akavar 20/50 and Akavar Slimming Gel, but the products have not 
worked as advertised. Specifically, they have not experienced 
weight loss without the need for change in diet and exercise routines, 
Akavar 20/50 did not automatically reduce their caloric intake and 
cause weight loss, and Akavar Slimming Gel did not make them 
appear thinner. Plaintiffs Forlenza, Monroe and I. Bodor thus have 
suffered significant injury and damage because they purchased a 
product based on false advertising and because the product has not 
worked as advertised, 
(b) Prior to the filing of this action, Plaintiffs Batiz and Winzen 
purchased Zantrex-3 products for their own personal use. In so 
doing, Plaintiffs Batiz and Winzen believed and relied specifically 
on the representations contained in the marketing materials for the 
products, which they had viewed on television, on the Internet, and 
in the premises of the Retailer Defendants where they purchased the 
product, and which explicitly state that Zantrex-3 will cause 546% 
more weight loss than the leading ephedrine-based diet pill, that the 
weight loss will be rapid due to the fast acting product and would 
also be long lasting, and that the product would cause a very high 
energy boost and increase potency. Plaintiffs Batiz and Winzen 
have consumed Zantrex-3, but the product has not worked as 
advertised. Specifically, Plaintiffs have not experienced rapid 
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rights of Plaintiffs and the Classes, and did so with fraud, oppression, and malice. 
Therefore, Plaintiffs and the Classes are also entitled to punitive damages against 
Defendants in an amount that will be shown by proof at-trial. 
FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
VIOLATION OF CALIFORNIA BUSINESS AND PROFESSIONS 
CODE SECTIONS 17200 ET SEQ. 
(By Plaintiffs Forleiaza and Monroe, and On Behalf of the 
Zantrex-3, Relacore, and Akavar Classes) 
92. Plaintiffs incorporate by this reference the preceding allegations as if fully 
set forth herein and, to the extent necessary, plead this cause of action in the alternative. 
93. As alleged hereinabove, Plaintiffs have standing to pursue this claim as 
Plaintiffs have suffered injury in fact and have lost money or property as a result of 
Defendants' actions as set forth herein. Specifically: 
(a) Prior to the filing of this action, Plaintiffs Forlenza, Monroe and I. 
Bodor purchased Akavar products for their own personal use. In so 
doing, Plaintiffs Forlenza, Monroe and I. Bodor believed and relied 
specifically on the representations contained in the marketing 
materials for the products, which they had viewed on television, on 
the Internet, and in the premises of the Retailer Defendants where 
they purchased the product, and which explicitly state that a 
consumer need not change his or her diet and exercise routine in 
order to lose weight with the product, and that Ak&var 20/50 
automatically reduces caloric intake and causes weight loss 
accordingly. Plaintiffs Forlenza, Monroe and I. Bodor have 
consumed Akavar 20/50, but the product has not worked as 
advertised. Specifically, they have not experienced weight loss 
without the need for change in diet and exercise routines, and the 
Akavar products did not automatically reduce their caloric intake 
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and cause weight loss, nor did it create any of the "slimming" results 
claimed. Plaintiffs Forlenza, Monroe and I. Bodor thus have 
suffered significant injury and damage because they purchased a 
product based on false advertising and because the product has not 
worked as advertised, 
(b) Prior to the filing of this action, Plaintiffs Batiz and Winzen 
purchased Zantrex-3 products for their own personal use. In so 
doing, Plaintiffs Batiz and Winzen believed and relied specifically 
on the representations contained in the marketing materials for the 
products, which they had viewed on television, on the Internet, and 
in the premises of the Retailer Defendants where they purchased the 
product, and which explicitly state that Zantrex-3 products will 
cause 546% more weight loss than the leading ephedrine-based diet 
pill, that the weight loss will be rapid due to the fast acting product 
and would also be long lasting, and that the product would cause a 
very high energy boost and increase potency. Plaintiffs Batiz and 
Winzen have consumed Zantrex-3 products, but they have not 
worked as advertised. Specifically, Plaintiffs have not experienced 
rapid weight loss, or any weight loss at all as a consequence of 
consuming Zantrex-3 products, and have experienced no energy 
boost or any of the other results claimed for the product Plaintiffs 
Batiz and Winzen thus have suffered significant injury and damage 
because they purchased a product based on false advertising and 
because the product has not worked as advertised, 
(c) Prior to the filing of this action, Plaintiff M. Bodor purchased 
Relacore for her own personal use. In so doing, Plaintiff M. Bodor 
believed and relied specifically on the representations contained in 
the marketing materials for the products, which she had viewed on 
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98. Defendants' wrongful business practices constituted, and constitute, a 
continuing course of conduct of unfair competition since Defendants are marketing and 
selling their products in a manner likely to deceive the public. 
99. Defendants' wrongful business practices have caused injury to Plaintiffs 
and the Classes. 
100. Pursuant to section 17203 of the California Business and Professions Code, 
Plaintiffs and the Classes seek an order of this court enjoining Defendants from 
continuing to engage in unlawful, unfair, or deceptive business practices and any other 
act prohibited by law, including those set forth in the complaint. Plaintiffs and the 
Classes also seek an order requiring Defendants to make full restitution of all moneys it 
wrongfully obtained from Plaintiffs and the Classes. 
FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
BREACH OF WARRANTY 
(By Plaintiffs Forlenza and Monroe, and On Behalf of the 
Zantrex-3, Relacore, and Akavar Classes) 
101. Plaintiffs incorporate by this reference the preceding allegations as if fully 
set forth herein and, to the extent necessary, plead this cause of action in the alternative. 
102. As alleged hereinabove, Plaintiffs have standing to pursue this claim as 
Plaintiffs have suffered injury in fact and have lost money or property as a result of 
Defendants' actions as set forth herein. Specifically: 
(a) Prior to the filing of this action, Plaintiffs Forlenza, Monroe and I. 
Bodor purchased Akavar products for their own personal use. In so 
doing, Plaintiffs Forlenza, Monroe and I. Bodor believed and relied 
specifically on the representations contained in the marketing 
materials for the products, which they had viewed on television, on 
the Internet, and in the premises of the Retailer Defendants where 
they purchased the product, and which explicitly state that a 
consumer need not change his or her diet and exercise routine in 
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order to lose weight with the product, and that Akavar 20/50 
automatically reduces caloric intake and causes weight loss 
accordingly. Plaintiffs Forlenza, Monroe and I. Bodor have 
consumed Akavar 20/50 and applied Akavar Slimming Gel, but the 
products have not worked as advertised. Specifically, they have not 
experienced weight loss without the need for change in diet and 
exercise routines, and Akavar 20/50 did not automatically reduce 
their caloric intake and cause weight loss. Plaintiffs Forlenza, 
Monroe and I. Bodor thus have suffered significant injury and 
damage because they purchased a product based on false advertising 
and because the product has not worked as advertised. 
(b) Prior to the filing of this action, Plaintiffs Batiz and Winzen 
purchased Zantrex-3 products for their own personal use. In so 
doing, Plaintiffs Batiz and Winzen believed and relied specifically 
on the representations contained in the marketing materials for the 
products, which they had viewed on television, on the Internet, and 
in the premises of the Retailer Defendants where they purchased the 
product, and which explicitly state that Zantrex-3 products will 
cause 546% more weight loss than the leading ephedrine-based diet 
pill, that the weight loss will be rapid due to the fast acting product 
and would also be long lasting, and that the product would cause a 
very high energy boost and increase potency. Plaintiffs Batiz and 
Winzen have consumed Zantrex-3 products, but the products have 
not worked as advertised Specifically, Plaintiffs have not 
experienced rapid weight loss, or any weight loss at all as a 
consequence of consuming Zantrex-3 products, and have 
experienced no energy boost or any of the other results claimed for 
the product Plaintiffs Batiz and Winzen thus have suffered 
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2. Adjudge and decree that Defendants have engaged in the conduct alleged 
herein; 
3. For restitution and disgorgement on certain causes of action; 
4. For an injunction ordering Defendants to cease and desist from engaging in 
the unfair, unlawful, and/or fraudulent practices alleged in the Second 
Amended Complaint; 
5. For compensatory and general damages according to proof on certain 
causes of action; 
6. For both pre and post-judgment interest at the maximum allowable rate on 
any amounts awarded; 
7. Costs of the proceedings herein; 
8. Reasonable attorneys' fees as allowed by statute; and 
9. Any and all such other and further relief that this Court may deem just and 
proper, including but not limited to punitive damages. 
Dated: August 10,2009 CALL. JENSEN & FERRELL 
A Professional Corporation 
Scott J, Ferrell 
Lisa A. Wegner 
Scot D.Wilson 
Rog<g 
Scrft J. Ferrell 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs and the Classes 
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BASIC 
R E S E A R C H ' 
5742 West Harold Gaily Owe 
5AltlaktCily.UT84n6 
phone (8011517-7000 
fax (8011517-7001 
website wwwBasicResearch.org 
January 31, 2008 
(VIA FEDERAL EXPRESS AND ELECTRONIC MAIL) 
Admiral Insurance Company 
1255 Caldwell Road 
Cherry Hill, NJ 08034 
Attn: Claims Department 
E-Mail: admclaifn5@admiranns.com 
Re: Tender of Claims - Admiral Insurance Company Policy No. CA00OO1165-O1 
Insured: Covarix. LLC D/B/A: Basic Research, LLC; Covarix, LLC and Subsidiaries; 
Western Holdings. LLC and Subsidiaries, etc. 
To Whom It May Concern: 
Covarix, LLC dba Basic Research, LLC ("Basic Research") and Subsidiaries, and Western 
Holdings, LLC and Subsidiaries, among others (collectively the "Insureds"), are the named 
Insureds under Admiral Insurance Company Police No. CA00001165-01. The Insureds hereby 
provide notice, and tender the defense, of the following lawsuits and claims asserted against, 
inter olio, Basic Research, LLC, Dynakor Pharmacal, LLC, and Western Holdings, LLC: 
1. Miller v. Basic Research LLC, et a/., United States District Court, District of Utah, Civil 
No. 2:07-CV-00872; and 
2. Tompkins v. Basic Research, LLC. et o/., Superior Court of the State of California, 
Sacramento 
County, Civil No. 34-2007-000882591. 
For your reference, copies of the complaints filed in both cases are enclosed herewith, 
together with copies of all other papers which have been filed in each case as of the date of this 
letter. The Insureds first received a copy of the complaint in the Miller case on about November 
10,2007. The Insureds first received a copy of the complaint in the Tompkins case on about 
December 10,2007, The named plaintiff in the Tompkins case is Mary Tompkins. The named 
plaintiffs in the Miller case are; Pamela Miller, Randy Howard, and Donna Patterson. 
Each of these cases purports to be brought as class actions, and purports to assert false 
advertising claims relating to the marketing and sales of a product known as Akavar*-20/50 
("AkavBr"). In essence, the plaintiffs in both cases assert that the named defendants made false 
advertising claims concerning, Inter alia, the efficacy of the Ak3var product. In the Miller case, 
the plaintiffs seek class certification for a purported nationwide class of consumers who have, 
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WALSH & FURCOLO LLP 
SYMPHONY TOWERS 
PARTNERS 750 B STREET, SUTE 2740 NEVADA O m c i 
iSSSJ^S^ SAN DIEGO, CA 92101-8129 i645\^GECejiE*ciRcie 
CHnshMcKwn TfetEPHONK (B19) 232-8486 Sure 271 
FostorFuicofeJr. www.wamiiw.com FACSWHC {7fC)3a2-7S1B 
E-maik j wtdsh@wqfulaw.com 
June 6„ 2008 
DENIAL OF COVERAGE 
VIA CERTIFIED MAIL/ 
RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED 
Ronald F. Price, Esq. 
BASIC RESEARCH. LLC 
5742 West Harold Gatty Drive 
Salt Lake City, UT 84116 
Re: PAMELA MILLER, et aL v. BASIC RESEARCH, LLC, et aL 
US. District Cowl District of Utah Civil No. 2:07^CV^00872; 
MARY TOMPKINS v. BASIC RESEARCH, LLC, et al. 
US District Court. District of Utah Civil No. 2:08*CV-00313 
Insureds : Covarix, LLC dba Basic Research, LLC, et al. 
Claim No. : C129036 
Policy No. : CA000011665-01 (8/20/07 - 8/20/08) 
Our File No. : ADM:087QU1/I7 
Dear Mr. Price: 
As you know from our previous correspondence, this office has been retained by Admiral 
Insurance Company ("Admirer) to investigate and evaluate the coverage issues present in this 
matter under the above referenced policy issued to Covarix, LLC dba Basic Research, LLC, et 
aL ("Basic Research" and/or "insured**). This letter shall serve as a response to your tenders to 
Admiral ofdefense and indemnity ofthe above-referenced lawsuits on behalf of Basic Research. 
Western Holdings, LLC ("Western Holdings" and/or "Insured )^ and Dynakor Phaimacal, LLC 
("Dynakor").1 We have carcftilly considered all ofthe information and coverage arguments 
1
 Your initial lender was on behalf of Basic Research and Western Holdings, bin was ambiguous regarding the 
individuals named as defendants or Dynakor and clarification was requested. In response, you indicaied lender was 
made for Dynakor and Basic Research. 
AU001462 
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ADMIRAL 
1255 Caldwell Road 
P.O. Box 5725 
d e n y HJIL NJ 08034-3220 
Fax (856) 429-3*30 
Phone (B56) 429-9200 
DATE: 06/25/2009 
COVAR1XLLC 
5742 W HAROLD CATTY DRIVE 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTS4I16 
Alt: Douglas Carp 
INSURED: 
POLICY NO: 
CLAIM NOr 
CLMTNAME: 
EVE; 
Dear Mr. Carp: 
COVARIX LLC DBA BASIC RESEARCH LLC 
CA000011665-02 
C137310 
Nicole Forleaza 
05/29/2009 
We are in receipt of the lawsuit you forwarded entitled Nicole Forienza and Shaideo Monroe, Indf viduairy and on 
behalf of all others similarly situated vs Dynakor PharmacaJ, LLC, et ai, which is pending hi United Stales District 
Court, Central District of California under case number CV09-3730 MMM (Ssx). 
The complaint served as Admiral's first notice of this loss. The complaint contains counts for Violation of California 
Legal Remedies Act (wrongful business practices), unjmi cmichmem 
Violation of CA business and Professions code 17200 and Breach of Warmly. ^ 
as a class action suit, a ruling of the court thai the alleged conduce dW ocw, ratitirtforj, 
and general damages, pre and post judgment interest, costs and fees as well as punitive damages. 
Basically the complaint alleges that toe defendants, who include Basic Research, LLC, knowingly made raise 
representations In their advertisement of the product Akavar. 
This letter shall serve as a Reservation of Rights available to Admiral pursuant to the terms of the relevant Admiral 
policies as wflj be discussed m rtahcr detail below. Please mite 
u i^is,rh« reservation is subject to change as additional mfonnadon is received 
Admiral Insurance Company provides Claims-Made Commercial General Liability coverage (CGL) to Covarix dba 
Baste Research, IXC under policy CAOOOOI1665-02, which has liability limits of S imillkm, an aggregate limit of 
$2miUk>n and a $ 100,000 deductible. Coverage applies In the following I 
8ECT1DNI -COVERAGES 
COVERAGE A BODILY 1MJURY AND PROPERTY DAMAGE LIABILITY 
CL0130 0J02 
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1255 Caldwell Road 
PjQ* BW 5725 
Cherry Hill, KT 08034-3220 
Fax (856) 42Sh3&Q 
PkoTie <85$) 429-9200 
ADMIRAL!1^*"'* \NY 
Date: (T7/Oi$ft0(# 
CQVARJXLLC 
5742 W HAROLD G M T * DRIVE 
SALT L^KEcrry, irr &i te 
AtC Douglas Carp 
•R£: Insured: COVARIX LLC D*A BASIC RESEARCH LLC 
Claimant Nicole Forlenza 
A d ^ l r ^ y N o : CA0OOM1665-02 
AdnriraJ Claim No: ClXftlO 
Dear Mr. Carp; 
We arc m receipt of the lawsuit you forwarded entitled Nicole Forleuza and Sbaiden Monroe, individually and 
on behaif of all others similarly situated vs Dynakor Pbarmacalr LLC, et ai, which is pending in United States 
District Court/Cental Dttfcrict of California under case number CV09-3736 MMM (Ssx). 
The complaint scrvcjd as Admiral's first notice of this loss. The complaint contains counts for Violation of 
California Legal Remedies Act (wrongful business practices), unjust enrichment (profit from alleged 
misrepresentation), Fraud, Violation of GA business and Professions code 1720Q and Breach of Warranty. The 
coinjjaaint seeks a certification as a class action suit, a ruling of Che court that the alleged conduct did occur, 
restitution, injunction, oompensatory and general damages, pre and post judgment interest, costs and fees as 
well as punkive damages. 
Basically die complaint alleges that die defendants, who include Basic Research, LLC, knowingly made false 
representations in their advertisement of roe product Akavar. 
This letter shall serve as a Reservation of Rights available to Admiral pursuant to the terms of the relevant 
Admiral policies as will be discussed m Ivrmer detail helowl Please note dial Admiral's investigation remains 
origc4ngatkiU%9, Ibis reserve 
Admiral rhsttrimce Company provides Claims-Made Commercial QeneTd'liah'aity coverage (CGL) to 
CoVatxfedba Ba&c Research, LLC urjder policy CAOOOOi1665-02, which has liabfltty limits of SJmiBkm, an 
aggregate limit of S2rmHkm and a $UX);QG0deductible. Coverage appHes^ in m following manner: 
SECnON I-COVERAGES 
COVERAGE A B00JI.Y INJURY AND WOPfcRTY DAMAGE LIABILITY 
CL03 000*02 
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GAUNTLETT & ASSOCIATES 
A T T O R N E Y S A T LAW 
18400 Von Karman, Suite 300 
Irvine, California 92612 
Phone: (949)553-1010 •Facsimile: (949)553-2050 
Email: lnfo@gauntiettJaw.com 
Website: wwvw.gauntlettlaw.com 
Our File Number. 
10448-014 
July 15,2009 
VIA EMAIL & UPS OVERNIGHT 
dkagen@achniralins. com 
DawnKagen 
ADMIRAL INSURANCE COMPANY • 
Claims Superintendent 
1255 Caldwell Road 
P.O. Box5725 
Cherry Hill, NJ 08034-3220 
Re: Forlenza, et al v, Basic Research, LLC, etal 
U.S.D.C., Central District of California, Southern Division (Santa Ana), 
Case No. CV 09-03730-AG (SSx) (the "Forlenza suit9") 
Insured: Covarix, LLC dba Basic Research, LLC 
Claimant: Nicole Forlenza, Shaiden Monroe, E. Batiz and J, Boschen 
Admiral Policy Nos.: CA000011665-01 and CA000011665-02 
Admiral Claim No/. C137310 
Dear Ms. Kagem 
We are counsel along with Howrey, LLP for Admiral's insured, Covarix, LLC, dba Basic 
Research, LLC in the above-captioned lawsuit We write to update Admiral about certain 
developments in the litigation that your July 6, 2009 letter does not mention. 
On June H, 2009 the First Amended Complaint was filed in the Forlenza suit and 
previously sent to Admiral. The FAC differs from the Complaiiit previously tendered for 
defense in that: (1) Plaintiffs Nicole Forlenza and Shaiden Monroe have abandoned their class 
action allegations and now sue as individuals, alleging defendants* false advertising of weight-
loss supplement Ak&var in violation of California's Unfair Competition Law ("UCL") and 
California Legal Remedies Act ("CLRA"); (2) new Plaintiff WE. Batiz" alleges class claims 
based on defendants' purported misleading advertising of Zantrex-3, a different weight loss 
supplement; and (3) new Plaintiff "J. Boschen" alleges class claims based on defendants' 
purported misleading advertising of Relacore, a different weight loss supplement Admiral's 
insureds request coverage and a defense of these additional claims as well as those of Forlenza 
and Monroe. 
Defendants have retained both our firm and Howrey, LLP as co-counsel in this case. 
165570.1-10448^14-7/15/2009 12:52 PM 
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DECLARATION OF ANDREW M. SUSSMAN 
I, ANDREW M. SUSSMAN, declare: 
1. The facts set forth herein are within my personal knowledge and, if sworn as a 
witness, I could and would testify competently thereto under oath. 
2. I am an attorney with Gauntlett & Associates and one of the attorneys for Basic 
Research, LLC ("Basic Research"), the Plaintiff in this insurance coverage lawsuit against 
Admiral Insurance Company ("Admiral"). 
3. On or about November 19, 2009, I sent an email to Admiral Claims 
Superintendent Dawn Kagan. This email followed up on a letter I sent to Ms. Kagan on 
September 30, 2009. Attached hereto as Exhibit "19" is a true and correct copy of my 
November 19,2009 email. 
4. On or about November 19, 2009,1 received an email from Ms. Kagan responding 
to my email of the same date. Attached hereto as part of Exhibit "19" is a true and correct copy 
of the email I received from Ms. Kagan. 
5. On or about December 8, 2009,1 sent an another email to Ms. Kagan following 
up on my September 30, 2009 letter. Attached hereto as Exhibit "20" is a true and correct copy 
of my December 8, 2009 email. 
6. On or about December 8, 2009,1 received an email from Ms. Kagan responding 
to my email of the same date. Attached hereto as part of Exhibit "20" is a true and correct copy 
of the email I received from Ms. Kagan. 
7. On or about January 11, 2010, Ms. Kagan sent a letter and email to my colleague 
at Gauntlett & Associates, James A. Lowe, advising Basic Research that Admiral had appointed 
"an associated counsel" for Basic Research who would also serve as "panel counsel" for Admiral 
in the Forlenza suit. Attached hereto as Exhibit "21" is a true and correct copy of Ms. Kagan's 
January 11,2010 communication. 
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8. The associated/panel counsel Admiral identified in its January 11, 2010 
communication did not participate in the defense of Basic Research in the Forlenza suit. 
I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States of America that the 
foregoing is true and correct. 
Executed at Irvine, California on this 6th day of July, 2010. 
ANDREW M. SUSSMAN 
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Murray, Peggy A. 
From: Sussman, Andrew M. 
Sent: Thursday, November 19,2009 11:07 AM 
To: dkagan@admiralins.com 
Cc: Karen A. Knokey; Murray, Peggy A.; Lowe, James A. 
Subject: Admiral Insurance Claim No. C137310 on Behalf of Insured Covarix, Inc., dba Basic Research, 
LLC 
Attachments: 09-09-30 Itr to D.Kagan (request for pymt of Forlenza suit defense expenses).PDF 
Dear Ms. Kagan: 
We have had no response to our letter to you of September 30,2009 (a copy of which Is attached) which: 
(1) confirmed your representation on Admiral Insurance's behalf that Admiral would defend its insureds in 
the Forlenza, et al v. Basic Research, LLC et al lawsuit; (2) provided copies of the insureds' defense 
counsels1 invoices for legal fees and expenses incurred in the defense as of the invoices' dates; and (3) 
explained why the expenses were reasonable and necessary to the defense and therefore immediately 
due and payable by Admiral. 
Since then, the insureds have accrued additional defense expenses. The invoices reflecting them will be 
provided to you in the very near future. Meanwhile, Admirers insureds are being seriously prejudiced by 
its ongoing failure to honor its acknowledged defense obligations and to communicate. 
I phoned you yesterday and today to inquire but there has been no response. Please contact me today to 
advise when the insureds will be reimbursed for their previously-submitted defense expenses, and to 
confirm that Admiral will promptly reimburse their additional Forlenza suit defense expenses as they are 
incurred. 
Very truly yours, 
Andrew M. Sussman, Esq. 
Gauntlett & Associates 
(949) 553-1010 
(949) 553-2050 FAX 
This information is intended for use by the individuals or entity to which it is addressed, and may contain 
information that is privileged, confidential, and exempt from disclosure under applicable law. If the reader 
of this message is not the intended recipient, or employee or agent responsible for delivering the 
m e s s a g e to the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any dissemination, distribution, or copying 
of this communication is strictly prohibited, if you have received this communication in error, please notify 
us immediately by telephone and return the original message to us. 
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Murray, Peggy A. 
From: Sussman, Andrew M. 
Sent: Thursday, November 19, 2009 11:15 AM 
To: Karen A. Knokey; Murray, Peggy A.; Lowe, James A. 
Subject: FW: Admiral Insurance Claim No. C137310 on Behalf of Insured Covarix, Inc., dba Basic Research, 
LLC 
David and Jim; 
FYI--
AMS 
From: DKagan@admiralins.com [mailto:DKagan@admiralins.com] 
Sent: Thursday, November 19, 2009 11:09 AM 
To: Sussman, Andrew M. 
Subject: Re: Admiral Insurance Claim No. C137310 on Behalf of Insured Covarix, Inc., dba Basic 
Research, LLC 
Dear Mr. Sussman-
I apologize for the delay. We are having the rates and legal bills reviewed by counsel. I followed up with 
them yesterday and hope to hear from them in the immediate future. 
Dawn Kagan 
Claims Superintendent 
Admiral Insurance Company 
1255 Caldwell Road 
PO Box 5725 
Cherry Hill, NJ 08034-3320 
Phone: 856-429-9200 ext360 
Fax: 856-429-3630 
E-mail: dkagan@admiralins.com 
"Sussman, Andrew M.H <AM$@gauntlett!aw.com> T Q 
<dkagan@admiralins.com> 
11/19/2009 0206 P M c c " K a r e n A- Knokey" <KAK@gauntlettlaw.com>, "Murray, Peggy A." 
<PAM@gauntlettIaw.com>f "Lowe, James A." <JAL@gauntlettlaw.com> 
Subject Admiral Insurance Claim No. C137310 on Behalf of Insured Covarix, 
Inc., dba Basic Research, LLC 
Dear Ms. Kagan: 
We have had no response to our letter to you of September 30, 2009 (a copy of which is attached) which: 
(1) confirmed your representation on Admiral Insurance's behalf that Admiral would defend its insureds In 
the Fortenza, et al v. Basic Research, LLC et al lawsuit; (2) provided copies of the insureds' defense 
counsels' invoices for legal fees and expenses incurred in the defense as of the invoices* dates; and (3) 
11/19/2009 i . / n i 
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Murray, Peggy A. 
From: Sussman, Andrew M. 
Sent: Tuesday, December 08, 2009 9:42 AM 
To: dkagan@admiralins.com 
Cc: Lowe, James A.; Karen A. Knokey; Murray, Peggy A. 
Subject: Admiral Insurance Claim No. C137310 On Behalf of Insured Covarix, Inc., dba Basic Research, 
Inc. 
Importance: High 
Dear Ms. Kagan: 
On November 19,2009 we spoke by telephone about Admiral's failure to substantively respond to our 
correspondence to you of September 30,2009 and November 19,2009. You acknowledged your 
previous representations on admiral's behalf that Admiral would defend its insureds in the Fortenza, etal 
v. Basic Research, LLC et al lawsuit. You also represented that the previously-submitted attorney billing 
statements for the defense up to the invoice dates had been turned over to outside counsel for review and 
that you expected to be able to respond shortly. 
Since then we have not heard from you. More importantly, Admiral has not yet paid a dime of its 
insureds' defense expenses. The insureds are being seriously prejudiced by Admiral's ongoing dishonor 
of its promise and failure to pay its defense expenses as incurred - or at all - and by Admiral's failure to 
communicate. 
Please contact me today to advise when the expenses will be paid, and to confirm that the ongoing 
defense expenses will be paid as they continue to be incurred. 
Very truly yours, 
Andrew M. Sussman, Esq. 
Gauntlett & Associates 
(949) 553-1010 
(949) 553-2050 FAX 
This information is intended for use by the individuals or entity to which it is addressed, and may contain 
information that is privileged, confidential, and exempt from disclosure under applicable law. If the reader 
of this message is not the intended recipient, or employee or agent responsible for delivering the 
message to the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any dissemination, distribution, or copying 
of this communication is strictly prohibited. If you have received this communication in error, please notify 
us immediately by telephone and return the original message to us. 
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Murray, Peggy A. 
From: Sussman, Andrew M. 
Sent: Tuesday, December 08, 2009 11:11 AM 
To: Murray, Peggy A. 
Subject: FW: Admiral Insurance Claim No. C137310 On Behalf of Insured Covarix, Inc., dba Basic Research, 
Inc. 
From: DKagan@admiralins.com [mailto:DKagan@admiralins.com] 
Sent: Tuesday, December 08, 2009 11:07 AM 
To: Sussman, Andrew M. 
Subject: Re: Admiral Insurance Claim No. C137310 On Behalf of Insured Covarix, Inc., dba Basic 
Research, Inc 
Dear Mr. Sussman-
As you are aware, Admiral has accepted the defense of Basic Research under a Reservation of Rights. 
We are still awaiting counsel's review of your voluminous legal bills and will advise, as soon as possible, 
as to what will be paid. 
Dawn Kagan 
Claims Superintendent 
Admiral Insurance Company 
1255 Caldwell Road 
PO Box 5725 
Cherry Hill, NJ 08034-3320 
Phone: 856-429-9200 ext360 
Fax: 856-429-3630 
E-mail: dkagan@admiralins.com 
"Sussman, Andrew M.w T D 
<AMS@gauntlettlaw.com> <dkagan@admiralins.com> 
cc "Lowe, James A." <JAL@gauntlettlaw.com>, "Karen A. Knokey" 
12/08/2009 12:41 P M <KAK@gauntlettlaw.com>, "Murray, Peggy A." <PAM@gauntlettlaw.com> 
Subject Admiral Insurance Claim No. C137310 On Behalf of Insured Covarix, Inc., 
dba Basic Research, Inc. 
Dear Ms. Kagan: 
On November 19, 2009 we spoke by telephone about Admiral's failure to substantively respond to our 
correspondence to you of September 30, 2009 and November 19, 2009. You acknowledged your 
previous representations on admiral's behalf that Admiral would defend its insureds in the Forlenza, etal 
v. Basic Research, LLC et a/lawsuit. You also represented that the previously-submitted attorney billing 
statements for the defense up to the invoice dates had been turned over to outside counsel for review and 
that you expected to be able to respond shortly. 
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ADMIRAL im.im1 
1255 Caldwell Road 
P.O. Box 5725 
Cherry HiU, NJ 08034-3220 
Fax (856) 429-3630 
Phone (856) 429-9200 
Date: 01/11/2010 
CERTIFIED MAIL RRR & REGULAR MAIL 
Gauntlett & Associates 
Att: James A Lowe, Esq. 
18400 Von Kannan Suite 300 
Irvine, CA 92612 
RE: Insured: 
Claimant 
Admiral Policy No: 
Admiral Claim No; 
COVARDE LLC DBA BASIC RESEARCH LLC 
Nicole Forlenza 
CA000011665-02 
C137310 
Dear Mr. Lowe: 
PJeas^ 'fefe advisetfthat Admiral Insurance. Company has assigned the following attorney as an associated counsel for the insured, 
as ^ariel^blinsel for Admiral Insurance Company, pursuant to Admiral's right to do so under Civil Code 2860. 
• (• 
Alan Frederick, Esq. 
Marrone, Robinson, Frederick & Foster 
111 North l*Sfreet 
Burbank, CA 99984 
818-841-1144 
Mr. Frederick will need immediate and complete access to your file, in order to bring Admiral up to date on this matter, due to 
the lack of reporting from either your office or The Howrey firm, thus far. 
We wish to remind you that Admiral is providing a defense under a complete Reservation of Rights under all of the terms and 
conditions of the policy, including the right to withdraw from the defense and seek reimbursement for monies paid. 
Should you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact the undersigned. 
Very truly yours, 
^OJ^SK!\U)U^ . . . . . . . 
Dawn Kagan 
Claims Superintendent 
Vj&l && ;SWS ^ j -
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GAUNTLETT & ASSOCIATES 
David A. Gauntlett [Pro Hac Vice] 
Andrew M. Sussman [Pro Hac Vice] 
18400 Von Karman, Suite 300 
Irvine, California 92612 
Telephone: (949)553-1010 
Facsimile: (949) 553-2050 
info(S),gauntlettlaw.com 
ams@gauntlettlaw.com 
MANNING, CURTIS, BRADSHAW & BEDNAR LLC 
Alan C.Bradshaw (4801) 
Tyson Snow (10747) 
170 South Main Street, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1655 
Telephone: (801)363-5678 
Facsimile: (801) 364-5678 
abradshaw(o),mc2b .com 
tsnow@mc2b.com 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs and Counterdefendants 
Basic Research, LLC, Dynakor Pharmacal, LLC, The Carter-Reed Company, LLC, 
Zoller Laboratories, LLC, Dennis Gay, Daniel B. Mowrey and Mitchell K. Friedlander 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
DISTRICT OF UTAH 
BASIC RESEARCH, LLC, et al., 
Plaintiffs and Counterdefendants, 
vs. 
ADMIRAL INSURANCE COMPANY, a 
Delaware corporation, 
Defendant and Counterclaimant. 
AND RELATED COUNTERCLAIM 
Civil No. 2:09-cv-00878 CW 
Judge: Clark Waddoups 
PLAINTD7FS' REQUEST FOR 
JUDICIAL NOTICE IN SUPPORT 
OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT AS TO LIABILITY 
ON ADMIRAL INSURANCE 
COMPANY'S DUTY TO DEFEND 
MILLEIVTOMPKINS AND 
FORLENZA LAWSUITS 
167933.2-10448-014-7/8/2010 REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE 
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Pursuant to Rule 201 of the Federal Rules of Evidence and in support of its concurrently-
filed motion for partial summary judgment, Plaintiffs respectfully request the Court take judicial 
notice of each of the following documents: 
1. United States Trademark (Serial #77160070): "EAT ALL YOU WANT AND STILL 
LOSE WEIGHT;" Registered to Western Holdings, LLC (Registration # 3441872). 
2. United States Trademark (Serial #77167925): "AND WE COULDN'T SAY IT IN 
PRINT IF IT WASN'T TRUE;" Registered to Western Holdings, LLC (Registration 
#3441894). 
True and correct copies of the trademark certificates are attached hereto as Group Exhibit "23," 
3. Federal Trade Commission Complaint regarding Bio Trim Product ("FTC Bio Trim 
Complaint") filed November 3, 2004 (United States District Court, Central District of 
California; Federal Trade Commission v. Natural Products, LLC, et al\ Case Number 
SACV04-1279 AHS (MLGx)). 
A true and correct copy of the FTC Bio Trim Complaint is attached hereto as Exhibit "24." 
4. Federal Trade Commission Press Release regarding Bio Trim Product ("FTC Bio Trim 
Press Release") dated November 7, 2005 ("FTC Stops Bogus Ads for 'Bio Trim' and 
Other Weight-loss Products"). 
A true and correct copy of the Bio Trim Press Release is attached hereto as Exhibit "25." 
5. Federal Trade Commission Red Flag Web Page ("FTC Red Flag Web Page") ("Red Flag 
Claim 2: Eat what you want! The more you eat, the more you lose and we'll show you 
how."). 
A true and correct copy of the FTC Red Flag Web Page is attached hereto as Exhibit "26." 
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I. WESTERN HOLDINGS, LLC TRADEMARK CERTIFICATES 
Under Rule 201(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence, a court may take judicial notice of a 
fact "not subject to reasonable dispute in that it is... (2) capable of accurate and ready 
determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned." A certified 
and sealed copy of United States trademark falls squarely within Rule 201(b). Such documents 
are produced by the United States Patent and Trademark Office, the United States governmental 
entity charged with the production, granting and maintenance of such documents. 
Federal courts have held that the USPTO's accuracy as a source of trademark 
information cannot reasonably be questioned. In Metro Pub., Ltd v. San Jose Mercury News, 
987 F.2d 637, 641 (9th Cir. (Cal) 1993) (rev'd on other grounds) judicial notice was taken 
certified copies of trademark registrations. In doing so, the court reasoned: "Rule 201(b)(2) of 
the Federal Rules of Evidence permits a federal court to take judicial notice of a fact that is not 
subject to 'reasonable dispute' because it is 'capable of accurate and ready determination by 
resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.' Certified copies of 
trademark registrations from the principal register fall within this category." Id. at 641 n.3. 
This court should also take judicial notice of the proffered trademark registrations as 
admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 803(8), which excepts from the Hearsay Rule 
"[r]ecords, reports, statements, or data compilations, in any form, of public offices or agencies, 
setting forth ... (b) matters observed pursuant to duty imposed by law as to which matters there 
was a duty to report" are not excluded by the hearsay rule. As held in Fresenius Medical Care 
Holdings, Inc. v. Baxter Intern, Inc., 2006 WL 1330003 (N.D. Cal. 2006), the United States 
Patent and Trademark Office is a "public agency" that falls within the Rule: "[t]he United States 
Patent and Trademark Office ('PTO') is an agency of the United States, within the Department 
of Commerce, and thus falls squarely within the 'public offices or agencies' requirement of Rule 
803(8)." Id. at *3. In rejecting a party's challenge to the admissibility of PTO documents related 
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to patents, the court noted that "courts regularly consider such documents." Id. As the United 
States Patent and Trademark Office is equally responsible for the issuance of patents and 
trademarks, the holding of Fresenius applies with equal force to the admissibility of trademarks. 
Similarly, the trademarks fall under an exception to the hearsay rule as records of 
regularly-conducted activity by the PTO. Fed. R. Evid. 803(6). 
These documents are also self-authenticating as domestic public documents not under 
seal (Fed. R. Evid. 902(2)) and as official publications (Fed. R. Evid. 902(5)). 
The proffered trademarks contain evidence directly relevant to a dispositive issue in the 
case: whether the advertising idea at issue is that of "another" pursuant to the Admiral Insurance 
Policies at issue here. Accordingly, Plaintiffs respectfully request the Court take notice of the 
above-identified trademarks. 
II. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION BIO TRIM COMPLAINT 
This Court may take judicial notice of the FTC Bio Trim Complaint because it is a court 
record. Fortune v. Patterson, No. 04-377, 2009 WL 3166274, at *3 n.3 (W.D. Pa., September 
28, 2009) ("[T]his Court examined the docket sheet for that case on the PACER system This 
Court hereby takes judicial notice of those documents, as well as that civil action's docket 
sheet"); Deluna v. Curry, No. l:08-cv-00574, 2009 WL 2922990 (E.D.Cal., September 08, 
2009) ("The record of state court proceeding is a source whose accuracy cannot reasonably be 
questioned, and judicial notice may be taken of court records. . . . As such, the PACER website 
for the Ninth Circuit, containing that court's case management docket system, is subject to 
judicial notice."); DCR Fundi L.L.C. v. Tal Technologies, Inc., No. CIV-03-772-L, 2008 WL 
2003798, at *1 n.2 (W.D.Okla., May 07, 2008) ("The court takes judicial notice of the Court of 
Appeals' docket sheets for the appeals in this case as well as those documents filed in the Court 
of Appeals that are accessible on PACER."); Purdom v. Gettleman, No. 08-CV-7-JMH, 2008 
WL 695258, at *2 (E.D. Ky. March 12, 2008) ("[T]he Court has accessed the trial court docket 
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sheet by use of the PACER electronic system. The Court takes judicial notice of the information 
contained in the trial court docket sheet."). 
The attached copy of the FTC Bio Trim Complaint is self-authenticating as a domestic 
public document not under seal (Fed. R. Evid. 902(2)) and an official publication (Fed. R. Evid. 
902(5)). It also falls under exceptions to the hearsay rule as a record of regularly-conducted 
activity (Fed. R. Evid. 803(6)) and as a public record (Fed. R. Evid. 803(8)). 
III. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION PRESS RELEASE AND RED FLAG PAGE 
First, the Court may take judicial notice of the FTC Bio Trim Press Release and FTC Bio 
Trim Red Flag Web Page as records of regularly-conducted activity (Fed. R. Evid. 803(6) and as 
public records and reports (Fed. R. Evid. 803(8)). The documents also are self-authenticating as 
either domestic public documents not under seal (Fed. R. Evid. 902(2)) and as official 
publications (Fed. R. Evid. 902(5)). 
Second, both the FTC Bio Trim Press Release and FTC Red Flag Web Page come from 
the FTC's website at www.ftc.gov. A court may take judicial notice of a public website and 
excerpts from the website. Hendrickson v. eBay, Inc., 165 F. Supp. 2d 1082, 1084 n.2 (CD. Cal. 
2001) (stating that "[t]o the extent some of the descriptions about eBay's website are not in the 
record, the Court takes judicial notice of www.eBay.com and the information contained therein 
pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 201"); id. (noting that "eBay's own website describes itself 
as 'the world's largest online auction service' "); Rearden LLC v. Rearden Commerce, Inc., 597 
F. Supp. 2d 1006, 1014 n.3 (N.D. Cal. 2009) ("The court takes judicial notice of contents of this 
website and other websites cited herein pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 201."); Energy 
Automation Systems, Inc. v. Saxton, 618 F. Supp. 2d 807, 810 n.l (M.D. Tenn. 2009) ("A court 
may take judicial notice of the contents of an Internet website."); Wang v. Pataki, 396 F. Supp. 
2d 446, 458 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) ("The Court may take judicial notice of such internet 
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material.")- Judicial notice is therefore proper and should be taken. 
Dated: July 8,2010 
MANNING, CURTIS, BRADSHAW & 
BEDNARLLC 
Alan C. Bradshaw (#4801) 
Tyson Snow (#10747) 
170 South Main Street, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1655 
Telephone: (801) 363-5678 
Facsimile: (801) 364-5678 
abradshaw@mc2b.com 
tsnow@mc2b.com 
By: /s/ Andrew M. Sussman 
GAUNTLETT & ASSOCIATES 
David A. Gauntlett (Pro Hac Vice) 
Andrew M. Sussman (Pro HacVice) 
18400 Von Karman, Suite 300 
Irvine, California 92612 
Telephone: (949) 553-1010 
Facsimile: (949) 553-2050 
info@gauntlettlaw.com 
ams@gauntlettlaw.com 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs and Counterdefendants 
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Int. a.: 5 
Prior U.S. Us.: 6,18, 44,46, 51, and 52 ^
 M „ A „ o m 
Reg. No. 3,441,872 
United States Patent and Trademark Office Registered June 3.2008 
TRADEMARK 
PRINCIPAL REGETIER 
EAT ALL f0€ WANT AND STILL 
LOSE WEIGHT 
WESTERN HOLDINGS, LLC. (WYOMING LTD THE MARK CONSISTS OF STANDARD CHAR-
LIAB CO) ACTERS WITHOUT CLAIM TO ANY PARTICULAR 
1821 LOGAN AVENUE FONT, STYLE, SIZE, OR COLOR. 
CHEYENNE, WY 89701 
FOR: DIETARY SUPPLEMENTS, IN CLASS 5 (U.S. SN 77-160,070, FILED 4-18-2007. 
CLS. 6,18,44, 46, 51 AND 52). 
FIRST USE 1-26-2007; IN COMMERCE 1-26-2007. J^L PRATER, EXAMINING ATTORNEY 
EXHIBIT 23 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Case 2:09-cv-W78-CW Document 45-1 Filed 07™10 Page 3 of 3 
Int. CI.: 5 
Prior U.S. CIs.: 6,18,44,46, 51, and 52 
Reg. No. 3,441,894 
United States Patent and Trademark Office Registered June 3,2008 
TRADEMARK 
PRINCIPAL REGISTER 
AMD WE COULDN'T SAY IT M 
PRINT IF IT WASN'T TRUE, 
WESTERN HOLDINGS, LLC (WYOMING LTD THE MARK CONSISTS OF STANDARD CHAR-
LIAB CO) ACTERS WITHOUT CLAIM TO ANY PARTICULAR 
1821 LOGAN AVENUE FONT, STYLE, SIZE, OR COLOR. 
CHEYENNE, WY 82001 
FOR: DIETARY SUPPLEMENTS, IN CLASS 5 (U.S. SN 77-167,925, FILED 4-27-2007. 
CLS. 6,18,44,46, 51 AND 52). 
FIRST USE 1-26-2007; IN COMMERCE 1-26-2007. JILL PRATER, EXAMINING ATTORNEY 
• *-» I I 
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I WILLIAM E. KOVACIC 
General Counsel 
BARBARA Y.K. CHUN (Cal Bar No. 186907) 
Federal Trade Commission 
10877 Wilshire Blvd., Ste. 700 
Los Angeles, CA 90024 
(310) 824-4312; Pax (310) B24-4380 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION 
PILED 
'20MNQV-3 AKIf-59 
<Cl£R*. U.S. CSI'THICT COURT 
CENTRAL OlSr. OF CALIF. 
' LOS AKfELSS 
PY . 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
NATURAL PRODUCTS, LLC; 
ALL NATURAL 4.U, LLC; and ' 
ANA M. SOLKAMANS, 
Defendants. 
SfiCVOA-1279 ^HS 
1* 
COMPLAINT FOR PERMANENT 
INJUNCTION AND OTHER EQUITABLE 
RELIEF 
Plaintiff/ the Federal Trade Commission (nFTC" or 
"Commission''), through its undersigned attorneys, for its 
Complaint alleges: ;. • 
1. Plaintiff FTC brings this action under Section 13 (b) of 
the Federal Trade Commission Act (nFTC Act")/ 15 U.S.C. § 53(b), 
to secure a permanent injunction, rescission of contracts and 
restitution, disgorgement of ill-gotten gains, and other equitable 
relief against the Defendants for engaging in deceptive acts or 
practices and false advertisements for food, drugs, devices, 
services or cosmetics, in or affecting commerce in connection with 
EXHIBIT 24 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Case 2:O9-cv-O0(^ -CW Document 45-2 Filed 07/4p 0 Page 6 of 18 
compound so powerful, so effective, so relentless in its 
awesome attack on bulging fatty deposits that it has 
virtually eliminated the need to diet. . . The product 
is called Bio Trim and it's dynamite! In fact thousands 
of people are now trying Bio Trim and losing weight 
faster than ever before! FLUSHES CALORIES RIGHT OUT OF 
YOUR BODY!" Id. (capitalization in original). Adjacent 
to these statements are what purport to be before and 
after photos of Kelly B. The before picture has the 
caption "BEFORE 140 lbs." The after picture has the 
caption "AFTER 6 weeks - 103 lbs." Id. 
"When a person ate a small amount of this unique plant 
extract they would miraculously lose weight! The 
researchers investigated this phenomenon discovered 
through sophisticated testing, that the plant extract 
did indeed cause the human body to bring about rapid 
weight-loss." Id. 
"EAT ALL YOU WANT AND STILL LOSE WEIGHT (PILL DOES ALL 
THE WORK)" Id. (capitalization in original). 
"You can continue to enjoy all those foods you love to 
eat. Bio Trim simply does not allow your body to 
consume and absorb excess calories . . . Period!" Id. 
"Each day you'll notice absolute visible results as your 
unwanted pounds of fat flab and cellulite completely 
disappear. . . . Natural Products . . . [has] examined 
the clinical proof conducted on the Bio Trim ingredients 
thoroughly and [is] convinced that with Bio Trim you can 
achieve the body of your dreams. They don't care if 
5 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Federal Trade Commission 
Protecting America's Consumers 
For Release: November 7,2005 
FTC Stops Bogus Ads for Bio Trim" and Other Weight-loss Products 
Under the terms of a consent agreement approved by the Federal Trade Commission and announced today, Tustiri. California 
based Natural Products, LLC, All Natural 4 U, LLC and their owner, Ana M. Solkamans, are permanently prohibited from 
making false and misleading claims about weight-loss products, including a dietary supplement they marketed as "Bio Trim," 
"Body-Trim/Bio-Trim,' and "Body-Trim." 
In a complaint filed in November 2004, the FTC alleged that the defendants made false and unsubstantiated claims in 
advertising on their Web sites and in magazines and newspapers around the country. They claimed, for example, that Bio Trim 
"guarantee^] rapid weight loss" and its users could "eat all [they] want and still lose weight (pill does all the work)." 
"If you see an ad for a weight-loss product making fantastic claims, keep your money in your pocket" said Lydia Pames, 
Director of the FTC's Bureau of Consumer Protection. "If s just that - a fantasy. The claims made for Bio Trim were simply not 
possible. There is no pill that lets you eat all you want and still lose weight." 
The Commission's complaint alleged that the defendants' sales pitches were false, unsubstantiated, and in violation of the 
FTC Act Under the terms of the stipulated order settling the Commission's charges, the defendants can no longer claim that 
any weight-loss product: 1} causes users to lose substantial weight while eating unlimited amounts of food, 2) causes 
substantial weight loss by blocking the absorption of fat or calories, or 3) works for all overweight users. 
The order also prohibits the defendants from making any claims that any health-related service or program, weight-loss 
product, dietary supplement food, drug or device causes weight loss, or about their health benefits, performance, efficacy, 
safety, or side effects, unless, at the time a claim is made, the defendants have competent and reliable sdentific evidence that 
substantiates the truth of the claim. They are also prohibited from profiting from, or disclosing, personal information about their 
customers or prospective customers in connection with commerce in weight-loss products. 
A judgment of more than $2.1 million, representing the amount of consumer injury, will be suspended due to defendants' 
inability to pay. The judgment will be imposed if they are found to have misrepresented their financial condition. 
The stipulated final order stopping the defendants' allegedly illegal conduct was a result of "Operation Big Fat Lie," the 
Commission's November 2004, multi-agency crackdown on false weight-loss advertising. The Commission vote approving the 
consent agreement was 4*0. The FTC filed the proposed stipulated final order in the U. S. District Court for the Central District 
of California, Southern Division, on October 28,2005. The order was signed and filed on November 2,2005 by District Judge 
Alicemarie H. Stotler. 
"Operation Big Fat Lie" identified "Seven Red Flag Bogus Weight-Loss Claims" that the FTC has advised publications and 
broadcasters to avoid. These "red flags" include the following: a claim Is too good to be true If it says the product will 1) cause 
weight loss of two pounds or more a week for a month or more without dieting or exercise; 2) cause substantial weight loss no 
matter what or how much you eat; 3) cause permanent weight loss (even when you stop using the product); 4) block the 
absorption of fat or calories to enable you to lose substantial weight 5) safely enable you to lose more than three pounds per 
week for more than four weeks; 6) cause substantial weight loss for all users; or 7) cause substantial weight loss by wearing it 
on the body or rubbing it into the skin. 
Challenged ads in the "Operation Big Fat Lie" sweep ran in nationally-known publications. For example, ads for defendants' 
products ran in national magazines, including Woman's Own magazine. The Red Flag Reference Guide for Media on Bogus 
Weight Loss Claim Detection is available to assist media in detecting false weight-loss claims. The FTC also uses "teaser" 
websites such as http://wemarket4u.net/fatfoe/ to educate consumers about weight loss scams. 
NOTE: The stipulated final order is for settlement purposes only and does not constitute an admission by the defendants of a 
law violation. A stipulated final order requires approval by the court and has the force of law when signed by the judge. 
Copies of the complaint and stipulated final order are available from the FTC's Web site at http://www.ftc.gov and also from 
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the FTC's Consumer Response Center, Room 130,600 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20580, The FTC 
works for the consumer to prevent fraudulent, deceptive, and unfair business practices in the marketplace and to provide 
information to help consumers spot, stop, and avoid them. To file a complaint in English or Spanish (bilingual counselors are 
available to take complaints), or to get free information on any of 150 consumer topics, call toll-free, 1-877-FTC-HELP (1-877-
382-4357), or use the complaint form at http://Www-.ftc.gov. The FTC enters Internet, telemarketing, identity theft, and other 
fraud-related complaints into Consumer Sentinel, a secure, online database available to hundreds of civil and criminal law 
enforcement agencies in the U.S. and abroad. 
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Cause weight loss no matter what or how much the 
consumer eats " ^ ^ ' f f l 
RED FLAG CLAIM 2 
Eat what you want! 
The more you eat, the more you lose and we'll show you how. 
Realty Check 
It is impossible to eat unlimited amounts of food - any kind of food - and still lose 
weight. Any claim to that effect in an ad or commercial is false. Some products may 
help curb appetite or cravings. For these products, Its okay to say people can eat 
what they want so long as K is dear from the ad or commercial that people will not 
want to eat as much food as before they started using the product. 
Variations 
This breakthrough ingredient has patients losing one full pound every 12 
hours, two pounds or more each day, and ail without counting calories, 
without missing a single meal and without giving up those delicious, 
mouthwatering foods they love the most* 
'My formula for living/ lets you eat: hamburgers, hot dogs, fries, steak, ice 
cream, sausage, bacon, eggs and cheeses! And STILL LOSE WEIGHT!" 
"Eat ail the foods you love, and still lose weight (pill does all the work}." 
1 lost nine pounds during my first week eating just as I always do — going to 
parties, even eating gobs of vacation goodies, including my favorite food: ice 
cream. Four weeks later, I've lost another 27 pounds.* 
"Eat any mouthwatering food you want, and still blast away dress sizes and 
belt notches lightning fast.' 
Horn* | Resourcvs | Site Map | Federal Trade Commission | Search | False Claims 
What You Can Do { Beyond the Red Flag | Red Flag Promotions | En Esparto! 
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH 
BASIC RESEARCH, LLC, a Utah limited 
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ADMIRAL'S RESPONSE: Admiral does not dispute that the Tompkins Suit alleges 
that Basic Research made misleading claims to promote Akavar as a product that enabled one to 
lose weight without diet or exercise. Admiral also does not dispute that such claims, according 
to Tompkins Plaintiffs, were a widespread problem, nor that others have made similar claims to 
advertise weight loss products. However, as with the Miller Complaint, Basic Research 
mischaracterizes the Tompkins Plaintiffs' statements. The Tompkins Plaintiffs' statement that 
fraudulent weight loss products are a widespread problem sets up its allegation that Basic 
Research took part in an "epidemic" of consumer fraud in the weight loss industry. Id. at f f 16-
17. Basic Research misconstrues this statement as support for its contention that the Tompkins 
Plaintiffs have sued Basic Research in connection with its use of another's advertising ideas. 
However, the Tompkins Plaintiffs are suing Basic Research not for injury due to use of 
another's advertising ideas, but for consumer fraud. The Tompkins Complaint states: 
Fraudulent weight loss products are an enormous problem in the United States.... 
Basic Research was created to capitalize on the fraudulent weight loss product 
epidemic. 
Tompkins Class Action Compl., fflf 16-17. The Tompkins Plaintiffs point to the "widespread 
problem" of misleading claims about easy weight loss products as background for its allegations 
of fraud by Basic Research. They allege neither that Basic Research used another's advertising 
ideas, nor that they suffered any injury because of it. 
BASIC RESEARCH'S FACT NOS. 25-26. For the purposes of this Motion, Admiral 
does not controvert the statements of fact in paragraphs 25-26. 
(3) The Forlenza Suit 
14 
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BASIC RESEARCH'S FACT No. 30. The Forlenza Suit further alleges Basic Research 
made misleading claims in its advertisements that Akdvar enables one to lose weight without diet 
or exercise. 
Defendants claim that Akdvar "cause [s] easy, automatic, permanent weight loss" 
all "within a few short weeks. " To prove this assertion Defendants claim that a 
group that used Akdvar experienced 1604% more weight loss over a six-week 
period than those who did not use their product - and that group never had to 
exercise or diet. ... These false claims mislead consumers to believe that they 
can achieve the same results. [Id. at f 13, Exh. " 5 " (Forlenza Complaint), f 22.] 
Defendants make the following claims for the Akdvar products: Eat What You 
Want And Still Lose Weight ... Effectively, Defendants claim that no change in 
diet or behavior is required to lose weight while taking Akdvar 20/50. A true and 
correct copy of Defendants' online claim on this point is attached hereto as 
Exhibit 6. [Id. at f 15, Exh. "7" (Forlenza Second Amended Complaint), f 
31(a).] 
ADMIRAL'S RESPONSE: Admiral does not dispute the fact that the Forlenza 
plaintiffs alleged that Basic Research made misleading claims in its advertisements as set forth in 
this paragraph. 
BASIC RESEARCH'S FACT NOS. 31 -32. 
31. The Forlenza Suit also alleges that others have made similar claims to advertise 
weight loss products or "miracle pills." 
The weight-loss industry is a multi-billion-dollar industry in the United States. 
Hundreds of new products appear on the market every year, many of them 
claiming to be a quick and easy solution to the weight loss problem. In an effort to 
promote real weight loss and to prevent Americans from being defrauded by 
"miracle pills. " The U.S. Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") instructs that 
"[a]ny claims that you can lose weight effortlessly are false. The only proven way 
to lose weight is either to reduce the number of calories you eat or to increase the 
number of calories you burn off through exercise. ... " [Id. at ^ 13, Exh. " 5 " 
(Forlenza Complaint), f 19J 
16 
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ADMIRAL'S RESPONSE: Admiral does not controvert the statements of fact in 
paragraph 35. It notes, however, that the two phrases to which Basic Research points were each 
trademarked on June 2, 2008 - which is after the Tompkins and Miller complaints were filed. 
The Tompkins Complaint was filed on December 6, 2007, in California state court. {See 
Tompkins Class Action Cbmpl.) The original Miller Complaint was filed in U.S District Court in 
Utah on November 9, 2007. {See Miller Proposed Class Action.) Nearly seven months later the 
trademark was registered with the U.S. Patent & Trademark Office. (PL's Exh. "23".) The 
registration date also post-dates the inception date of the first of the two Admiral policies. {See 
PL's Material Fact 1 and PL's Exh. 1.) 
Furthermore, while Western Holdings, LLC may be a separate and distinct entity from 
Basic Research, it is an affiliate and is a named insured along with Basic Research on the 
Admiral insurance policy at issue in this case. {See PL's Exh. 10.) 
BASIC RESEARCH'S FACT No. 36. Others have previously used an almost identical 
slogan to advertise weight loss products. For example, in 2004, the Federal Trade Commission 
filed an action against Natural Products, LLC, All Natural 4 U, LLC, and Ana M. Solkamans for 
using the slogan "Eat All You Want and Still Lose Weight (Pill Does All the Work) " to advertise 
Bio Trim™, a weight loss product See FTC v. Natural Products, LLC et al (CD. Cal Case no. 
SACV 04-1279), Complaint for Permanent Injunction and Other Equitable Relief (filed 
11/3/2004), p.5<h 12(d). [RJN, Exh "24" thereto] 
ADMIRAL'S RESPONSE: Admiral does not dispute the statements of fact in 
paragraph 36. The Federal Trade Commission Action (FTC) demonstrates that the problem of 
consumer fraud in the weight loss industry is widespread (as alleged in the underlying lawsuits) 
18 
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and not new. Furthermore, while other entities may have used similar slogans and statements 
which Basic Research is using, those entities are not the Underlying Plaintiffs in the Miller, 
Tompkins and Forlenza Suits, and neither they nor the Underlying Plaintiffs have alleged injury 
for the use of their advertising ideas. 
BASIC RESEARCH'S FACT Nos. 37-38 Admiral does not dispute the statements of 
fact in paragraphs 37-38. 
D. Admiral's Denial of Defense 
BASIC RESEARCH'S FACT Nos. 39-41. Admiral does not dispute the statements of 
fact in Paragraphs 39-41 but would note that the terms of the letters speak for themselves. 
BASIC RESEARCH'S FACT NOS. 42.-44. 
42. By letters dated June 25, 2009 and July 6, 2009 Admiral acknowledged notice of 
the Forlenza Suit and agreed to defend Basic Research in the Forlenza Suit subject to a 
reservation of rights under the second Admiral Policy [Id. At f f 19 & 20, and Exhibits "11" & 
"12. 7 
43. On November 19, 2009, counsel for Basic Research e-mailed Admiral to express 
concern over Admiral's ongoing failure to honor its acknowledged defense obligations and to 
communicate with basic Research. In its response, Admiral apologized for the delay and stated 
it was having invoices for the incurred defense costs reviewed by counsel [Declaration of 
Andrew Sussman CSussman Decl). ^\3&4 & Exh. "19"] 
44 On December 8, 2009 counsel for Basic Research again emailed Admiral to 
request that it honor its acknowledged defense obligations. In its response, Admiral confirmed 
19 
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and not the covered offense of the use of another's advertising ideas in Basic Research's 
advertisements. The alleged use of Western Holdings's taglines15 is merely factual background 
in the Underlying Complaints and does not trigger Admiral's duty to defend Basic Research 
against claims of advertising injury. 
E. No Reasonable Interpretation of the Underlying Actions Leads to the 
Conclusion that Any of The Underlying Plaintiffs Assert the "Personal and 
Advertising Injury" Offense of "Use of Another's Advertising Idea." 
1. The Only Reasonable Interpretation 
The foundational premise of Basic Research's argument is that the policy covers false 
advertising so long as the insured employs false claims that were the brainchild of someone other 
than the insured. Accordingly, the argument goes, so long as the insured uses some straw-man 
as the "owner" of the false statement, there is coverage. There is no reasonable rationale for 
such a conclusion. What is the sense of covering false advertising that the insured paid for 
someone else to provide versus false advertising that the insured dreamed up? The answer is 
"none." What the policy clearly covers is the unauthorized taking and use of someone else's 
advertising idea. 
2. Case Law Interprets Policy Language to Fall Outside of the Personal 
and Advertismg Injury Coverage. 
The case law is not prolific with respect to the particular offense in question. However, 
that which does exist views the coverage from the common sense perspective advocated by 
Admiral. 
15
 Indeed, the facts of this case show that Western Holdings, the company that is supposedly the 
originator of the incriminated taglines, is actually a named insured under the Admiral policy. 
Moreover, as the trademark registrations offered into evidence by Basic Research are dated June 
2, 2008. This registration post-dates 1) the filing of the Miller Suit; 2) the filing of the Tompkins 
Suit; and 3) the inception of the first Admiral policy. 
37 
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In Superformance Intern, v. Hartford Cas. Ins., 203 F.Supp.2d 587 (E.D.Va. 2002), the 
insured produced replica models of the Ford Cobra. The insured was sued by Carroll Shelby and 
Ford on various legal theories. From the bevy of allegations, the insured claimed that its insurer, 
Hartford, provided coverage under the "Personal and Advertising Injury" Coverage, and more 
particularly under the offense of "Copying, in your 'advertisement1, a person's or organization's 
'advertising idea' or style of 'advertisement'...." Id 
The Court held that while there were allegations in the underlying case that supported a 
claim for false advertising, "[t]he Policy does not explicitly provide coverage for false 
advertising and the claim cannot be read into any of the covered offenses. Thus, there is no 
coverage for false advertisement based on the plain meaning of the Policy's terms." Id. at 598. 
In Applied Bolting Tech. Prods, v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 942 F. Supp. 1029 (E.D. Pa., 
1996), the insured's "Personal and Advertising Injury" coverage provided coverage for the 
covered offense of "misappropriation of advertising ideas." The insured was sued by a 
competitor who claimed that the insured's advertising falsely claimed that the insured's 
advertisements met a particular industry standard when they did not and that consumers, 
believing the false advertising, purchased the insured's inferior product to the detriment of the 
competitor. Id. at 1031: 
Applying Vermont law with respect to policy interpretation and duty to defend,16 the 
Court held that the use of the standard by the insured was not an "advertising idea." Id. at 1033. 
The court also noted that misappropriation of an advertising idea was the wrongful taking of the 
16
 Vermont law is materially the same as that of Utah and California , with respect to the 
concepts of insurance contract interpretation and duty to defend. See Applied Bolting Tech 
Prods., 942 F.Supp.2d at 1032. 
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manner by which another advertises its goods or services or the wrongful taking of another's 
manner of advertising. Id. 
In Edwards Theatres, Inc. v. United National Ins. Co., 126 Fed.Appx. 831 (9th Cir. Cal. 
2005),n the Underlying Plaintiff IMAX claimed that the insured Edwards Theatres used its 
trademark "IMAX" to apply to conventional films and that such use damaged IMAX's 
reputation. Id. at 832. The Court held that there was a duty to defend under the United National 
policy for "use of another's advertising idea" because a trademark is an advertising idea. Id. at 
833. The case illustrates what Admiral contends is the proper interpretation of the offense: the 
insured has used the injured plaintiffs advertising idea and that plaintiff alleges that it sustained 
damage arising out of such use. 
In the very recent opinion of Champion Laboratories, Inc. v. American Home Assurance 
Company, No. 09C7251, 2010 WL 2649848 (N.D. 111. June 30, 2010) (slip opinion), the court 
addressed the scope of the coverage for "use of another's advertising idea." District Judge Amy 
J. St. Eve held: 
Under Illinois law, the use of another's advertising idea "occurs when a business 
wrongfully takes a competitor's idea about the solicitation of business." Put 
differently, the use of another's advertising idea concerns "the wrongful taking of 
the manner by which another advertises its goods or services." 
Id. at *4 (internal citations omitted). Judge St. Eve got it right. The essence of the coverage is to 
address the insured's liability for wrongfully taking a competitor's advertising idea or the 
wrongful taking of the manner by which another advertises its goods or services. 
The Underlying Plaintiffs, here, make no claim that they were injured by an "advertising 
idea". Their claims do not "arise out o f the use of an "advertising idea." Their claim is that 
17
 Cited by Basic Research. See Basic Research's Initial Memorandum at 20, n. 68. 
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they were injured because the representations in the advertising were misleading and false. They 
have no concern as to whether the false advertising was the brain child of Basic Research, 
Western Holdings or someone else. Their alleged injury arises out of the content of the 
advertising, not the manner of advertising. 
In light of the foregoing, it is clear that none of the Complaints filed in the Miller, 
Tompkins or Forlenza Suits allege facts that constitute the offense of "use of an another's 
advertising idea in your advertisement". Accordingly, the two-part test for establishing an 
advertising injury claim is not satisfied, and Admiral requests the Court to rule as a matter of law 
that it owes no duty to defend Basic Research in the Miller, Tompkins or Forlenza Suits. 
F. Coverage is Precluded by Exclusion "g" 
Basic Research goes to great lengths to avoid Exclusion "g", which provides a second 
and additional basis for the Court to rule that Admiral owes no duty to defend Basic Research in 
the Miller, Tompkins or Forlenza Suits. See Basic Research's Initial Memorandum at 16-25. 
Exclusion "g" provides that there is no coverage for personal or advertising injury "arising out of 
the failure of goods, products or services to conform with any statement of quality or 
performance made in [the insured's] 'advertisement'." Admiral Policy, Basic Research Exhibit 
1; Documents 43-1, page 12 of 59; Basic Research Exhibit 2, Document 43-2, Page 12 of 65. 
None of the arguments made by Basic Research address the plain context of the Underlying 
Plaintiffs' claims: that each relied on false advertising that told him or her in no uncertain terms 
("we couldn't say it if it wasn't true") that Akavar 20/50 worked such that a purchaser could "eat 
all you want and still lose weight." These statements go to the heart of the product's quality and 
performance and the alleged failure to conform to the advertised statement. 
40 
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1. Statements of Quality or Performance 
Basic Research asserts: "The Florenza claimants allege, in the disjunctive, damages 
arising out of their "purchase[s of] a product based on false advertising and because the product 
has not worked as advertised'' Basic Research's Initial Memorandum at 17 (emphasis in the 
original). Basic Research argues that while the second claim that the product has not worked as 
advertised could trigger the exclusion, the first claim of false advertising is not limited to claim 
of quality and performance and therefore does not trigger the exclusion . See id. 
Perhaps we are missing something but each of the Underlying Plaintiffs' claim that the 
advertising is false in that Akavar 20/50 does not work as advertised. Clearly this claim arises 
out of the alleged failure of the product to conform with a statement of quality or performance 
and is, therefore, precluded from coverage. 
2. Definitions of the Exclusion's Terms 
Basic Research resorts to the familiar tactic of finding a dictionary definition of a word 
that, when substituted for the word in the policy, theoretically creates a meaning that supports the 
claim for coverage. From that exercise, Basic Research concludes that the exclusion applies only 
to statements about how the product fulfills its purpose of enabling users to "eat all you want and 
still lose weight." As Basic Research puts it: "But although this accused slogan indicates a 
result if the product is used, it does not say anything about how the product achieves the result." 
Basic Research's Initial Memorandum at 18. 
There is nothing in the plain language of the exclusion or any reasonable interpretation 
thereof that indicates that the exclusion is limited as Basic Research suggests. Clearly the 
exclusion is designed to make the insured assume and endure the foreseeable risk of making 
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statements in advertisements which misrepresent what the product can be expected to do and/or 
how it will perform. That is precisely what the Underlying Plaintiffs claim: Akavar 20/50 does 
not allow one to eat all one wants and still lose weight. 
Exclusion "g" is analogous to the category of exclusions contained in Coverage A's 
property damage exclusions 2 0 through 2(n),18 known as the business risk exclusions. These 
exclusions are designed to preclude liability coverage for defective workmanship or services 
which are a foreseeable risk that the business needs to address. See Grinnell Mut. Reinsurance 
Co. v. Lynne, 686 N.W.2d 118,123-24 (N.D. 2004) (The purpose of business risk exclusions is "to 
prevent policyholders from converting liability insurance into protection from foreseeable business 
risks.... Insurance companies theorize that a business risk, such as a cost resulting from improper 
performance of contract, should be built into the price of the product"). Courts explain the 
business risk doctrine in the following manner: 
The business risk doctrine is the expression of a public policy applied to insurance 
coverage provided under commercial general policies. Reduced to its simplest 
terms, the risk that insured's product will not meet contractual standards is 
a business risk not covered by a general liability policy. To ensure predictable 
. and affordable insurance rates, the business risk doctrine limits an insurer's 
assumption of risk to those risks that are beyond the "effective control" of the 
insured. 
Business risks, then, are: 
The Admiral Policy contains the Coverage A business risk exclusions and they are found at 
CG 00 02 12 04 at p. 4 of 16. See Basic Research Exhibit 1; Documents 43-1, Page 10-11 of 59; 
Basic Research Exhibit 2, Document 43-2, Pages 10-11 of 65. For instance Exclusion (2)(k) 
provides: 
2. Exclusions 
This insurance does not apply to: 
* * * * 
k. Damage To Your Product 
"Property damage" to "your product" arising out of it or any part of it. 
42 
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Finally, in Superperformance Intern, v. Hartford Cas. Ins. (E.D. Va. 2002) 203 
F.Supp.2d 587, 589-590, a manufacturer of sports cars and related products sued 
the insured for marketing similar products improperly bearing the manufacturer's 
name. After the insurer declined to provide a defense in the action, the federal 
district court concluded that the nonconformity exclusion precluded coverage for 
the manufacturers false advertising claims. (Id. at p. 598) 
TCI contends that the nonconformity exclusion is ambiguous, and can be 
reasonably understood as operating to bar coverage for claims by consumers, but 
not claims by competitors. Pointing to Aragon-Haas v. Family Security Ins. 
Services, Inc. (1991) 231 Cal App.3d 232 [282 Ca. Rptr. 233. (Aragon-Haas), 
TCI argues that we are obliged to accept its proffered interpretation of the 
exclusion for purposes of assessing Peerless's demurrer, (fn omitted) As the 
nonconformity exclusion is not ambiguous, we reject TCI's contention. 
Total Calllnt'l, 181 Cal.App.4th at 172-173. As one can see, the foregoing cases and the 
courts' analyses of Exclusion "g" are persuasive and show that in the present case, the 
Underlying Plaintiffs' claims rely entirely on the allegation that Akavar 20/50 "[did] not 
live up to the promise o f being able to eat everything and still lose weight. Thus 
coverage for the claims is precluded under Exclusion "g." 
5. Exclusion "g" Can Only Bar Indemnity But Not Defense 
Basic Research claims that Exclusion "g" only operates to bar the duty to 
indemnify and not the duty to defend because ultimately Plaintiffs may not be able to 
prove their claim that Akavar 20/50 fails to conform to the advertised statements of 
quality and performance. See Basic Research's Initial Memorandum at 23. Basic 
Research ignores a fundamental tenet of insurance law, that the duty to defend is 
determined by a comparison of the allegations of the complaint, if proven true, with the 
insurance policy. If the allegations fall within a policy exclusion, there is no duty to 
defend. See Deseret Fed. Co., 714 P.2d at 1147 (Utah 1986) ("Conversely, where there 
is no potential liability [due to the fact that the allegations fall within the scope of an 
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Pursuant to Rule 201 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, ("Plaintiffs")1 respectfully request 
that the Court take judicial notice of the "Memorandum Decision And Order Granting Plaintiffs' 
Motion For Approval Of Nationwide Class Notice Program And Denying Defendants' Motion 
For Stay" (the "Order"), entered on March 2, 2011 (the "Miller suit").2 A copy of the Order is 
attached as Exhibit "27." Judicial notice of orders entered in courts is appropriate3 and is 
particularly appropriate here to refute Admiral's argument that the remedies sought by the Miller 
suit plaintiff class are restitutionary in character rather than damages4 - an argument Admiral 
first raised at oral argument. 
Plaintiffs had no prior opportunity or ability to bring this Order to this Court's attention.5 
The Order should be considered by this Court in connection with Plaintiffs' pending Motion For 
Partial summary Judgment on the same grounds asserted by Admiral in support of its March 21, 
2011 "Notice of Supplemental Authority" in opposition to Plaintiffs Motion. 
As now defined by the Miller Court, the Miller class includes all persons who purchased 
Akavar after seeing or hearing the "advertisement" at issue in this insurance coverage lawsuit 
lBasic Research, LLC; Dynakor Pharmacal, LLC; The Carter-Reed Company, LLC; PC MGMT, 
Inc.; Joseph Bode; Sheila Erickson; Dennis Gay; Daniel B. Mowrey; Mitchell K. Friedlander; 
and Zoller Laboratories, LLC. 
1
 Pamela Miller, et al v. Basic Research LLC, et al9 United States District Court, District of 
Utah, Case No. 2:07-CV-871 TS. 
3State ex rel A.S., 2008 UT App. 71, 2008 WL 601267, at *2 (Utah Ct. App. March 6, 2008) 
(court may take judicial notice of "legal documents . . . generated through court 
proceedings "). 
* Limelight Productions, Inc. v. Limelite Studios, 60 F.3d 767, 769 (11th Cir. (Fla.) 1995) held 
that measuring a plaintiffs monetary remedy as the amount of defendant's profits from alleged 
wrongdoing (in Limelight, for trademark infringement; here, for false advertising) does not 
change the remedy's character from "damages" to "restitution." Limelight's logic is 
underscored here because any damages that ultimately may be awarded to the Miller plaintiff 
class would not be measured by adding up the individualized amounts paid by each class 
member for Akavar. The Miller complaint's damage claims (Exhibit "3," p. 54) are not so 
limited. 
5The Order was entered on March 2, 2011 - the same date on which (pursuant to this Court's 
order entered February 18, 2011) Plaintiffs and Defendant Admiral Insurance Company 
("Admiral") filed their moving, opposition and reply papers in support of and in opposition to 
Plaintiffs' Motion For Partial Summary Judgment which was argued herein on March 24,2011. 
1 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
now before this Court, without regard to whether or not they lost weight, and whose injury would 
depend on the content of the first "advertisement."6 
Contrary to Admiral's arguments at the March 24, 2011 hearing of Plaintiffs' motion, 
whether a person used Akavar but did not lose weight is irrelevant to whether that person is a 
member of the class as defined by the Miller Court. Although persons who claim that they 
purchased and used Akavar but failed to lose weight are members of the Miller class if, but only 
if they heard or saw the slogan "eat all you want and still lose weight" before purchasing the 
product, the Miller class as defined by the Miller Court also includes persons who purchased 
Akavar and lost weight, so long as they saw or heard the "eat all you want and still lose weight" 
slogan before purchasing the product.7 
Admiral abandoned its argument that the "f. use of another's advertising idea in your 
'advertisement'" offense could never encompass false/misleading advertising claims8 at oral 
argument. Yet it urges that these claims must be limited to allegations analogous to trademark 
infringement9 or breach of warranty,10 thereby assuring that coverage (f) would be eviscerated by 
express policy exclusions, rendering its coverage illusory and contrary to settled law, rejecting 
analogous arguments.11 Admiral's policy construction "rests on an overly restrictive reading of 
At page 2 of the Order, the Miller Court defined the certified plaintiff class in the underlying 
Miller class action lawsuit as: "Persons who purchased Akavar after seeing or hearing the 
marketing slogan: 'Eat all you want and still lose weight' during the relevant damages period." 
[Emphasis added.] 
7Nowhere in the Miller First Amended Complaint do the Miller plaintiffs allege that the Akavar 
product is completely ineffective for causing weight loss, or that all of the members of the class 
used the product and did not lose weight. Whether a consumer "used" Akavar is irrelevant to 
whether he or she is a member of the class defined by the Miller Court. 
8Admiral's Opposition/Summary Judgment Motion [Docket 51 in District Court action, filed 
Aug. 9,2010 ("Admiral OppVMSJ")], p. 34 and n. 12. 
9Admiral Opp./MSJ, p. 39. 
l0Id. at p. 44. 
11McCormack Baron Mgmt. Servs., Inc. v. American Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., 989 S.W.2d 168, 
171-72 (Mo. 1999). 
2 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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the complaint"12 and is at odds with settled Utah law.13 
The monetary damages sought by the Miller plaintiff class are alleged to be owed 
because the class members allegedly saw or heard advertisements before purchasing the product 
- not because they tried the product and it allegedly did not work.14 
Miller's Sixth Cause of Action seeks monetary damages, not restitution, under the Utah 
Consumer Sales Practices Act (U.C.A. §13-11-1 et seq.).15 These provisions mean a single 
consumer may seek "actual damages"16 and "money damages" in a class action,17 as here. 
Dated: March 28, 2011 
MANNING, CURTIS, BRADSHAW & GAUNTLETT & ASSOCIATES 
BEDNAR L L C _ ^ ^ y David A. Gauntlett 
By: &£<^ ~ AndteW M'SuSSman 
Alan C. Bradshaw 
Aaron C. Garrett 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs, 
Basic Research, LLC; Dynakor Pharmacal, LLC; The Carter-Reed Company, LLC; PC MGMT, 
Inc.; Joseph Bode; Sheila Erickson; Dennis Gay; Daniel B. Mowrey; Mitchell K. Friedlander; 
and Zoller Laboratories, LLC 
uMichael Taylor Designs, Inc. v. Travelers Prop. Cas. Co. of Am., F. Supp. 2d , 2011 
WL 221658, at *6 (N.D. Cal. (S.F. Div.) 2011). 
^Harris v. Zurich Holding Co. of Am., Wo. 2:05-CV-482 TC, 2006 WL 120258, at *2 (D. Utah 
Jan. 17,2006) (" c[T]he insured need only show that the underlying claim may fall within policy 
coverage; the insurer must prove that it cannot' "). 
l4See Miller suit's First Amended Class Action Complaint (Exhibit "3" to Plaintiffs' Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment herein), Prayer For Relief, pp. 53-54, f "F" ("On the Sixth Cause of 
Action, against Defendants jointly and severally, in an amount equal to actual damages suffered 
by Plaintiffs and members of the Class as proven at trial plus interest "). 
15U.C.A. § 13-ll-19(4)(a) ("A consumer who suffers a loss as a result of a violation of this 
chapter may bring a class action for the actual damages caused by an act or practice specified 
as violating this chapter " (emphasis added)). 
l6Andreason v. Felsted, 137 P.3d 1,4 (Utah Ct. App. 2006) ("Under... 13-11-19 . . . a consumer 
who is able to prove actual damages . . . also proves that he has suffered a loss and . . . entitled 
to recover the value of his 'actual damages or $2,000, whichever is greater.' " (emphasis added)). 
X1
 Miller v. Corinthian Colleges, Inc., No. 2:10-CV-999 TS, 2011 WL 652478 (D. Utah Feb. 15, 
2011) ("Plaintiffs' claims for money damages may also be cognizable under the class action 
provision of the Act." (emphasis added)). 
3 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Pamela MILLER; Randy Howard; and Donna Patterson; on behalf of 
themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, 
v. 
BASIC RESEARCH, LLC; Dynakor Pharmacal, LLC; Western 
Holdings, LLC; Dennis Gay; Daniel B. Mowrey, Ph.D; Mitchell K. 
Friedlander; and Does l through 50, Defendants. 
No. 2:07-CV-87i TS. March 2.201 x. 
Opinion 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR 
APPROVAL OF NATIONWIDE C U S S NOTICE PROGRAM AND DENYING 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR STAY 
TED STEWART, District Judge. 
*1 Before the Court is Plaintiffs Pamela Miller, Randy Howard, and Donna Patterson's 
("Plaintiffs") Motion for Approval of Nationwide Class Notice Program1 and Defendants 
Basic Research, LLC, Dynakor Pharmacal, LLC, Dennis Gray, Daneii B. Morey, and 
Mitchell K. Friedlander's (collectively, "Basic Research" or "Defendants") Motion to 
Stay.2 A hearing was held on these Motions on February 28,2011. The Court took the 
Motions under advisement and now enters the following Order. 
I. MOTION FOR APPROVAL OF CLASS NOTICE 
On September 2,2010, in the Court's Order certifying the class in this action, the Court 
"ORDERED that the parties meet and confer regarding notice and submit a proposed 
order within 60 days."3 Although the parties met and conferred as ordered, the parties 
were unable to come to an agreement as to how to notify the class. On November 12, 
2010, Plaintiff submitted to the Court the present Motion for Approval of Nationwide 
Class Notice Program, which seeks approval of Plaintiffs' proposed class notice 
program over Basic Research's objections. 
Plaintiffs' proposed notice plan is allegedly based on the class definition provided by the 
Court in its September 2,2010 Order, where the Court held that the class shall comprise 
-those persons who purchased Akdvar in reliance of the slogan 'Eat ail you want and 
still lose weight.' "4 In Plaintiffs' proposed notice, under the heading of "Who is 
Included?", the notice states: "The Court decided that the Class includes: Everyone who 
purchased Akdvar after seeing the marketing slogan 'Eat all you want and still iose 
weight.'"* Plaintiffs' notice plan proposes to disseminate this notice via the internet, 
radio, print, and television. 
In Basic Research's opposition to this Motion, Basic Research notes that its objection 
stems not from the proposed notice plan per se, but rather this Court's definition of the 
certified class. Basic Research argues that the inclusion of the word 'reliance" in the 
class definition renders it unworkable. As Basic Research explains, since a notified 
individual's class membership (s generally presumed unless the notified Individual opts-
out, determining reliance at the class membership stage would necessarily rely upon 
either this Court making an individual assessment as to class membership, or leaving to 
the individual the determination of reliance before opting-out 
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Basic Research's concerns were echoed by Judge Hartz of the Tenth Circuit, who 
noted in dissent of the Tenth Circuit's denial of Defendants' Petition for Panel 
Rehearing: 
It seems to me that there is a class-action issue in this case that should be explored 
on an interlocutory appeal. The district court's definition of the class is peculiar. The 
court's order granting certification of the class defines the class as "limited to those 
persons who purchased Akavar in reliance on the slogan 'Eat all you want and still 
lose weight.'" This is not the definition sought by Plaintiffs. They sought a class 
defined as "All persons in the United States who purchased, for consumption and not 
for resale or assignment, Akavar 50/50 from a retail sales establishment directly from 
Defendants, or from a website controlled or operated by Defendants." They made 
good arguments justifying such a class, and it is not clear to me why the district court 
rejected that definition of the class and chose what it did. Indeed, the court said it 
would leave the issues of Individual reliance for determination during the damages 
stage of the case If Plaintiffs established a violation during the class proceedings. But 
there would be no need to establish.individual reliance for members of the class if one 
had to prove reliance even to be a member of the class.5 
*2 Of course, Basic Research is careful not to endorse Judge Hartz's proposal to 
reconsider Plaintiffs' broader class definition. Instead, Basic Research merely 
suggested that the issue be discussed at a hearing. 
Prior to the February 28,2011 hearing, the Court ordered that the parties come 
prepared to propose alternate definitions to the certified class at the February 28,2011 
hearing. At the hearing, Plaintiffs renewed their request for the broader definition it 
initially requested in its motion for class certification. Basic Research declined to 
provide a specific alternative for the Court to consider. Instead, Basic Research 
requested the Court de-certify the class. 
After reviewing the parties' respective arguments, Judge Hartz's dissent, and the case 
law concerning class definition and notificatbn, the Court finds it necessary to modify its 
definition of the class. By including the word "reliance" in the class definition, the Court 
inadvertently created an ascertainability issue that it previously did not anticipate. In its 
own review of the case law, the Court finds the class definition provided by In re New 
England Mutual Life Insurance Company Sales Practices Litigation instructive and 
persuasive.7 There, the district court faced claims by various Plaintiffs that the New 
England Life Insurance Company had used deceptive and manipulative sales tactics to 
encourage new and existing policyholders to purchase certain life insurance products. 
Like the present action, the plaintiffs argued that the class should be defined as all 
purchasers during the relevant damage period,6 while the defendant argued, among 
other things, that a class should not be certified because of the need for individualized 
findings of reliance.9 After considering several class definitions, the court decided to 
certify a class of persons who were "presented" with the allegedly deceptive and 
manipulative Information and purchased certain life Insurance products thereafter ,1.° 
The court found that this avoided the overly broad definition proposed by the plaintiffs, 
while avoiding the defendants concerns regarding reliance at the class notification 
stage. 
The Court finds this reasoning instructive and applicable to the instant dispute. The 
Court therefore modifies its definition of the certified class to the following: 
Persons who purchased Ak&var after seeing or hearing the marketing slogan 'Eat all 
you want and still lose weight' during the relevant damages period. 
In reviewing Plaintiffs' proposed class notification, the Court notes that Plaintiffs have 
presented several variations of this language, including "if you purchased AkSvar either 
partially or wholly because of the slogan 'Eat all you want and still lose weight,' you are 
a member of the Class."11 Now that the Court has modified its definition, the Court 
expects all such references to the class definition in the class notification to conform to 
the specific language presented by the Court 
1-—.//„ _ v * w * c t w mm/Document/I5e6fcb474b701 Ie08ac6a0el 1 ld7a898A^iew/FullTe.., 3/25/2011 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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*3 The Court, therefore, approves Plaintiffs' class notification program-with the above 
stated modifications-and will grant Plaintiffs' Motion. 
H. MOTION TO STAY 
Basic Research moves the Court to stay these proceedings pending the outcome of an 
enforcement action which the Federal Trade Commission f FTC) has filed against 
Basic Research, captioned United States v. Basic Research, LLC et al.t Case No. 
2:09-CV-972 DB (the "FTC Action"). 
A. LEGAL STANDARD 
As this Court has set forth previously,,2 the Court has inherent power to grant a stay 
pending the result of other proceedings.13 The Supreme Court has described this power 
as "incidental to the power Inherent in every court to control the disposition of the 
causes on its docket with economy of time and effort for itself, for counsel, and for 
litigants."14 To make this determination "calls for the exercise of judgment, which must 
weigh competing interests and maintain an even balance."15 'Factors relevant to the 
court's decision are: (1) whether a stay would promote judicial economy; (2) whether a 
stay would avoid confusion and inconsistent results; and (3) whether a stay would 
unduly prejudice the parties or create undue hardship."1B 
The party seeking a Landis stay carries a heavy burden: 
[A party seeking] a stay must make out a dear case of hardship or 
Inequity in being required to go forward, If there is even a fair possibility 
that the stay for which he prays will work damage to some one else. 
Only in rare circumstances will a litigant In one cause be compelled to 
stand aside while a litigant in another settles the rule of law that will 
define the rights of both.17 
B. RELEVANT BACKGROUND 
In 2006, the FTC and Basic Research entered into a global settlement that resolved an 
administrative action filed against Basic Research by the FTC and a 2004 lawsuit filed 
in this District by a Basic Research entity challenging aspects of the FTC's scientific 
substantiation standards for advertising claims. As part of this settlement, the FTC and 
Basic Research entered into a Consent Agreement containing a provision that Basic 
Research alleges explicitly permits Basic Research to make weight-loss and fat-loss 
claims in its advertisements, so long as Basic Research has "competent and reliable 
scientific evidence" for such claims. 
In September of 2006, Basic Research provided copies of advertisements for certain of 
Its products, including AkSvar 20/50 at issue in this case, along with scientific 
substantiation supporting its advertisement claims for these products. Basic Research 
alleges that over the next two years, it and the FTC engaged In extensive discussions 
concerning these materials. 
In 2009, Basic Research brought a declaratory action against the FTC in this Court 
captioned Basic Research, LLC, et al. v. Federal Trade Commission, et §L, Case No. 
2:09-CV-779 CW. Two months later, the FTC filed in this Court the FTC Action against 
Basic Research. Basic Research alleges that the FTC action challenges the adequacy 
of the scientific substantiation Basic Research possesses in support of its advertising 
claims for AkSvar. Basic Research has moved to consolidate these cases and the 
motion is currently under advisement with Judge Waddoups of this Court. 
C . SUMMARY OF PARTIES5 ARGUMENTS 
M Basic Research argues the present action should be stayed pending resolution of 
the FTC Action. Basic Research argues that all three of the factors typically weighed by 
courts in determining a stay weigh in its favor. 
1, Judicial Efficiency 
As to judicial efficiency, Basic Research argues that the FTC litigation will necessarily 
resolve a key issue in this case. Here, in certifying the class, the Court noted that "the 
existence of a sufficient scientific basis [for Basic Research's advertisements] is a 
dispositive issue, a determination on that Issue will resolve one way or another all of 
https://a.nextwestlaw.com/Document/I5e6fcb474b701 Ie08ac6a0el 1 ld7a898/View/FullTe... 3/25/2011 1 
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Plaintiffs' claims,"18 Basic Research alleges that the FTC litigation will address this 
very issue-namely, the interpretation of the "competent and reliable scientific evidence" 
term from the Consent Agreement and whether Basis Research had such reliable 
scientific evidence to substantiate its advertising claims for AkSvar. 
Basic Research argues that staying this case while the FTC Action resolves these 
Issues will reduce unnecessary duplicative discovery requests, duplicative dispositive 
motions, and avoid wasting scarce judicial resources. 
Plaintiffs argue that requiring Basic Research to defend a suit, in and of itself, is 
insufficient to warrant a stay.t9 Moreover, Plaintiffs note that Defendants are still 
proceeding in two cases related to the FTC Action concerning another Basic Research 
product, Relacore.20 Thus, Plaintiffs argue that there Is no hardship on Defendants in 
proceeding on the merits in this case as well. 
2. Risk of Inconsistent Result* and/or Conclusions 
Basic Research argues that as the issue of whether Basic Research had adequate 
science to substantiate Its advertising claims is a dispositive issue in both cases, 
proceeding with this action raises a significant risk of inconsistent or contradictory 
rulings. 
Plaintiffs argue that any risk of Inconsistent rulings is overstated by Basic Research. 
Plaintiffs assert that any ruling in the FTC Action will have no preclusive effect in the 
present matter. Moreover, Plaintiffs argue that its claims here-RiCO, UPUAA, and state 
consumer fraud-are distinct from the claims involved in the FTC Action-the FTC Act and 
the Consent Decree. Thus, Plaintiffs argue that Basic Research couid prevail in the 
FTC Action yet still be found liable here. 
3. Prejudice to the Parties 
Basic Research further argues that Plaintiffs will not be harmed by a stay of these 
proceedings. Basic Research asserts that should the FTC prevail in the FTC Action, 
Plaintiffs will likely be entitled to the benefit of that ruling here. On the other hand, if 
Basic Research prevails, then there is no violation of the Consent Agreement and 
Plaintiffs are spared the effort of proceeding on the merits with their claims. Basic 
Research also notes that the FTC seeks the same injunctive relief in the FTC Action as 
Plaintiffs do in the present action. 
Finally, Basic Research notes that delay of these proceedings will not prejudice 
Plaintiffs. Basic Research notes that it is under a continuing obligation to preserve 
documents, therefore Plaintiffs' discovery efforts will not be harmed. Further, Basic 
Research alleges that the evidence in this matter Is largely documentary, so there is 
little danger that Plaintiffs' case wiil be harmed by faded memories. 
*5 Plaintiffs argue that Basic Research has severely understated the prejudice running 
to Plaintiffs in the event the Court awards the requested stay. Plaintiffs note that this 
case has already been proceeding for nearly three years, and predates the FTC Action 
by nearly two years. Plaintiffs argue that a stay would delay for years the prosecution of 
Plaintiffs' claims, including Plaintiffs' request for injunctive relief. Related to this concern. 
Plaintiffs argue that a stay would prevent Plaintiffs from conducting discovery on this 
matter, which raises a risk that witnesses' memories may fade or otherwise become 
unavailable and evidence may be lost. Moreover, Plaintiffs argue that a stay of these 
proceedings may eliminate its ability to recover on its claims should it prevail in this 
litigation. 
D. DISCUSSION 
In weighing the above stated arguments, the Court finds that Basic Research has failed 
to carry its heavy burden of justifying a stay. Although simultaneously pursuing litigation 
related to the same subject is inconvenient, this hardship does not outweigh the severe 
prejudice to Plaintiffs' claims in staying these proceedings. Plaintiffs' ability to gather 
evidence would be limited, If not eviscerated, by a stay of these proceedings. During the 
time the proposed stay would be in effect, there remains a high risk that evidence will be 
jost and witnesses' memories wiil fade or they may become unavailable. This risk is 
magnified by the fact that the FTC Action is in its early stages, and may take years to 
resolve. 
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Additionally, any supposed benefit of awaiting the outcome of the FTC Action is 
marginal at best. Even if Basic Research prevails In the FTC Action, Plaintiffs could still 
proceed on their claims because the FTC Action would likely have no preclusive effect 
upon Plaintiffs. And even If the FTC prevails in the FTC Action, whether that decision 
would have preclusive effect against Basic Research in this action is a question of law 
which need not be decided at this juncture. Thus, Basic Research's requested stay 
would require Plaintiffs to stand idle on their claims for years, based on the mere 
possibility that a decision against Basic Research could be used preclusively in this 
action. Such a possibility is Insufficient to warrant a stay in these circumstances. 
The Court, therefore, finds the requested stay unwarranted and will deny Basic 
Research's Motion to Stay. 
III. CONCLUSION 
It is therefore 
ORDERED that Plaintiffs' Motion for Approval of Nationwide Class Notice Program 
(Docket No. 158) is GRANTED. It is further 
ORDERED that Defendants' Motion to Stay (Docket No. 166) is DENIED. 
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